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his is a work about po liti cal reconciliation, about the need and 
challenges of reconciling after severe po liti cal violence. I be-
came interested in this subject while living in South America as 
a child and seeing fi rsthand the diffi culties of engaging with a fraught 
past. Many years of thinking about these issues led me to graduate 
school, culminating in a doctoral dissertation on which this book is 
loosely based. I would like to thank Nancy Fraser and Courtney Jung, 
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importance of retaining the connection between normative theory and 
practical politics in my work. Matthew Goldfeder read the text with 
care and pressed me on a number of points, making the argument more 
coherent than it otherwise would have been. His patience with my 
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he past one hundred years witnessed the highest number of po-
liti cal deaths of any century (Rummel 1997). Two major wars, 
numerous civil confl icts and wars of in de pen dence, and sys-
tematic state- sponsored atrocities have left behind a battered po liti cal 
landscape. The genocide of Jews, Roma, Armenians, Ibos, Tutsi, Hutu in 
Burundi, Bengalis, Khmer, the Aché (Paraguay), Guatemalans, Timorese, 
Bosnian Muslims, southern Sudanese, and Herero and repression, mass 
terror, and murder in places as disparate as Chile, Argentina, South 
Africa, Romania, Uganda, China, and Iran illustrate the heteroge-
neous nature of po liti cal violence of the past century but do not by any 
means exhaust its range and depth. Certainly, a century characterized 
by massacre and torture is not unique in human history, and there is 
little reason to believe that the twenty- fi rst will be much different. Al-
though the instruments of violence today may be more sophisticated 
and the ideologies behind them different from before (and even this is 
not always the case), horrifi c violence has long been with us (Kiernan 
2007). Nevertheless, what is remarkable are the numerous recent ef-
forts at publicly engaging past atrocities, often through new legal 
mechanisms but also through a multiplicity of other po liti cal and social 
strategies, with the aim of reconciling former enemies while simulta-
neously addressing accountability, truth telling, and the concerns of 
2 ▪ Chapter 1
victims. As Martha Minow has eloquently written, these legal and 
quasi- legal attempts to identify perpetrators and cata logue crimes have 
“illuminated the hopes and commitments of individuals and societies 
seeking, above all, some rejoinder to the unspeakable destruction and 
degradation of human beings” (1998, 1).
Po liti cal violence does not end with the last death, however. A 
common feature of mass murder has been the attempt at destroying 
any memory of victims, with the aim of eliminating them from history. 
In the Holocaust, the Aghed (genocide of the Armenians), the Cambo-
dian genocide, the Rape of Nanking, the Rwandan genocide, the Gulag 
and the Laogai, the tortures and murders of leftists in the Southern 
Cone, and the rule of apartheid, among many others, perpetrators 
sought not only to eliminate violently a perceived threat but also to 
eradicate any possibility of alternate, competing social and national 
histories.
Surprisingly, in some countries complex and diffi cult engagements 
with the past have resulted in remarkable transformations of society. 
South Africa, Argentina, Chile, and a united Germany are all signifi -
cantly more demo cratic and open than before. In other places, such as 
Cambodia and Rwanda, peace and stability are the most that can be 
hoped for, at least in the near term. However, all of these societies have 
had to confront a complicated tangle of questions: How should perpe-
trators, victims, and bystanders be faced? What is the proper balance 
between punishment and forgiveness? How much memory is too much, 
and when is it too little? What does it mean to be reconciled with the 
past and with each other, and how should this be achieved? What, in 
other words, are the stakes in reconciling? These and similar concerns 
occupy a central place in societies emerging from massive violence. 
This book seeks to contribute to these debates by sketching a norma-
tive theory of reconciliation that differs from prevailing approaches.
The diffi culty in articulating such a theory fi nds an echo in Max 
Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation” (1958). There, Weber distin-
guished between two different ethical systems in the po liti cal world: 
the ethic of ultimate ends, which is committed to the attainment of 
certain ideals regardless of consequences, and the ethic of responsibil-
ity, which recognizes that one’s conduct must be guided by what is 
possible in the real world, with all of the limitations that this entails. In 
the end, Weber was distraught about these alternatives, concluding 
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that the former ran the risk of degenerating into the belief that the 
ends justify the means— giving us Auschwitz and revolutionary fi ring 
squads— and the latter could always be tempted into one more com-
promise, ultimately condemning action to a series of half steps evacu-
ated of any meaningful content. Something similar haunts any attempt 
at formulating a model of reconciliation. On one hand, one risks pro-
moting a pure ideal that is unattainable without signifi cantly more 
 violence being done in its wake; take, for example, calls for swift and 
severe retribution for all human rights violators and their accomplices. 
Though accountability is desirable as a moral goal— there is, after all, 
great satisfaction in seeing perpetrators held responsible for gross 
violations— seeking absolute justice can quickly turn into its own ter-
ror. And yet a model that too easily seeks compromise in po liti cally 
delicate situations can serve as a mere apology for perpetrators, in the 
pro cess forfeiting any meaningful claim it may make to promoting rec-
onciliation. This book seeks to navigate this Scylla and Charybdis by 
recognizing that reconciliation is a complex, multileveled pro cess that 
is best understood as disjunctured and uneven, with multiple moral 
claims often in competition with one another. Rather than posit a 
model, on one hand, equating reconciliation with social harmony be-
tween former enemies or, on the other, as a condition of minimal 
peace with no exploration of past injustices, I outline a conception that 
emphasizes the importance of shared notions of moral respect and 
tolerance among erstwhile adversaries as a realistic and morally defen-
sible idea of what we should expect in transitional societies. Reconcili-
ation, I argue, refers to a condition of mutual respect among former 
enemies, which requires the reciprocal recognition of the moral worth 
and dignity of others. It is achieved when previous, confl ict- era iden-
tities no longer operate as the primary cleavages in politics, and thus 
citizens acquire new identities that cut across those earlier fault lines. 
This model is normative— it stipulates certain moral criteria that are 
necessary for a society to be reconciled while also recognizing that the 
dynamics of reconciliation are manifested in different ways depending 
on what dimension of society one analyzes. That is to say, the dynamics 
of reconciliation among po liti cal elites are different from those among 
regular individuals in the private sphere, and the requirements of in-
stitutional reform contain certain normative imperatives that differ 
from the demands and expectations that can be placed on civil society. 
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These different social levels— political society, civil society, institutional, 
and individual— draw our attention to the myriad ways in which rec-
onciliatory efforts are manifested and develop.
This book is a work of normative po liti cal theory. It seeks to make 
a contribution to current po liti cal theory debates about how best to 
envision reconciliation while remaining realistic about the very sig-
nifi cant practical obstacles such efforts face. A number of important 
recent works have limited their focus to the institutional or adminis-
trative policies of transitional justice (such as the use of trials, truth 
commissions, or reparations) while eschewing broader theoretical ex-
plorations of reconciliation (Drumbl 2007; Elster 2004; Freeman 2006; 
Torpey 2006). Others have focused on comparative analyses of transi-
tions, highlighting the practical challenges faced by incoming elites 
Barahona de Brito 2001; McAdams 2001). Many of these texts discuss 
reconciliation to some extent, but only in the context of broader tran-
sitional justice policies without elaborating normative understandings 
of reconciliation as such. Indeed, there has been a remarkably small 
amount of sustained theoretical work written on reconciliation, and 
much of this has been a critique of the concept rather than a positive 
formulation of its normative foundations.1 I hope to contribute to these 
normative debates by sketching a viable theory. While I draw heavily 
from cases, I do not pursue a comparative case studies approach per se 
nor offer policy prescriptions or recommendations. Instead, I identify 
the moral claims and counterclaims that arise in transitional settings 
and explore how they may reinforce (and often work against) one an-
other. Nevertheless, I strongly believe that any normative model must 
remain sensitive to the particularities and contexts of specifi c 
transitions— the type of transition, the outlay of different po liti cal and 
social forces, and the likelihood of the resumption of violence— or it will 
condemn itself to clever but ultimately useless theorizing. I have at-
tempted, then, to outline a model that shows sensitivity to particularity 
while also considering the normative claims that seem to emerge across 
cases. Rather than provide a general, transhistorical model of recon-
ciliation, I restrict my project to cases that share certain features, thus 
excluding other instances of dealing with past violence that face some-
what different challenges. In subsequent sections, I detail the pa ram-
e ters and normative concepts that are at the core of my model, but 
before doing so, I outline the scope of the model— what kinds of cases it 
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intends to cover and what kinds it does not— in order to clarify its do-
main of applicability.
Scope of the Theory
The literature on transitional justice and historical memory is vast, 
and the types of transitions and po liti cal contexts are suffi ciently varied 
that one should be hesitant to offer a nomothetic model of reconcilia-
tion that would satisfactorily operate in every instance. Indeed, I be-
lieve that this is not possible. My model is intended to be useful in 
certain kinds of cases: those of extreme domestic po liti cal violence 
where the opposing sides are not territorially separate. In this section I 
demarcate the bounds of the theory and indicate what falls inside and 
outside its scope.
Under certain circumstances, partition may be a more just solution 
than forcing enemies to live together. Biafra, East Timor, Western 
Sahara, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), and Chechnya are all cases where 
separation is more desirable than forced integration. This is because of, 
among other things, the form of po liti cal identity involved: Where the 
opponents can be distinguished principally by territory, rather than by 
non- territorial religious, linguistic, ethnic, or other affi liation, parti-
tion may very well be the optimal solution. Of course, non- territorial 
categorizations are often interwoven with territorial distinctions 
as well, but the salience of territoriality plays a crucial role in assessing 
what options are available (Brilmayer 1991; Lehning 1998). In cases 
where opponents occupy different territories within a larger po liti cal 
community and one group actively oppresses the other, reconciliation 
following po liti cal violence may not be the most desirable solution, 
particularly if the oppressed overwhelmingly seek in de pen dence and 
have little chance of achieving satisfactory po liti cal and economic pro-
tections in the status quo. Thus, the attempt at secession by the Ibo 
during the Biafran War and the successful separation by the Bangla-
deshis during their war with Pakistan would both appear legitimate 
(Harneit- Sievers and Emezue 2000; Ikpeze 2000; Kuper 1981), as 
would the division of East and West Timor (J. Taylor 1999). This is not, 
of course, to sanction ethnic cleansing, but only to underscore that in 
situations where the oppressed group is (1) territorially distinct from 
the oppressor and has little chance of achieving parity and (2) seeks 
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separation, then reconciliation as discussed in this book would require 
forcing two (or more) groups to remain together that should be permit-
ted to separate. However, in situations where the opponents are not 
territorially distinct, separation is not an alternative, and some form of 
reconciling enemies remains the only option. The violence in Chile in 
the 1970s and 1980s occurred between groups that cannot be sepa-
rated by territory; leftists and rightists exist throughout the country, 
and therefore separation makes no sense. A careful reading of the 
wars in the former Yugo slavia reveals a great deal of pre- confl ict eth-
nic interpenetration and cohabitation as well, and thus separation was 
achieved only through massive bloodletting; present- day Iraq is also 
characterized by signifi cant ethnic and religious overlap (Burg and 
Shoup 2000; Gagnon 2005).
Wherever the po liti cally salient identities are not territorially 
based, reconciliation is the only viable solution. What exactly is po liti-
cally salient depends on the par tic u lar case: It could be religious, eth-
nic, class, or something  else (indeed, it is almost always a combination 
of these), and the relevance of any set of distinctions is always open to 
change over time, giving credence to the social constructivist’s under-
standing of identity formation (Jung 2000). In any case, the model 
proposed  here is relevant only where po liti cally salient ascriptions do 
not neatly square with territorially salient distinctions; where they do, 
an alternative solution such as partition may be more desirable (though 
some form of reconciliation may be necessary in those cases as well). To 
paraphrase Hirschman (1970), I assume that “exit” is not an option.
Colonialism
In cases where the colonialist and the colonized are territorially sepa-
rate, the model presented  here is inapplicable. Thus, the Japa nese use 
of Korean sex slaves and the Rape of Nanking are not directly relevant 
to my framework and the specifi c debate I engage  here. These cases 
require an additional theoretical analysis of the complex relations be-
tween the society that perpetrated atrocities and the one that suffered 
them.
Where the colonized and colonizer do live in the same po liti cal 
territory, the model  here may be relevant. The indigenous- colonialist 
relationships in Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
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make interesting candidates for this study, precisely because (the de-
scendants of) the perpetrators and victims must live together. In these 
situations, there is no “exit.” Nevertheless, these are all historical cases, 
where the primary means of reconciliation occurs through a reassess-
ment of historical memory, and the po liti cal order is not in danger of 
collapse because of renewed attention to historical grievances. I focus, 
however, on contemporary instances of mass atrocity and reconcilia-
tion where actual perpetrators and victims are still alive, the po liti cal 
order is not well entrenched, and renewed violence remains a possibil-
ity. So- called “consolidated democracies” normally do not face the 
same dangers as societies in transition to democracy, though they cer-
tainly have a moral obligation to refl ect on past atrocities and their 
consequences. Regardless, the challenges facing those societies are 
temporally distinct from the focus of this study, requiring an investiga-
tion of the historical legacy of violence and its relation to contemporary 
life (Barkan 2000; Waldron 1992). This project focuses on reconcilia-
tion in societies that have undergone recent large- scale po liti cal vio-
lence where opposing sides drew their identities along non- territorial 
fault lines.
Why Not Forget?
Before turning to different theoretical models of reconciliation, I 
should say something about one contending alternative: societal for-
getfulness as a means of “moving on.” The rise in the use of truth com-
missions gives the impression that engaging the past is necessary after 
mass violence and that ignoring it is morally wrong. Some scholars cite 
an “emerging norm of right to the truth” in international law,2 and in-
ternational human rights organizations claim there is an obligation on 
the state to unearth the past, with no exceptions.3 But these arguments 
are themselves contentious, and we should fi rst inquire whether for-
getfulness may indeed be a legitimate, and possibly better, alternative 
to the reconciliatory efforts I discuss in this book.
Defenders of forgetting the past argue that to look backward will 
only re- traumatize a fragile society. Demanding prosecutions and en-
couraging victims to talk about their experiences will not contribute to 
reconciliation, but only rekindle the embers of animosity and anger. 
Reexamining past grievances does little but prolong bitterness and 
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antagonism, preventing a society from moving forward.4 As such, what-
ever cathartic benefi ts for victims may come from truth commissions, 
trials, or memorials, the likelihood of renewed violence outweighs 
them. Bruce Ackerman sees these efforts as wasting “moral capital in 
an ineffectual effort to right past wrongs— creating martyrs and fos-
tering po liti cal alienation, rather than contributing to a genuine sense 
of vindication.” “Moral capital” should be used to educate the people 
on the rule of law, rather than pursuing a “quixotic quest after the mi-
rage of corrective justice” (1992, 72). Though not a supporter of forget-
fulness, Michael Ignatieff questions the likelihood that “when the 
truth is known by all, it has a capacity to heal and reconcile. These are 
not so much epistemological assumptions as articles of faith about 
 human nature: that the truth is one and, if we know it, it will make us 
free” (1998, 170). Many contemporary scholars remain skeptical of the 
benefi ts of revisiting the past. These arguments assume that fragile 
societies must privilege the practical needs of the present over moral-
ity. Peaceful coexistence requires burying the past.
But if forgetting requires burying awful experiences and behaving 
as if nothing had happened, what kind of reconciliation is this? Who is 
reconciled? Without some understanding of what happened, it is diffi -
cult to see how people could be reconciled with one another— to know 
whom to reconcile with means knowing who did what and who suf-
fered what. An agreement to forget the past may bring respite from 
violence and ease a transition, but it is unlikely to remain for too long 
(Schwan 1998). In many cases where leaders have called for forgetting 
the past, public demands for the truth eventually resurface (this brings 
to mind Uruguay, Brazil, and Spain) and some historical reckoning be-
comes unavoidable.
Of course, for some, forgetting is a welcome response to the past. 
Perpetrators and their supporters are likely to encourage historical 
amnesia for self- interested reasons. Forgetting, however, is hardly apo-
liti cal or adopted freely; rather, it masks the power that perpetrators 
continue to enjoy. To expect victims to surrender their claims to moral 
ac know ledg ment constitutes a second moral injury against them, where 
their suffering is effectively excised from public consciousness and 
their experiences are disparaged as potentially disruptive to social re-
construction. Public forgetting instrumentalizes victims by signaling 
that their moral value is less important than stability and peace. It is 
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a form of degradation, and “thus it involves a kind of injury that is not 
merely tangible and sensible. It is a moral injury, and we care about 
such injuries” (Murphy 1995, 25). The demand that past crimes be 
forgotten ignores this loss of self- respect. This moral injury results 
from treating victims as if no wrong had occurred and, consequently, 
they are not entitled to make claims for moral recognition. Simultane-
ously, perpetrators feel vindicated, for forgetfulness can in fact serve to 
confer legitimacy on past policies, at the very least by signaling that 
past wrongs  were not suffi ciently awful to demand judgment. The con-
sequences can be devastating. As David Crocker remarks, “Repressed 
emotions of rage, humiliation, and fear can be expressed in uncon-
trolled and harmful ways” (1998, 496). A policy of forgetting, of course, 
is never guaranteed to “succeed,” even by crass instrumentalist terms. 
Silencing the past may only displace it to future generations, who may 
take up old grievances and return to violence. The state also loses in 
this calculus, as unaddressed violations may undermine its future le-
gitimacy in the eyes of victims’ descendants (Warren 1998).
Nevertheless, advocates argue that certain states have chosen a 
policy of forgetfulness successfully, effectively burying mutual resent-
ments and resisting calls for accountability and painful confrontations 
with their recent histories. Mozambique and Cambodia are two coun-
tries often identifi ed as successful cases. Today, Cambodia has a United 
Nations– backed hybrid tribunal to prosecute former high- level Khmer 
Rouge, and it is no longer accurate to speak of it as a case where social 
forgetting is the norm. Mozambique, however, still stands out for its 
seemingly socially sanctioned forgetfulness.
Much has been written about how Mozambique has decided to 
ignore the legacy of its civil war, creating a new moral and po liti cal 
community founded on the willful ignorance of recent history (Alden 
2001; En gland 2002; Manning 2002). After the 1992 peace agreement 
that ended sixteen years of vicious fi ghting, leaders from the two com-
batant groups Renamo and Frelimo turned to the Catholic church to 
mediate potential confl icts, and the 1994 elections went ahead without 
any major contestation occurring along war time fault lines. Boosters of 
the transition argued that it was achieved peacefully precisely because 
Mozambicans chose to renounce the past and move on (Alden 2001).
Nevertheless, though there was no explicit public engagement 
with the nation’s history— certainly not by the po liti cal elites who had 
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negotiated the cease- fi re and legal amnesty— it was not completely 
rejected either. Within civil society, villages turned back to a number 
of autochthonous mechanisms to deal with po liti cal confl ict. More 
 importantly, these  were seen as legitimate by villagers themselves, in-
cluding the survivors (Bartoli 2001). Curandeiros, or traditional heal-
ers, served as authority fi gures who could mediate communal and 
personal confl ict. Specifi cally, curandeiros played a crucial role in rein-
tegrating former soldiers who had murdered by “rehumanizing” them, 
casting off the “bad luck” that came from the victim’s spirit. The pro-
cess was complex, but the important point  here is that it included an 
implicit ac know ledg ment of guilt and sense of responsibility by the 
soldier, for otherwise the soldier would not require rehumanization. 
These rituals occurred mostly in rural areas where the majority of the 
fi ghting took place. Ser vices conducted by curandeiros served as a 
method of reconstructing badly broken social relations, allowing for 
the reintegration of erstwhile enemies into the same moral and social 
community. Through a complex series of ritualized and meaningful 
actions, former opponents— on occasion from the same town or even 
family— were invited to live together as equals (Nordstrom 1997). 
Writes Rama Mani:
The traditional belief is that harm is done not just to the individ-
ual involved— victim or perpetrator— but to the entire family 
or community. Consequently, reconciliation and reintegration 
require that entire communities participate in the  ritual to rid 
themselves of the harm. With the ceremony, the violator is for-
given and the victim is healed, and each can be reconciled and 
reintegrated into the community as before. (2002, 118)
Though this does not amount to the notion of reconciliation I de-
lineate, it is far removed from the idea of forgetfulness, since the latter 
term normally precludes any type of moral engagement with the past 
or ac know ledg ment of culpability— in this case the very basis of the 
soldiers’ rehumanization. After all, if the goal is to forget completely, 
why engage in rituals of purifi cation and reintegration? Forgetting 
usually means letting “bygones be bygones,” but  here there is at least a 
recognition that serious wrongs  were committed and that there  were 
victims and perpetrators. The fi ction that the past does not matter 
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does not hold, since there is such a preoccupation with dealing with it, 
if only to move away from it. And there is, of course, no guarantee that 
future calls to revisit the past will not occur, as they have in numerous 
other countries in similar situations.
The importance of coming to terms with the past may not always 
be immediately evident, and the force of historical memory may take 
some time to appear. In spring 2000, Polish historian Jan Gross pub-
lished Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jed-
wabne, Poland, an account of how the small town of Jedwabne lost its 
entire Jewish population in World War II (2001). The Nazis had tradi-
tionally been blamed for the murders, though it is now clear that 
Catholic Poles killed their Jewish neighbors. More disturbingly, it 
seems that these crimes may have been more common than once be-
lieved. The thesis of the book was im mensely controversial in Poland, 
a country that has long thought of itself as the victim nation par excel-
lence. Now Poland is engaged in a full- scale reappraisal of its past, 
investigating its own history of anti- Semitism and the implications for 
the nation’s understanding of itself (Gross 2006; Polonsky and Michlic 
2004).
In all of these cases, forgetting has not succeeded. Poland is still 
confronting crimes committed fi fty years ago, and Cambodians have 
recently begun to demand the truth about their nation’s genocide. 
Even Mozambicans, another people touted as having turned their back 
on the past, still fi nd it necessary to engage in some form of ritual to 
reintegrate perpetrators and former combatants into community life. 
Arguing against social amnesia, Wole Soyinka has written:
Beyond Truth [sic], the very pro cess of its exposition becomes 
part of the necessity, and, depending on the nature of the past 
that it addresses, the impact it has made on the lives of the citi-
zens and the toll it has taken on their sense of belonging, it may 
be regarded as being capable of guaranteeing or founding the 
future of a nation. Indeed, it may be seen as a therapy against 
civic alienation. (1999, 12)
Here Soyinka may be overstating the power of truth, and I argue 
in subsequent chapters that there are other moral claims that require 
our attention as well. Nevertheless, his point is well- taken; it implies, at 
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the very least, that facing the past is important for societal and com-
munal rebirth and that advocates of social amnesia fail to capture the 
pull that history can have on a country’s historical understanding of 
itself.
Paradigms of Reconciliation
Facing the past is a crucial element in reconstructing a shattered soci-
ety. But what it means to reconcile such a society is not self- evident. 
Reconciliation, like most normatively complex social phenomena, can-
not be mea sured in any exact manner, and it is precisely this elusive yet 
very real quality that makes any discussion of its nature and sources 
diffi cult. Nevertheless, several broad approaches have emerged, ranging 
from a “minimalist” legal one predicated on coexistence to a “maxi-
malist” approach based on mutual healing, restoration, and forgive-
ness. These are not hard- and- fast schools of reconciliation, since there 
are in fact few such fully developed normative theories; rather, they 
represent general understandings that have informed the way we think 
of reconciliation. Nor are they purely in opposition to one another; the 
call for healing and restoration of social relations accepts the impor-
tance of minimal coexistence as a starting point but seeks to deepen it 
substantially through forgiveness and the development of thick ties of 
solidarity. Nevertheless, I believe that neither approach is satisfactory.
Minimalist approaches formulate reconciliation as simple coexis-
tence between former enemies, a basic agreement by different groups 
to accept the law rather than violence to resolve disagreements. Rajeev 
Bhargava discusses this view in the context of “barbaric” societies mov-
ing toward “minimal decency”:
A minimally decent society is governed by minimally moral 
rules. A complete breakdown of such rules characterizes a bar-
baric society. In this context, what makes these rules moral is 
their capacity to prevent excess wrongdoing or evil, not their 
ability to promote a par tic u lar conception of the good life, in-
cluding a substantive conception of justice. Such moral rules 
include negative injunctions against killing, or maiming or ill- 
treating others, and also a system of basic procedural due pro-
cess. (2001, 45)
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In this context, procedural justice means accepting basic norms 
for negotiation, contestation, and decision making while suspending 
broader issues of redistribution or punishment. Procedural justice is 
the cornerstone of the minimalist approach. It rejects demands for ac-
countability or transformative policies of material redistribution as 
unattainable and probably destabilizing while arguing that anything 
less than basic ground rules for coexistence will result in renewed vio-
lence. Reconciliation, therefore, means creating a space where former 
enemies can become po liti cal opponents within the bounds of the rule 
of law. Writing about Nazism and Stalinism, Stuart Hampshire argues 
that totalitarianism seeks to create “a bombed and fl attened moral 
landscape” and the destruction of “all notions of fairness and justice 
from practical politics and, as far as possible, from persons’ minds” 
(1989, 68). In the face of such thorough moral destruction, the only 
viable alternative is a po liti cal order that reinscribes limits for po liti cal 
and state power and imposes a “bare minimum concept of justice,” 
amounting to no more than a method of mediating po liti cal contesta-
tion absent social solidarity or shared background values (1989, 72). 
Hampshire considers this “basic level of morality, a bare minimum, 
which is entirely negative,” as the most that can be expected following 
such extreme po liti cal violence. Indeed, procedural justice becomes 
the only means of achieving a tolerable coexistence between erstwhile 
enemies “without any substantive reconciliation between them, and 
without any common ground” (1989, 109).
This argument is certainly compelling, since it refl ects a kind of 
realism and concern about immediately destabilizing conditions, but 
minimalism leaves a number of normative issues undertheorized, and 
thus remains problematic as a long- term position on the past. By bas-
ing reconciliation on thin proceduralism, minimalists focus on the de-
mands of the present to the near exclusion of engaging the past. We 
should resist this narrow approach. Victims of atrocity and their de-
scendants have a moral interest in knowing and publicizing the truth 
about human rights abuses, not in order to pursue a vindictive politics 
of victimhood, but as a means of achieving legitimate demands for 
moral recognition. Without some engagement with the past, reconcili-
ation will remain superfi cial and tenuous at best.
Truth seeking is not only victim oriented, however. Investigating 
past abuses can undermine apologist histories that perpetrators used 
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to justify their actions. Delegitimizing these histories is crucial for rec-
onciliation, for otherwise abuses remain uncontested and effectively 
reinforce an equivalence between violators and the violated, with each 
“side” having its own justifi cations or interpretation of what happened. 
Investigating violations can also contribute to addressing the causes of 
violence, providing a basic groundwork for institutional and po liti cal 
reforms to ensure that the past is not repeated. Minimalism has little 
to offer in this regard. Because it eschews investigation and disclosure 
of the past, it contains no mechanism for promoting institutional re-
form, much less societal transformation. Instead, it risks reifying the 
power arrangement existing in the transitional period, with the only 
caveat that enemies not pursue violence to settle disputes. The result 
is an approach that, unwittingly perhaps, permits apologists to argue 
for “forgetting and moving on” while maintaining intact the institu-
tions responsible for past crimes.
Similarly, minimalism ignores that often a history of violence may 
leave a signifi cantly uneven distribution of power and resources bene-
fi ting past perpetrators. This is a materialist claim, one that comple-
ments the discursive concerns about delegitimizing perpetrator justifi -
cations. Minimalists risk underplaying how in negotiated transitions, a 
thin system of procedural justice may further strengthen existing 
power relations and ignore a pressing need for distributive justice poli-
cies, particularly important where pronounced economic inequalities 
can further destabilize the country. The po liti cal terrain after mass 
violence is often uneven— particularly after negotiated settlements— 
with some actors enjoying signifi cant po liti cal and economic capital 
and others living under conditions of impoverishment and destitution 
nearly identical to the period of violence, albeit perhaps without the 
overt po liti cal oppression of the previous era. A more satisfactory 
model of reconciliation must attend to these issues of disparate and 
uneven power relations.
At the other end of the theoretical spectrum lies what I term maxi-
malist approaches, which reject the accommodationism and “hasty 
peace” typical of minimalism.5 For maximalists, reconciliation occurs 
when perpetrators acknowledge responsibility, repent, and then are 
forgiven by their victims. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this ap-
proach is Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who served as the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s chairman. Tutu famously 
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sought to reground reconciliation on the notion of ubuntu, or humane-
ness, drawing attention to the importance of generating compassion 
and forgiveness among former enemies.
In No Future without Forgiveness (1999), Tutu discusses this the-
ory of reconciliation at length. While the book is not an academic work, 
its centrality in debates about reconciliation requires that we give it 
attention. It is noteworthy for the way it rejects mere cohabitation as 
normatively problematic, arguing that minimalism simply excuses per-
petrators of any responsibility while undercutting moral refl ection and 
placing immediate needs above the more diffi cult work of moral re-
pair. Of par tic u lar concern for Tutu is the fact that minimalism is in-
suffi ciently attentive to the needs of victims. For him, reconciliation 
contains a constitutive element of ac know ledg ment and forgiveness. 
Ac know ledg ment is achieved not only through investigating past ac-
tions and publicly disseminating the fi ndings but also more profoundly 
through the perpetrator’s explicit recognition of wrongdoing and the 
victim’s forgiveness:
If the wrongdoer has come to the point of realizing his wrong, 
then one hopes there will be remorse, or at least some contri-
tion or sorrow. This should lead him to confess the wrong he 
has done and ask for forgiveness. It obviously requires a fair 
mea sure of humility, especially when the victim is someone in 
a group that one’s community has despised, as was often the 
case in South Africa when the perpetrators  were government 
agents. The victim, we hope, would be moved to respond to an 
apology by forgiving the culprit. (1999, 271)
Tutu is careful to qualify his understanding of reconciliation through 
the use of a soft conditional (“if the wrongdoer . . .  then one hopes” 
and “the victim, we hope”); however, the result— the overcoming of 
estrangement— is argued in no uncertain terms. “In the act of forgive-
ness we are declaring our faith in the future of a relationship. . . .  [W]e 
are saying  here is a chance to make a new beginning. It is an act of 
faith the wrongdoer can change” (1999, 272).
Similarly, po liti cal theorist Lyn Graybill (2001) centers reconcilia-
tion on mutual forgiveness, which creates the possibility of securing 
a shared future for everyone affected by the violence. She argues that 
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trials and social amnesia are equally unsatisfactory in this regard, as 
both ignore the important transformations required to suture old wounds 
and reintegrate former enemies into a shared community, transforma-
tions that can occur only through the power of forgiving. Rodney Pe-
tersen espouses a similar defi nition of reconciliation, characterizing it 
as a “restoration or even a transformation toward intended  wholeness 
that comes with transcendent or human grace” (2001, 13). Forgiveness 
is the vehicle of transformation, restoring and transforming practices 
between former enemies. The transformation must be “grounded in a 
deep ontological understanding of life” and “rooted in a costly self- 
immolation in the heart of being itself. It affects my being and the one 
with whom I exist in a state of alienation insofar as I will allow it” (2001, 
11). Achieving this transformation requires a great sacrifi ce on the part 
of the perpetrator and the victim; perpetrators must take responsibil-
ity for their crimes and repent, in the pro cess critically interrogating 
their identity and leaving themselves vulnerable to censure and re-
proach, and victims must move beyond “insincere and grandiloquent 
language” of facile pity toward seeing their violators “in the present, not 
as encumbered in the past or as prejudged in the future” (2001, 24).6
Arguably, the focus on forgiveness may be burdensome on victims, 
even if this is not the intention. The state cannot, of course, decree 
forgiveness, and none of these thinkers argues so. But though forgiving 
should be a free and unencumbered act, its de facto institutionaliza-
tion in some truth commissions (such as South Africa’s) or in offi cial 
apologies gives victims little space for opposing it and demanding in-
stead some sort of accountability. In this sense, reconciliation through 
forgiveness may appear coercive to victims. This is not to say that for-
giveness is never appropriate, but only to note that its institutionaliza-
tion as the prime mechanism for reconciliation is deeply problematic, 
for it is “morally objectionable as well as impractical . . .  to force people 
to agree about the past, forgive the sins committed against them, or 
love one another” (Crocker 2000, 108). Forgiveness may be morally 
praiseworthy, but it should not serve as the lodestar of reconciliation.
These understandings of forgiveness are typically grounded in 
theological conceptions of moral renewal and solidarity. In an impor-
tant recent work on South Africa, Claire Moon criticizes Tutu and 
other maximalist thinkers for constructing a notion of reconciliation 
that calls “upon the Edenic, or prelapsarian human condition, and 
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hail[s] a return to a condition of harmony and unity that preceded the 
Fall” (2008, 118). Moon is right to caution against apo liti cal under-
standings of reconciliation that problematically naturalize a prior just 
social order and then trace, as it  were, its fragmentation and collapse. 
Indeed, the term re-conciliation itself carries with it an idea of a re-
turn to a prior desirable state. Such narratives graft onto different soci-
eties a general moral story about harmony, rupture, and eventual reunion 
that risks ignoring important historical and po liti cal features.7
While Moon may overstate the case that “theological narratives 
work against the possibility of constituting different po liti cal confi gu-
rations and allegiances,” she is correct in drawing our attention to the 
narrative arc of harmony, fall, and return that is common  here (2008, 
121). The idea of a return to a prelapsarian state is problematic not 
only for its conceptualization of the past but also for what it requires of 
the present and future. It risks treating reconciliation as the substan-
tive agreement on moral issues and perspectives as well as a robust 
harmony between different groups that tends to smooth over real and 
legitimate differences— differences that are ineradicable elements of 
any po liti cal order. By underplaying po liti cal dissension, maximalist 
approaches face a diffi culty in defi ning the difference between signifi -
cant po liti cal confl ict that may degenerate into violence and forceful 
po liti cal dissent, a basic element of demo cratic politics. In large part, I 
suspect, this is because they fail to discuss how post- atrocity politics 
should look. But po liti cal life based on forgiveness must still outline 
the normative criteria to distinguish between extremist po liti cal dis-
course and legitimate po liti cal debate; without such criteria, both may 
be discarded as fundamentally disruptive of the goal of profound 
reconciliation that forgiveness entails. The demands that forgiveness 
makes on po liti cal discourse risk overdetermining the shape of this 
discourse, so that it no longer includes contestation but rather is rein-
scribed with terms such as “love,” “fraternity,” and “pity.”8 It defi nes 
permissible politics according to the likelihood of further antagonism, 
not according to the actual content of the claims made by actors. Be-
cause po liti cal contestation may come into opposition with the need to 
forgive, po liti cal contestation risks being delegitimized. But po liti cal 
life includes more than the search for consensus; it also contains some-
thing of an agonistic dimension, and thus any theory of reconciliation 
must allow for a distinction between legitimate po liti cal contestation 
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and repression. Maximalists struggle to draw this distinction precisely 
because they focus on forgiveness and the attendant lack of criteria to 
judge what forms of po liti cal contestation are permissible. But there is 
an even deeper problem with these approaches, one that they share, 
paradoxically, with minimalist theories discussed earlier.
Both minimalists and maximalists anchor their understandings of 
reconciliation in specifi c discourses that do not translate well into 
other social spheres. In both cases, they draw from a par tic u lar type of 
discourse that functions appropriately within certain bounds but 
found ers in other contexts. In other words, they rapidly reach their 
limits of applicability outside their specifi c domains. Consider mini-
malists: They use an essentially legalistic, proceduralist model that 
provides a persuasive account of what the minimum basis of post- 
atrocity politics should be— simple coexistence bound by the rule of 
law, with a core of human rights protections. But procedural justice 
tells us little about what reconciliation looks like between individuals. 
It fails to address that reconciling former enemies interpersonally 
means more than securing the absence of violence; it also requires 
thoughtfully engaging issues of responsibility, vengeance, resentment, 
and even forgiveness, as well as refl ection on what the moral contours 
of new personal relations should be. Minimalists say little about the 
uses of shame, survivor demands for recognition of their experiences, 
or complex moral issues surrounding personal apologies and forgive-
ness. Nor do they tell us much about different types of elite discourse 
and how po liti cal elites can contribute to or undermine societal recon-
ciliation. What should be the role of elites in rebuilding their society, 
beyond the minimal stipulation that they not use violence to further 
their own interests? What are the dangers and benefi ts of having elites 
promote a revisionist account of the past, and how does this affect per-
sonal and broader social historical understandings? Where do offi cial 
apologies fi t in? Related to this is the role of civil society: Certainly, 
civil society actors can further the pro cess of reconciliation by helping 
inform public debate on articulating defi nitions of perpetrators, vic-
tims, and bystanders; fostering discussions on the meaning of concepts 
such as justice, truth, and guilt; and critically examining past legitimiz-
ing narratives (they can also, of course, distort or even sabotage efforts 
at achieving all these things). All of this far exceeds the narrowly tai-
lored proscriptive requirements found in minimalist approaches.
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Maximalists suffer from the same limitation. Rather than begin 
from an overly formalistic legal approach, maximalists tend to rely on 
the faculty of forgiveness as the wellspring of reconciliation.  Here, the 
problem lies with forgiveness’s traditional understanding as a personal 
faculty occurring between individuals qua individuals. It does not 
travel well into other spheres of social relations, at least not without 
having to undergo some drastic conceptual changes that result in its 
substantial redefi nition. Consider the use of legal pardons, often seen 
as the legal twin of forgiveness (Freeman 2002). In the legal sphere, a 
sovereign grants a pardon in order to eliminate juridical culpability. 
Pardons do not, however, necessarily require the perpetrator’s moral 
transformation. Indeed, pardons often have little to do with public 
repentance; rather, they are employed for po liti cal reasons, such as 
ensuring stability or eliminating a potential threat. Furthermore, par-
dons remain the prerogative of the sovereign, not the victim.9 Whereas 
forgiveness can be understood as a faculty that expresses the victim’s 
agency, juridical pardons are fi rmly rooted in the sovereign, and vic-
tims have little infl uence on their use.
Nor is it clear what it means for forgiveness to play a central role in 
social discourse. Certainly, elites can apologize for actions committed 
by members of their group, and other elites may forgive them (Digeser 
2001; Tavuchis 1991). But apologies and forgiveness do not necessarily 
reconcile, nor do they necessarily remove mistrust. Though some civil 
society groups may encourage forgiveness as a way of reaching clo-
sure on the past, how this is to be operationalized remains at best 
problematic; how do we institutionalize forgiveness in public discourse 
or public policy while maintaining its transcendental and expiatory 
character? Another way of putting it is this: If forgiveness requires 
unpredictability— precisely because it must be the action of a free 
agent, and thus if we know that forgiveness always follows transgres-
sions, the faculty loses its moral force— its institutionalization and 
routinization will result in predictability and, consequently, its debase-
ment. The deep ontological transformations expected by Tutu and 
others become muted, or at least signifi cantly attenuated, because 
there is no mechanism to ensure that the guilty truly repent and the 
victims forgive them for it. Rather, what is left is a discourse that calls 
for reintegration through the embrace of the other without providing 
any insight into how this could operate as a social, rather than merely 
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personal, dynamic. Again, this is not to say that forgiveness is inappro-
priate in post- confl ict contexts; it is only to state that we should be 
wary of placing it at the center of a theory of reconciliation, for it is 
unclear how forgiveness (as a faculty exercised between individuals) 
can be used in broader social or institutional contexts. Forgiveness of 
this sort, as a social mechanism of integration, requires more attention 
to its operationalization than maximalists have given it.
Both minimalist and maximalist theories are based on too narrow 
a conception of reconciliation. The former’s legalistic understanding 
fails to capture myriad other elements that need to be addressed at 
the interpersonal, social, and po liti cal levels, and the latter draws on 
an individualist theory of forgiveness that cannot be satisfactorily pro-
jected onto social, legal, or po liti cal levels. Because of their restricted 
origins and applicability, both minimalist and maximalist formula-
tions are univalent— that is, they remain anchored to types of dis-
course that operate at only one societal level. This, in turn, prevents 
them from identifying how disparate calls for justice, forgiveness, 
and truth telling— all morally legitimate— interact at different social 
levels.
Reconciliation as Respect: 
A Multivalent Approach
This book argues that reconciliation is best understood as a multilevel 
pro cess, one characterized by specifi c logics and strategies operating 
at four levels: the po liti cal, institutional, civil society, and interpersonal 
levels. For example, truth commissions and tribunals address issues of 
victim recognition, factual accounts of the past, and accountability at 
an institutional (and in the former case, possibly civil society) level but 
do not exhaust all the demands for reconciliation. Po liti cal leaders may 
introduce new education policies that discuss the past and may occa-
sionally promote public memory projects (e.g., monuments, museums) 
to preserve historical memory. Civil society groups, such as nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and community associations, in many 
instances have played important roles in bringing attention to crimes 
and generating public debate about them, as well as fostering dis-
cussions about complicity and responsibility. Moreover, sophisticated 
therapies for treating survivors have emerged to address legacies of 
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atrocity and trauma at the micro level, further indication that recon-
ciliation is a complex pro cess, operating on multiple levels.
That efforts at reconciliation exist at different levels, from the 
 po liti cal and institutional to the social and interpersonal, is not mere 
coincidence. Rather, it points to something more fundamental: Recon-
ciliation develops through the contextually specifi c actions and 
strategies of actors, and thus any theory must maintain sensitivity to 
these different contexts. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that these 
different types of responses to the past will work in harmony; they 
may, in certain instances, work at cross- purposes, undermining the 
larger goal of reconciliation and social regeneration. Trials may end 
in acquittals and kindle calls for vengeance, while truth commissions 
may bring to light awful crimes but leave perpetrators untouched. 
Civil society groups may radicalize public discourse and raise unreal-
izable expectations of justice, or conversely, some actors may actually 
serve as apologists for past crimes, arguing that the crimes  were legiti-
mate responses to a real or perceived threat. And of course, efforts at 
treating trauma will sometimes fail, as survivors fall into further de-
spair. Thus, reconciliation does not unfold harmoniously along differ-
ent levels. Rather, it is best theorized as disjunctured and uneven, and 
its complex and multivalent character means that institutional re-
sponses (tribunals and truth commissions) are by themselves insuffi -
cient to guarantee its success.
These four levels are only conceptually distinct; reconciliation 
through the smooth and even integration of these levels is rarely, if 
ever, achieved empirically. Nevertheless, by theorizing an ideal model, 
we can identify how actions and developments at different levels can 
affect the larger effort of reconciliation. In this sense, the model serves 
as a heuristic and analytical device to interrogate the strengths and 
shortcomings of actual reconciliatory efforts, and it identifi es the ma-
jor normative concerns that post- atrocity societies face in a manner 
that is more nuanced and sensitive to competing normative claims. 
 Here, I briefl y defi ne the various levels.
By po liti cal society, I mean the po liti cal elite who control the 
state, as well as the major actors outside government who represent 
defi ned sectors of the population. Po liti cal society also includes for-
mal politics, such as party politics, and serves as a major sphere for 
presenting and shaping offi cial accounts of the past. The transitional 
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context— whether it was negotiated or imposed through military 
victory— is a major constraining factor in how po liti cal elites engage 
the issue of reconciliation.
The institutional level includes formal institutional mechanisms 
such as tribunals and truth commissions assembled to interrogate the 
past, address responsibility, and formally recognize victims. The impri-
matur of the state sets these types of institutions apart from strictly civil 
society efforts at investigating the past and examining responsibility.
Civil society is a third crucial level of the reconciliatory pro cess. 
Civil society actors can contribute to reconciliation by offering more 
complex and critical interpretations of the past and by opposing statist 
accounts that simplify or distort the historical record. NGOs and other 
civil society groups also help inform the categories of bystanders, vic-
tims, and perpetrators, as well as concepts such as justice and respon-
sibility. Furthermore, civil society is an important locus for promoting 
the rule of law and mutual respect, since these values require more 
than merely legal enforcement.
Finally, there is the interpersonal level, where individuals deal 
with the past by interpreting their personal narratives as part of, or a 
complement to, the larger public narrative developed at macro levels. 
Issues of accountability and recognition are transformed into con-
cerns about personal responsibility, revenge, forgiveness, and personal 
moral transformation. Subsequent chapters show that certain re-
sponses have an impact on several levels simultaneously and others 
remain anchored to only one level (or have only minor repercussions 
at other levels).
At the center of this multilevel theory is the normative concept of 
mutual respect. Reconciliation, I argue, is based on a normative shift 
from estrangement and distrust to mutual respect, including (most 
importantly) among enemies. This means deepening the formal “rule 
of law” typical of legal minimalism not just to guarantee due pro cess 
protections and procedural justice in some formal jurisprudential 
sense but also to recognize the validity of others’ claims to participate 
in the po liti cal and social spheres. Respect includes the recognition of 
others’ worth in and of itself and not simply because of po liti cal affi lia-
tion and limitations on the moral acceptability of certain actions to-
ward them. In the next chapter I elaborate this norm, but I should note 
 here that respect is more substantive than Bhargava’s (2001) bare co-
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existence but not as thick as the conceptions of solidarity animating 
maximalist accounts of reconciliation. Granted, this idea of respect is a 
diffi cult concept to mea sure empirically. One indication of success is 
when previous, confl ict- era forms of identity no longer represent the 
dominant modes of carving out po liti cal loyalty. Confl ict- era identities 
are constructed on a strongly binary logic: In- groups defi ne themselves 
through the construction of a dehumanized, disdained, and often- 
feared out- group requiring suppression, expulsion, or possibly even 
physical destruction (and often a combination of these). Where these 
previous identities lose their ability to mobilize loyalty and are instead 
mitigated by the development of alternative, overlapping po liti cal iden-
tities, the traditional in- group/out- group boundaries are no longer the 
most salient. Societies are reconciled to the extent that these new iden-
tities signify news ways of or ga niz ing po liti cal demands and loyalties. 
Of course, this does not mean that social tranquility and economic 
development follow, but it is indicative that old forms of enmity have 
been replaced by new po liti cal orientations, and in this sense we can 
say that reconciliation has been achieved. Nor does it mean the end of 
contestation and thus the end of politics; rather, it means that former 
enemies come to respect one another, see each other as moral equals 
and members of the same polity, and eventually form alliances with 
one another over new po liti cal, social, and economic challenges— the 
bread and butter, so to speak, of regular politics.
In this sense, I share a general theoretical perspective with An-
drew Schaap’s Po liti cal Reconciliation (2005), which argues that 
 society is not a hypostatized entity needing reconstruction after frag-
mentation, but rather should be understood as a pro cess, a fragile 
undertaking that is never ending and shapes us as much as we shape it. 
We reconcile, Schaap tells us, through public action and speech, which 
are inherently perspectival and thus po liti cal. His Arendtian approach 
focuses on “worldliness,” a recognition of the necessity of sustaining 
two fragile but simultaneous moments: one where a shared world is 
opened to adversaries and another where that world is called into 
question. The strength of Po liti cal Reconciliation lies in stressing the 
centrality of politics and risk and its unwillingness to yield to apo liti cal 
conceptions of reconciled society. I agree with much of the argument, 
though I believe that the idea of moral respect gives greater cohesion 
to reconciliation while still maintaining sensitivity to the openness and 
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fragility Schaap rightly highlights. This, in turn, necessitates theoriz-
ing moral respect across different contexts, as well as examining addi-
tional normative concepts that contribute to it, providing a theoretical 
account that can further elaborate the social relations under consider-
ation in Schaap’s work.
In addition to mutual respect, I introduce four other normative 
concepts that play a role in achieving reconciliation: truth, account-
ability, recognition of victims, and the rule of law, all further defi ned 
in the next chapter. These other concepts are crucial not only on their 
own— they can be justifi ed on their own terms, which is done in the 
following pages— but also because through their emergence and inter-
action with one another, they promote respect.
Truth is particularly important, for the most basic requirement for 
reckoning with past crimes is having an understanding of what actually 
occurred. Without knowledge of the past, any expectations of develop-
ing trust among citizens and between citizens and the state are se-
verely weakened. Accordingly, a society must investigate and publicize 
past abuses. I elaborate two broad dimensions  here: (1) truth in its “ob-
jective” or factual sense, requiring the identifi cation and investigation 
of specifi c instances of atrocity as well as patterns of violence and (2) a 
broader theoretical– normative engagement with the justifi catory nar-
ratives employed by previous elites to legitimize their actions, which 
is a highly po liti cal enterprise, all the more so in the unstable context 
of a po liti cal transition.
Holding perpetrators accountable is a key element of reconcilia-
tion, for it is unlikely that survivors will reconcile themselves with those 
who continue to enjoy impunity. Accountability can take many shapes, 
and I argue that it takes different forms depending on the context. This 
may include the estrangement or public devaluation of violators and the 
repudiation of past policies, as well as formal prosecutions.
A third norm concerns victim recognition, which underscores the 
importance of inscribing narratives of past atrocity with the manifest 
recognition of the individuals and communities who suffered. Recog-
nizing victims can serve several functions, including restoring their 
sense of dignity and self- worth and contributing to and informing 
broader historical memory by complementing the work of formal his-
torical projects. For these reasons, both instrumentalist and noninstru-
mentalist, recognizing victims is important to reconciliation.
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Finally, the establishment of the rule of law is necessary for the 
achievement of a lasting peace and reconciliation through respect. A 
commitment to the rule of law means that the successor regime has 
agreed to reform the relevant state institutions responsible for past 
crimes and provide the necessary mechanisms of accountability and 
oversight to ensure that individual rights will be respected. We can 
say, then, that the rule of law contains an institutional dimension of 
reform, concerned with revamping problematic state institutions and 
placing legitimate constraints on state power, as well as a normative 
dimension centered on accepting that po liti cal differences will not be 
decided through violence or force and po liti cal contestation will re-
main bound within formal and informal spheres of deliberation. Cru-
cially, this means a commitment to transparency and impartiality, the 
cornerstones of due pro cess. Though the institutional transformations 
required for successful po liti cal transitions are not the focus  here, it is 
important to underscore that both the institutional and normative di-
mensions of the rule of law are crucial for reconciliation. Clearly, both 
components are intimately connected.
There is a temporal element that requires some elaboration  here. 
If truth, accountability, and victim recognition often result in further 
estrangement among different groups (if only because they may desta-
bilize an already po liti cally delicate state of affairs), the rule of law and 
respect point to a closing of the moral distance between groups, show-
ing that reconciliation requires, in the last instance, a reconstruction 
of the po liti cal order that allows for past enemies to work and live in 
the same po liti cal and moral space. A key diffi culty with other ap-
proaches that equate reconciliation with forgetting is that they posit a 
new social order on (morally) insuffi ciently strong grounds by not grap-
pling with issues of responsibility, impunity, memory, remorse, and 
frustration, all of which can reemerge following the transition. By under-
scoring the rule of law and especially mutual respect, I call attention 
to two important issues: (1) that reconciliation is, in its fi nal calculus, 
about reintroducing former antagonists back into the same moral 
sphere and (2) that this requires an honest and sustained engagement 
with the past and with the moral issues surrounding perpetrators, by-
standers, and victims.
It is important to note that these normative concepts all deal with 
crucial po liti cal and ethical problems and therefore should not be 
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treated on a merely instrumental basis for the furtherance of reconcili-
ation; rather, it is precisely because they engage fundamental po liti cal 
and ethical issues that they are important to broad- based reconcilia-
tion. To treat them cavalierly and epiphenomenally misses the point 
entirely.
The following chapter discusses the normative concepts in detail, beginning with the core concept of respect. I provide an account 
of what each concept means and explain its normative content and 
limits. Chapters 3 through 6 then tackle the four levels— political, in-
stitutional, civil society, and interpersonal, respectively— and discuss 
why reconciliation at each level is both necessary and, by itself, in-
suffi cient for broader societal regeneration. I also discuss how the dif-
ferent levels affect one another, both positively and negatively. These 
discussions are or ga nized around the fi ve normative concepts. Chapter 
7 concludes this book.
One last note: The theory of reconciliation presented  here is not 
directly based on a par tic u lar version of contemporary demo cratic 
theory. While achieving reconciliation may take a great deal of time, it 
is largely a phenomenon of the transitional phases between the end of 
violence and the consolidation of democracy. The discussion I present 
in this book remains largely agnostic on the question of what type of 
democracy should follow the transition. Certain theories of democracy 
may be particularly compatible (or otherwise desirable) with the nor-
mative concepts I discuss, but I remain hesitant to expand my argu-
ment for reconciliation into a complete theory of democracy. To do so 
would overburden what I mean by reconciliation and would connect it 
too tightly to our preferred form of demo cratic life, without necessarily 
providing a convincing defense of the logical necessity of such connec-
tions. My argument for reconciliation is meant to serve as a groundwork 
for understanding the normative requirements for future peaceful and 
just social coexistence, and there are many plausible ways of thinking 
about this. It is partly decided through public deliberation and debate, 
as well as through elite negotiation and imposition. As I have argued, 
and as I argue in subsequent chapters, a peaceful society is not an apo-
liti cal society; we should not expect or desire po liti cal contestation to 
disappear. After all, this situation does not hold in established democ-
racies, so there is no reason to believe that it could be achieved in 
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fragile transitions. And, in any case, it would be deeply illiberal and 
authoritarian. Rather, we should expect reconciled societies to have 
po liti cal contestation, negotiation, argument, bartering, and so on. 
There are, of course, many ways of understanding these and the neces-
sary normative requirements for demo cratic justice. At a more theo-
retical level, one may argue for the virtues of, say, a (late) Habermasian 
(1996) or Rawlsian (2005) theory of proceduralist democracy above 
Laclauian (1996) radical democracy, or one may reject both in favor of 
a radical anarchism, such as Roberto Unger’s (1998), or even the more 
communitarian ideal proposed by Charles Taylor (1989) and Michael 
Sandel (1998). One could expand this list quite a bit. Each of these 
theories has strengths and weaknesses that have been debated exten-
sively elsewhere, and I do not pretend that reconciliation must result in 
any par tic u lar demo cratic theory. While I do draw a number of in-
sights of contemporary demo cratic theory, especially the recent focus 
on deliberation and demo cratic praxis, I do not develop a strong theo-
retical link between reconciliation and a par tic u lar demo cratic theory 
model (though I do rely on a number of insights from deliberative 
theories in my discussion of civil society). At an empirical level, I avoid 
making a categorical argument in favor of any specifi c form of demo-
cratic power sharing, such as liberal- pluralist above confederal or con-
sociational models. The appropriateness of any one depends on many 
factors, including the strength and types of demands of territorially 
based ethnic identities in the given country and their relationships 
with one another. While these are certainly important issues, they re-
quire an analysis of the concrete conditions of par tic u lar cases. This 




major diffi culty for societies emerging from a recent history 
of mass violence is how to contend with demands for justice, 
truth, and victim ac know ledg ment while recognizing the need 
for stability and peace. Although clearly important, a successful demo-
cratic transition requires more than strong leadership. Legacies of vio-
lence require that a society engage certain ethical questions in order to 
arrive at a just peace and meaningful reconciliation.
In the previous chapter I introduced the fi ve normative concepts 
that underpin my theory of reconciliation as respect. In this chapter, I 
discuss the concepts at length. I begin by presenting the idea of mu-
tual respect and then introduce the corollary concepts: truth telling, 
accountability, victim recognition, and rule of law. Although impor-
tant, each on its own is insuffi cient for reconciliation. They help pro-
mote the development of the norm of mutual respect, which is the 
heart of reconciliation in badly fractured societies. As will become 
clear throughout the following discussion and in subsequent chapters, 
though the concepts themselves are at fi rst framed in general terms, 
their actualization— that is, how they are manifested in any par tic u lar 
situation— varies signifi cantly, and thus are not part of a universal tem-
plate. The idea, in other words, is not to create a programmatic model 
of reconciliation that guarantees a par tic u lar outcome when certain 
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steps are followed (which is not, in my opinion, possible). Rather, these 
normative concepts should be seen as crucial ethical challenges that 
continuously arise in transitional settings, and demand attention be-
cause they point to some of the very basic questions of how a society 
relates to itself, its past, and its future.
How should a society deal with a legacy of severe human rights 
abuses? What ethical and practical considerations should frame a re-
sponse? Societies have turned to international and domestic criminal 
and civil trials to secure punishment (or amnesties to prevent further 
violence), truth commissions and other investigative institutions to in-
vestigate the past, public apologies and reparations for victims, and 
museums and monuments meant to preserve history. It is not uncom-
mon to fi nd a combination of mea sures, even though they may under-
mine one another. But without an understanding of what a society is 
trying to accomplish, and without some basic principles to guide its 
decisions, continued animosity and tensions are likely.
Mutual Respect
Reconciliation requires moving away from estrangement and distrust to 
a situation of respect and tolerance of others, including, crucially, former 
enemies. Reconciliation is the achievement of mutual respect across so-
ciety. Such a statement immediately requires some elaboration.
To understand mutual respect, we need to defi ne what it means to 
be a person, morally speaking. A healthy identity develops from inter-
subjective recognition among equals, which includes reciprocal recog-
nition of claims to moral worth and dignity. Dignity is a fundamental 
property of what it means to be a person, as it points to the value of 
autonomy that is at the core of a healthy sense of self. Kant’s second 
formulation of the categorical imperative, for example, argues that to 
treat another merely as a means, with no dignity, is a moral wrong 
(1998). While Kant did not espouse a theory of intersubjective moral-
ity, the notion that dignity is a fundamental value is at the basis of both 
deontological and intersubjective theories of morality. This is particu-
larly important to victims and others who have suffered po liti cal abuse 
and stigmatization and remain mistreated and devalued. A society that 
seeks to be reconciled must create conditions for the recognition of all 
citizens as bearers of moral worth and dignity.
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We recognize moral worth and dignity by showing respect for 
others. This is primarily a public relationship— or as Arendt (1989, 243) 
puts it, of “the domain of human affairs”— and differs from esteem, 
which refers to holding someone in special regard due to some par tic-
u lar trait of exceptional worthiness that we celebrate in her. Respect is 
not reserved for exceptional circumstances or for exceptional people;1 
rather, it follows from recognizing others as having inherent rather 
than instrumental moral worth by virtue of being persons. We show 
respect by behaving in ways that express that value. We do not, for in-
stance, “respect” another when we mea sure one’s value according to 
our own desires or goals, for such attitudes and behavior merely rele-
gate the other’s value to a mea sure of utility based on our own calcu-
lus. Respect requires that we recognize the other’s claim on us to her 
moral worth and dignity, and we consequently have an obligation to 
treat her in a way that expresses this recognition. We are responsible 
for the ways in which we treat others.
Another way of expressing this is to say that as morally autonomous 
agents, we ought to treat others in such ways that recognize them also 
as morally autonomous. To the extent that we are autonomous, we can 
choose to act vis-à- vis others in certain ways that are constrained by 
the moral claims they make on us. Autonomy need not mean monadic 
individualism, that is, the notion that individuals are theoretically 
“prior” to socialization or broader cultural infl uences, but only that 
personhood includes the possibility of making moral decisions, of 
choosing. If there  were no choice involved and our actions  were bio-
logically or socially overdetermined, it would make no sense to speak 
of moral autonomy or moral responsibility. Without autonomy, there 
would be no morality. The very idea of respect entails this conception 
of agency, since without it what appears to be recognition of the value 
of others is merely coincidental indifference bereft of any normative 
substance.
Respect is a reciprocal norm: It requires the mutual recognition of 
moral worth between subjects. Furthermore, it assumes that in engag-
ing with others, we have an obligation to give them reasons for our ac-
tions and values that could affect them. We owe them, as moral beings 
whose dignity we recognize, an account of why we treat them the way 
we do. In this sense, reason is not private, but intersubjective. It is not 
morally suffi cient for me to be satisfi ed with my own reasons for values 
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or actions that may affect others; it is not suffi cient, in other words, to 
assume that the values we hold are agent- neutral (in Christine Kors-
gaard’s terms), and thus do not require that we justify them to others 
(1996). This would be a sign of disrespect, for it disregards the other’s 
ability to judge my reasons and her right to respond to me. Rather, 
because I acknowledge others as moral, rational beings like me, it is 
incumbent upon me to give reasons they could recognize as valid. To 
respect another is to take seriously one’s ability to comprehend and 
judge my reasons and respond to them, and also expect that person to 
do the same for me. She cannot simply assume that the reasons for 
treating me in a par tic u lar way are normatively satisfactory or show 
respect for my dignity; she must offer reasons. This by no means re-
quires that we ultimately reach a consensus on ends or policies, nor 
does it point to deep solidarity or social harmony, but it does mean that 
we are obligated to engage with one another as moral equals who de-
serve respect. Nor does it assume that we are strictly rational creatures 
bereft of emotion. We are also emotional beings who experience pain and 
joy and develop meaningful commitments and relationships with others, 
and part of giving reasons is a recognition of the importance of these 
broader, complex relations for a healthy identity. Giving reasons to others, 
and expecting the same from them, is an expression of this respect.
Understood in this way, respect refers to something greater than 
the liminal requirements demanded by po liti cal theorists like Chantal 
Mouffe, who sees po liti cal life as fundamentally antagonistic with 
little room for considering others as moral equals (1997). Respect im-
plies the possibility of discussion and deliberation among former ene-
mies, and refl ects the ability to see another as a fellow human being. 
Nevertheless, it falls short of the deep fraternity that some thinkers 
place at the core of reconciliation. It certainly falls far short of what 
theologian and po liti cal theorist Miroslav Volf approvingly calls the 
“will to embrace”:
The will to give ourselves to others and welcome them, to re-
adjust our identities to make space for them, is prior to any 
judgment about others, except that of identifying them in their 
humanity. The will to embrace precedes any “truth” about 
others and any reading of their action with respect to justice. 
This will is absolutely indiscriminate and strictly immutable; it 
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transcends the moral mapping of the social world into “good” 
and “evil.” (2001, 42)
My understanding of respect does not transcend notions of good 
and evil, since it takes the problem of accountability quite seriously. 
Without just punishment and the rejection of impunity respect is 
nearly impossible, and we should not mistake it for absolving perpetra-
tors of responsibility for their actions. Instead, respect underscores the 
importance of replacing social relations based on fear and domination 
with tolerance toward others in public and semipublic life. Tolerance is 
ancillary to respect; to the extent that we see others as deserving rec-
ognition as fellow citizens and moral equals, we tolerate their po liti cal 
claims, ways of life, beliefs, and so on, as long as these do not violate 
the fundamental dignity of others or require a return to violence.
The term tolerance is not without its ambiguities, and an enormous 
amount of literature has been generated to defi ne its conceptual con-
tent and boundaries (Mendus 1998, 1999; Nehushtan 2007; Scanlon 
2003). Michael Walzer has usefully identifi ed a range of understand-
ings, from “simply resigned ac cep tance of difference for the sake of 
peace” to an “enthusiastic endorsement of difference” (1997, 10– 11). 
 Here, I understand tolerance as more than resigned ac cep tance to in-
clude a basic recognition of others as moral beings. But this does not 
mean we should expect an “enthusiastic” endorsement of former ene-
mies. Indeed, tolerance is for those with whom we strongly disagree. 
Tolerance includes several core elements: (1) it assumes the existence 
of continued, perhaps ineradicable disagreements with persons or 
beliefs, which are all more pronounced in the contexts under discus-
sion  here and (2) it requires that one’s views are not forced on those 
with whom one disagrees, or that one not threaten violence or other 
sanctions if they do not change their ways (Locke 1983; Newey 1999). 
Disagreements and even signs of disapproval toward others are funda-
mental aspects of social life, even more so following mass po liti cal 
violence, but their expression must remain within the bounds of mini-
mally acceptable social behavior (i.e., fall short of outright violence or 
repression). And yet it implies that we continue to see ourselves as part 
of the same community as those with whom we disagree— in other 
words, we stay in a relationship with them and recognize that we have 
certain obligations toward them, and they toward us. Tolerance, as 
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part of a larger understanding of reconciliation, is not simply disapproval 
and complete separation. Rather, tolerance requires that people stay in 
some nontrivial relationship with one another, and thus points toward a 
more signifi cant level of reciprocal accommodation and recognition.
Tolerance, then, is the ac know ledg ment of difference and disagree-
ment combined with a commitment to remain part of the same com-
munity. Beneath the disagreements and divisiveness there must be a 
basic, mutual recognition of moral worth and dignity— of respect— 
that serves to limit our reactions toward others. It is more than a uni-
lateral act of one toward another, since it is premised on reciprocity. 
Tolerance and respect develop over time and require that the other 
normative concepts discussed below be adequately addressed. In this 
sense, respect develops partially in tandem with the actualization of 
these other norms, but only after they have been pursued successfully 
for some period. Over time, mistrust may recede as former antagonists 
learn to live with one another, although perhaps not embrace each 
other. It is only then, after erstwhile enemies come to see each other as 
citizens and moral equals (even if po liti cally at odds), that respect can 
be said to take root. And it is then that we can talk about reconcilia-
tion, for at that point former enemies have made the diffi cult but im-
portant transformation of recognizing and accepting each other as 
members of the same polity and begin working together. To make 
sense of this, we now move to the corollary concepts: truth, account-
ability, recognition, and rule of law.
Truth
Public knowledge of past crimes is an important component of societal 
reconciliation, for without this perpetrators remain unchallenged, vic-
tims are further degraded, and acrimony and resentment between 
opposing groups remain, undermining future relations and destabiliz-
ing po liti cal and social life. An accurate rendering of the past can help 
mitigate these phenomena, fi rst by undermining the self- serving justi-
fi catory narratives of perpetrators— and in the pro cess holding them 
publicly accountable, even if only symbolically— and second, by offer-
ing extended recognition to victims and survivors. A generally accurate 
historical account can also frame future discussions about the past. 
Depending on the context, truth telling may largely confi rm what 
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many already believe happened, rather than uncover unknown crimes. 
In South Africa, for example, many blacks saw the truth commission’s 
work as a vindication of the struggle against apartheid, as public truth 
telling provided a broader approval of the widely shared knowledge 
that the white regime had committed gross and systematic atrocities 
(though some whites expressed shock at the commission’s fi ndings). 
In other cases, however, truth telling essentially undermines denial. 
During periods of mass violence, the state may deny responsibility 
for abuses and employ disappearances and similar strategies that are 
explicitly designed to obscure the nature of its actions, as occurred 
in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala (Garretón 1992). Uncovering the 
truth in these instances contains both an informative and critical 
dimension.
The aforementioned are fundamentally consequentialist argu-
ments, for they identify the moral salience of truth telling in its ability 
to foster profound changes in societies. But public knowledge of the 
past alone is insuffi cient to secure reconciliation. New knowledge may 
only further antagonize opponents and rekindle confl ict. But com-
bined with other moral imperatives, truth telling can promote a new 
po liti cal order predicated on mutual respect and tolerance. Truth can-
not provide all of this, nor does it serve as a curative elixir capable 
of magically erasing bitterness and distrust, but the alternative— 
continued denial, unchallenged dominance of perpetrator justifi ca-
tions, and further victim degradation— is certainly less likely to pro-
mote trust, and at any rate is morally unsatisfactory because of the 
contempt for fellow citizens that it implies. Admittedly, consequential-
ist arguments remain probabilistic at best, for it is impossible to prove 
axiomatically that truth telling results in a better society, especially if 
truth is divorced from other moral imperatives. However, as I argue 
below, when combined with the other normative concepts, truth tell-
ing can work to promote mutual respect and tolerance while remain-
ing practically viable. Without a reasonable understanding of what 
happened, the other goals of reconciliation are unlikely to be met.
A second set of reasons, essentially non- consequentialist, relies on 
the moral right to knowledge by victims and society as a  whole. Some 
scholars, such as David Crocker (2000) and Juan Méndez (1997), argue 
that there exists a deontological aspect to truth telling: Victims have a 
“right to know” about past abuses, regardless of the broader social 
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consequences of publicizing such knowledge. International human 
rights law has also endorsed the right to knowledge. UN Special Rap-
porteur Louis Joinet has written that there exists a non- derogable 
“fundamental right to truth.” This right is understood as both an indi-
vidual and collective right. “Its corollary is a ‘duty to remember,’ which 
the state must assume, in order to guard against the perversions of his-
tory that go under the names of revisionism or negationism” (1997, I, 
II). Theo Van Boven (1993) has also cited the right to truth as a basic 
right for victims of human rights violations.2
The deontological formulation requires further development, how-
ever: It should be conceptualized as both a right that victims have and 
a duty owed them through which truth telling becomes an expression 
of respect for their intrinsic moral worth— that is, an important ele-
ment not captured in more consequentialist arguments. Truth telling 
acknowledges the dignity and moral value of victims, signaling that 
past abuses  were morally wrong and require repudiation. At its core, a 
deontological formulation is certainly powerful and intuitively compel-
ling. It justifi es itself through the empathy we feel for victims and the 
claims they make on us to be recognized. By emphasizing a deonto-
logical dimension, we place victims at the center of reconciliation while 
encouraging society to refl ect on its responsibility and obligations to 
those who  were harmed.
Truth may be a fundamental aspect of reconciliation, but we are 
still in need of a satisfactory defi nition of the term. As I conceive it, 
reconciliatory truth contains three aspects: (1) an objective, forensic 
component, (2) a phenomenological, experiential component, and (3) a 
broadly narrative component that works to combine the fi rst two as-
pects into an intelligible account that explains the past. I discuss each 
of these in turn, and then identify some specifi cally theoretical diffi -
culties that can arise with truth telling.
Factual Truth
Since I accept that there is no socially relevant “fact” prior to its inter-
pretation, I use the term factual truth simply to refer to those various 
types of events and phenomena that are employed in an interpretive 
pro cess that invariably gives them meaning and places them in a 
longer chain of comprehension.3 Primarily, factual truth deals with 
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identifying and investigating specifi c instances of po liti cal atrocity, 
such as massacres and extrajudicial killings, tortures, rapes, and other 
empirically identifi able violations of rights. It is concerned with em-
pirically ascertainable events and actions, as well as the concomitant 
rules and procedures of verifi cation that these require.
But cata loguing discrete violations is insuffi cient to arrive at a gen-
eral understanding of po liti cal violence. Analysts must also investigate 
institutionalized patterns of repression, systematized policies of perse-
cution, responsibility of actors and specifi c units, command structures, 
and legal codes that facilitated po liti cal violence. This is crucial be-
cause violence is often part of a broader state policy, and thus to focus 
solely on specifi c events and par tic u lar perpetrators ignores the larger 
administrative, legal, and po liti cal apparatus that facilitates such viola-
tions, as well as those at the top who give the orders for their execu-
tion. Mark Osiel has written perceptively on what he terms “adminis-
trative massacres,” as “the large- scale violation of basic human rights 
to life and liberty by the central state in a systematic and or ga nized 
fashion, often against its own citizens, generally in a climate of war— 
real or imagined” (1997, 9). “Administrative massacres” captures the 
or ga nized, large- scale and systematized nature of these violations, show-
ing how disparate abuses are in fact often connected through state- 
centered policies.
For many societies reckoning with past atrocities, the population 
is often unaware of the extent of the violations. Certainly, there may 
be a broad understanding that abuses  were committed, but their na-
ture is not well- known. How systematic and or ga nized  were the 
abuses?  Were they offi cially sanctioned?  Were the targets legitimate 
po liti cal or military foes? How extensive  were the violations? These 
and similar questions determine how justifi able the violations seem in 
the eyes of the population, whether they  were inexcusable crimes or 
“unfortunate excesses” toward some defensible end. Investigation is 
crucial. Publicizing hidden violations, however, requires choices of 
selection and pre sen ta tion. These choices then make, implicitly and 
explicitly, claims of moral responsibility, for certain actors are named 
as perpetrators, others as victims, and still others as morally respon-
sible bystanders. In Althusserian terms, truth telling interpellates 
(Moon 2008). In an important sense, then, searching for the truth is 
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both a historical and po liti cal enterprise; it creates winners and losers 
and reframes historical understanding. Factual truth may be con-
cerned with investigating and classifying empirically identifi able phe-
nomena, but the very pro cess of selection and pre sen ta tion points to 
its po liti cal nature.
Phenomenological Truth
I term a second form of truth as phenomenological. It deals with the 
physical and psychological legacies of violence on victims and their 
families, and the ways in which survivors make sense of these experi-
ences. Fear is not easily framed in “objective” language. Nevertheless, 
personal stories offer insights that are missed in forensic reports. Con-
sider Chanrithy Him’s description of the aftermath of a Khmer Rouge 
(KR) attack on her town in 1975:
The destruction of something so familiar draws us closer. We 
dash toward the crumbled buildings, and the stench grows 
stronger. On the ground along the way, we see a soldier’s cam-
oufl age hat and burnt pieces of wood from the classrooms. As 
we move even closer, the smell grows even stronger and buzz-
ing fl ies swarm. Before our eyes lie piles of dead soldiers in 
destroyed bomb shelters that had been constructed in rectan-
gular spaces where the fl owerbeds used to bloom, between the 
steps to each classroom. Big fl ies with greenish heads and eyes 
swarm the gaping wounds in the soldiers’ decaying bodies. 
One blown- away leg lies beside the step to the fi rst classroom, 
lonely and morbidly out of place. One soldier’s crooked body 
lies on top of another soldier’s, his mouth frozen open in excru-
ciating pain.
I am nine years old.
Never have I seen so much death. For a moment I am hyp-
notized and spellbound by the ways these soldiers have been 
killed. [ . . .  ] My stomach begins to move. The breakfast I ate 
makes its way up my throat, followed by dizziness. Only then 
do I get hold of myself and feel the repeated tug, the per sis tent 
pull of Thavy’s brother’s hand. (2000, 60)4
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The power of this account echoes Hans Erich Nossack’s claim that 
“personal truth is the only reality,” and to speak it is “revolutionary” 
insofar as it forces us to confront the immediacy of po liti cal terror 
(2004, xii). But the importance of such stories goes beyond their par-
ticularity and immediacy. Victims bring order and meaning to their ex-
periences through narration, simultaneously connecting experience to 
collective accounts by employing empirical examples. Telling personal 
stories can “break the silence” imposed through trauma, crucial to the 
development of a collective understanding of the past (Lira 1997, 5). It 
establishes a connection between the individual and collective mem-
ory, facilitating broader comprehension of what occurred. Thus, phenom-
enological truth has two dimensions: (1) as a refl ection of the individual’s 
personal experiences and (2) as a way of enriching and giving greater 
substance to social history. But while phenomenological truth plays a 
role in informing collective understandings of the past, its creation is a 
dialectical pro cess: Its resonance emerges to the extent that it is both 
a response to and a further development of broader narratives— that 
is to say, it is not wholly the product of the speaker but also formed and 
shaped by other accounts of the past. As Claire Moon (2008) rightly 
notes, our understandings of violence shape and are shaped by already 
existing narratives. It is precisely this dialectical pro cess that connects 
individual experiences to narratives about social confl ict, providing a 
wider and empirically deeper understanding of the past. This is exactly 
what happens with phenomenological truths of the type presented in 
Chanrithy Him’s account of the Khmer Rouge attack. Her story, and 
her memoir in general, provides us with a particularized account that 
both informs and deepens our understanding of the KR era, bringing 
greater immediacy to our understanding of the Cambodian genocide. 
And similar to factual truth presented above, phenomenological truth 
also includes a po liti cal aspect, insofar as certain facts and experiences 
are privileged in pre sen ta tion; this in turn defi nes some people as vio-
lators, others as victims, and still others as bystanders. This rhetorical 
element makes these stories both powerful and also potentially prob-
lematic, as the combination of fact and empathy can provide a mislead-
ing account of events.
The diffi culty, then, is how to understand the combination of factual 
and phenomenological truth as something that is a broadly accurate 
repre sen ta tion without falling into either a naïve correspondence 
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theory or a radically fractured, deconstructionist notion that replaces 
the possibility of shared understanding with incommensurability.
Narrative Truth
In transitional settings, any historical inquiry is po liti cal charged. 
Making sense of what constitutes a “fair” appraisal of the past is prob-
lematic because of the po liti cal and ethical stakes involved and the 
diffi culty of combining factual and phenomenological claims in a co-
herent, convincing manner. Any such enterprise is also interpretive: It 
requires making sense of each part, each “fact,” in relation to the 
 whole story, which in turn affects the larger narrative picture. The goal 
of such a hermeneutic combination is to create larger narratives that 
make sense of events by placing them in culturally intelligible— and 
persuasive— language. In this book, narrative truth refers to these 
broader social understandings.
Keeping these narrative concerns in mind, it becomes clear that 
factual truth is not simply the cata loguing of crimes and creation of 
command- responsibility charts, but more importantly points to the 
selection (and implicit nonselection) of certain facts and people in an 
effort to make a larger, coherent story about po liti cal responsibility. 
Not all po liti cally motivated tortures, murders, and rapes receive equal 
attention in the broader account. Some are used as paradigmatic ex-
amples of po liti cal atrocity, while others are downplayed because of 
questions about mens rea (intent), po liti cal salience, or other reasons. 
This is, of course, a po liti cal enterprise, insofar as decisions must be 
made about what events deserve special attention. Accordingly, decid-
ing this is fraught with all sorts of diffi culties concerning selection. 
Phenomenological truths also engage in a kind of hermeneutic of rele-
vance. Individual stories are not totally agent driven, but rather are 
formed by and inform presiding social narratives, and in the pro cess 
contribute to our historical understanding. A courtroom may provide a 
framework for victims to recount their experiences, while simultane-
ously restricting such pre sen ta tions through the technical and pro-
cedural demands of the trial. Nationalist discourses about historical 
experiences (e.g., revolutionary struggles, past confl icts, moments of 
national glory) may be used to justify recent actions— often by all 
sides— while cultural discourses on responsibility, civility, and threats 
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to the community can serve as the backdrop to debates in the public 
sphere. Transnational narrative discourses of human rights and pop u-
lar sovereignty are important, as well as other political- ideological 
discourses (e.g., Marxism, Fascism, Maoism, anti- imperialism) within 
which phenomenological and factual truths are framed.
Nevertheless, if narrative truth as I have presented it  here aspires 
to synthesizing truths into a larger overarching story about the past, it 
is not the case that these truths cohere unproblematically. Personal 
understandings of an event or series of events emphasize different ex-
periences and downplay others, and can often contradict one another. 
There is, then, a certain openness that is constitutive of truth claims, 
insofar as they can never be complete (i.e., totally refl ective of all of the 
events and experiences they represent) nor fi nal. The hermeneutic 
synthesis required to make larger narratives intelligible is always open 
to revision, allowing for new interpretations of the past that emphasize 
some aspects and minimize others. However, this is not the same as 
 wholesale relativism.
Rather, we need a critical history that presents the past as accu-
rately as possible, while also ensuring that victims’ stories are not 
erased, nor abuses minimized through ideological manipulation of the 
past to lessen responsibility. A critical perspective eschews what Nietz-
sche called “monumental” histories, where the present is justifi ed 
through the unrefl ective appeal to the past or any transcendental claim 
justifying “necessary” actions for its realization (1997 67– 70). We need 
a perspective that interrogates given truths, and thus begins the ad-
mittedly diffi cult and po liti cally delicate pro cess of reconstructing a 
past that is not based on denials and con ve nient justifi cations. This is 
not an effort at radical deconstruction (if that means a relentless inter-
rogation that risks resulting in incommensurable perspectives with 
little coherence), but rather a project that remains sensitive to its own 
assumptions.
Truth is fundamental for reconciliation. Societies need a basic un-
derstanding of past events to assign responsibility and resist impunity. 
The rule of law requires knowing which institutions are most respon-
sible for abuse if they are to be reformed and made transparent and 
accountable. Punishment, too, requires knowledge of perpetrators, 
and without some semblance of the truth victims cannot secure the 
recognition they deserve as human beings; thus the norm of mutual 
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respect stays weak. Certainly, truth alone will not reconcile former 
enemies. Victims who retell experiences publicly often desire more 
than merely being heard, even though this is important to them; they 
may seek reparations, justice for the guilty, and the state’s guarantee 
that it will not violate their rights in the future. Admittedly, new reve-
lations may re- antagonize former enemies and threaten stability, at 
least in the short term. If we seek to secure a basic condition of mutual 
respect, the commitment to truth must be matched by a commitment 
to accountability, recognition, and the rule of law. As such, the truth is 
necessary but certainly insuffi cient for securing justice and promoting 
respect.
Accountability
While truth is undoubtedly important for reconciliation, some form of 
accountability for wrongdoers is also necessary. Arguably, complete 
justice would require that all perpetrators be held responsible for past 
abuses and be appropriately punished— a kind of Kantian commit-
ment to just deserts for all who deserve it. The im mense practical ob-
stacles to achieving this in the context of most transitions, as well as 
the risk of having it degenerate into a new “terror,” make it undesirable— 
however, at the very least, there must be a commitment to seeing that 
some “justice is done.” Before turning to the theoretical and practical 
limits of accountability, I discuss its normative content.
The Deontological Component 
of Accountability
Accountability requires publicly holding someone responsible and 
punishing him or her for an identifi able wrong or violation. While ac-
countability can take many forms, it contains a constitutive element of 
sanction. This is essentially a form of retributive justice.
As John Borneman (1997) discusses, many (though certainly not 
all) legal theorists follow Aristotle in dividing justice into two spheres: 
distributive and corrective— two paradigms that miss the punitive di-
mension of retribution. Distributive justice, which is concerned with 
allocating resources according to some principle of fairness or equal-
ity, does not explain the element of punishment found in retribution. 
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Nor does corrective justice. The latter implies returning to the status 
quo ante, so that the violator and the victim arrive at the relationship 
existing prior to the harm through the ruling of some impartial third 
party. For Aristotle, the goal of corrective justice is to compensate the 
victim for his or her “loss,” and in the pro cess remove the perpetrator’s 
“gain,” so that “when a mea sured value is assigned to the suffering, the 
terms gain and loss are appropriately used. Thus, the fair is the mean 
between the greater and the less. . . .  That which would be correctively 
just, then, would be the mean between the loss and the gain” (1984, 
bk. V, ch. 7, lines 12– 20). This assumes that we can return to some 
prior state, and furthermore that we should focus on the status of the 
victim, though not necessarily punish the violator. The perpetrator, for 
example, could be forced to return stolen property or compensate for 
its destruction, thus addressing the injustice caused, but not be pun-
ished for the theft in any meaningful sense. Retribution, however, in-
cludes a punitive element.5 First, it means punishing a perpetrator for 
his or her actions, and implies that victims are bearers of certain moral 
rights of dignity and worth (thus certain actions are seen as violations 
of these rights), and second, it means that perpetrators are also moral 
actors, to the extent that they are morally responsible for their actions 
and should thus be held accountable. Retribution means that we un-
derstand ourselves as agents with moral rights, and perpetrators as 
morally responsible actors (Murphy 1998).
Retribution, then, need not be pursued solely for utilitarian ends. 
While certainly retribution may have an instrumental bent— deterrence, 
enforcement of rules, expression of intolerance of impunity— this does 
not exhaust its power. Rather, it is also non- teleological: Violators are 
punished precisely because they are morally responsible for their ac-
tions, and not (solely) because punishing them would benefi t the 
greater good. Kant underscores this when he writes, “Punishment by a 
court . . .  can never be infl icted merely as a means to promote some 
other good for the criminal himself or for the good of society. It must 
always be infl icted upon him only because he has committed a crime” 
(1996, 105).
Retribution can also be understood from the perspective of the 
victim and her moral claims to respect. A victim expresses self- worth 
by showing resentment toward the violator and seeking to punish him 
(or have the violator punished). Unlike Nietz schean envy, resentment 
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 here is anchored in the anger that results after experiencing some moral 
wrong. Indeed, resentment is an expression of self- worth, for it shows 
the value one places on oneself and subsequent outrage at its violation. 
Without a sense of human dignity and value, there would be no resent-
ment. It is hard to imagine a person who respects herself, much less 
others, who does not resent purposeful harms infl icted on her.
Though there can be teleological aims to retribution, and indeed 
below I indicate what some of these are, retribution is centered on the 
wrongness of a par tic u lar act and the violator’s responsibility for the 
commission of this act. As such, retribution is also communicative, in-
sofar as it communicates our moral condemnation of the violation to its 
author and to society, a point not lost on Kant (1996) when he argued 
that any punishment must be expressed publicly, even if the commu-
nity  were to be dissolved immediately afterward. However, retribution 
should not be confused with revenge, even though the two terms are 
often used interchangeably. While revenge also draws its force from 
the apparent justness of punishment, it risks collapsing into cycles of 
violence, bereft of any sense of proportionality and with little likeli-
hood of ending. Retributive justice differs from revenge through its 
inclusion of procedural and substantive protections for the accused, 
and shifts from the victim’s demand for immediate punishment to a 
mea sured response based on the rule of law. Unlike vengeance, it re-
quires an evaluation of responsibility and an appropriate penalty.
I use retribution (and accountability) as a mea sured, legitimate 
response to harms against people. This formulation serves as an im-
portant heuristic device and moral ideal to orient our discussion of 
post- atrocity justice.
The Teleological Component to Accountability
To the extent that we can normatively separate retribution and ven-
geance, retribution can serve the broader moral enterprise of recon-
ciliation. I indicated earlier that retribution should not be seen only in 
instrumentalist terms. Still, under the proper institutional constraints, 
it can further the project advocated in this book in at least two ways. 
First, a commitment to accountability sends a clear message that con-
tinued impunity will no longer be tolerated. By holding violators ac-
countable for their behavior, the new state condemns past abuses and 
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signals the importance of the rule of law. Second, and more broadly, 
such a commitment reaffi rms (or perhaps affi rms for the fi rst time) 
social values of respect for human rights. These points are closely tied 
to one another, but I discuss them separately in order to tease out their 
importance.
Eliminating impunity is possibly the most defensible “forward 
looking,” or instrumentalist, use of retribution in transitional settings. 
Continued impunity is dangerous for a fragile democracy, weakening 
the rule of law and frequently jeopardizing the very existence of the 
new government. Particularly where former elites maintain some po-
liti cal, economic, or even military power, prosecutions may be used as 
an important way of dissolving this power. Along these lines, a typical 
defense of retribution rests on its promotion of the common good by 
sanctioning those who violate society’s norms. This utilitarian argu-
ment, with roots as far back as Cesare Beccaria (1995) and reformu-
lated by Jeremy Bentham (1995), normally assumes the existence of a 
relatively stable society with a functioning and impartial judiciary. 
Transitional societies require that we expand our focus to the role of 
the state as violator. In transitional situations, the emphasis shifts to a 
hypothetical: What would po liti cal and social life be like with the con-
tinued existence of signifi cant authoritarian enclaves? Ruti Teitel has 
perceptively made this point: “Rather than an argument for punish-
ment in the affi rmative, the argument [in transitional situations] is 
generally made in a counterfactual way; What result if there is no pun-
ishment?” (2002, 28). The answer is the continued and possibly perva-
sive undermining of the new order by elites from the previous regime, 
who would feel unrestrained in their actions.
Accountability also expresses a repudiation of past practices and a 
commitment to change future relations based on principles of respect 
for human rights and the law (Kirchheimer 1961; Shklar 1964). Punish-
ment signals the government’s interest in establishing a new po liti cal 
and social order rooted in the rule of law by underscoring the impor-
tance of human dignity and subsuming state interest to human rights. 
It creates a wall between then and now, and publicly shows that state 
power must be limited. This is a pedagogical exercise, in many respects. 
By holding perpetrators accountable, the state signals to society that 
human rights and respect for individuals should become dominant 
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social norms. Whether this is successful, of course, partly depends on 
the perceived fairness of the trials themselves— however, accountabil-
ity reaffi rms these norms by highlighting the wrongness of their trans-
gression. In this sense, accountability not only means drawing a line 
between the past and the future but also signals the importance of 
endorsing new social values.
Challenges to Accountability
Although accountability is a crucial component for the establishment of 
a new regime, it nevertheless faces certain pitfalls. I have already men-
tioned the possibility of punishment degenerating into vengeance, which 
is a real threat when transitional regimes do not emphasize their com-
mitment to the rule of law and instead replace one illiberal order with 
another. There are several other recurring problems with retribution.
First, formal retribution can be destabilizing. Trials and demands 
for punishment undoubtedly antagonize accused elites, who may 
threaten renewed violence. The threat of destabilization is a serious 
one, and entering into the delicate calculus of punishment versus stabil-
ity poses signifi cant dangers for new and fragile regimes. While there is 
no defi nitive theoretical solution to this problem, accountability— such 
as identifying perpetrators, writing new histories that detail complicity 
and responsibility, and encouraging massive social mobilization against 
perpetrator elites— should also be pursued in other (nonlegal) social 
spheres, such as civil society and elite discourse.  Here, a commitment 
to unearthing the truth of violations is particularly important— though 
legal action may not always be possible, at least the truth can serve to 
condemn violators in the social imaginary.
Of course, excessive demands for retribution are also problematic. 
It is not uncommon to see the accused sacrifi ced for social cohesion, 
turning them into scapegoats for the sake of “moving forward.” Successor 
regimes are always confronted with the formidable task of establish-
ing a new basis for solidarity, and certain strategies— such as high- 
profi le prosecutions of a handful of prominent or particularly violent 
perpetrators— can function nicely as symbolic evils with which to su-
ture open wounds. The symbolism of human rights trials, character-
ized as they are by powerful discourses of villains versus the innocent, 
46 ▪ Chapter 2
or evil versus good, can have a far stronger impact than the bureau-
cratic reform of the security apparatus and judiciary. At risk, of course, 
are the due pro cess protections of the accused, shed for the sake of 
social solidarity. Trials can be made to function as rituals to purge the 
sins of the past from the present (Walzer 1992). Though vengeance 
may be a part of this, it need not be; the motive may simply be to select 
some perpetrators as sacrifi cial lambs for social solidarity, a more in-
strumentalist (rather than vindictive) strategy, though a feeling of pop-
u lar revenge certainly helps. Scapegoating not only affects trials but also 
broader, category- based forms of punishment such as lustration (purg-
ing), where an entire group of people such as party members are system-
atically denied basic rights, including voting, employment opportuni-
ties, government offi ce, or something similar. In the fi rst scenario, a 
small number of individuals are blamed for widespread violations, 
even though most mass atrocity involves broad institutional and or gan-
i za tion al resources implicating a wide array of people in various ways. 
In the second scenario, guilt is extended to an entire class of people, 
who are summarily excluded from certain activities or positions, even 
though complicity can vary widely among individuals (Wilke 2007). In 
both situations the desire for social cohesion may undermine justice.
A third problem with accountability concerns the relationship be-
tween prosecutorial selectivity and historical repre sen ta tion. The suc-
cessor regime’s desire to show its commitment to accountability, often 
through a selective number of high- profi le cases, can result in a 
misrepre sen ta tion of the past. Certainly, fi nancial and resource con-
straints are a prime source of selectivity. Given that in most cases the 
scope of abuse was massive and the complicity widespread, a transi-
tional society with limited resources can only afford to prosecute some 
violators. The question then becomes “Whom do we prosecute?” The 
choices rely on a number of factors about potential defendants, includ-
ing their responsibility for par tic u lar abuses, public demands for their 
punishment, the likelihood of conviction, and what the new govern-
ment can gain from a successful trial. Regardless of the choices made, 
greater public scrutiny will be drawn to a par tic u lar group of individ-
uals while limiting broader historical understandings of the past. In-
deed, the past actions of the defendants may become misleadingly 
representative of all of the regime’s actions, thereby risking simplifi ca-
tion of what are invariably complex events with many actors.
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Closely related is a fourth problem. The repercussions of trials, 
with their symbolically powerful fi ndings of criminal liability and vic-
timhood, can continue to have an effect on social relations for a long 
time afterward. Future relations can be shaped for the worse by the 
public stigma that fl ows from prosecutions: Those who have even tenu-
ous connections to the prior regime may continue to be disparaged or 
ignored, regardless of the substance of their po liti cal positions, while 
victims may enjoy continued moral capital well beyond what they 
should expect, allowing them to exercise po liti cal infl uence over issues 
that have little to do with their past experiences or victim status. The 
possibility of creating a shared future where former enemies can see 
one another as members of the same community can suffer when past 
culpability continues to delegitimize opposing viewpoints and vigorous 
public debate. One need only think of the way that under President 
Paul Kagame, even legitimate po liti cal opposition in Rwanda is often 
accused of treasonous aims.
A strictly liberal legal understanding of culpability requires that 
individuals be held responsible only for those actions over which they 
had some control (Fletcher 2001). While understandable, such an ap-
proach risks focusing on too small a group of perpetrators, and thereby 
missing the morally ambiguous category of bystanders. Bystanders, 
meaning persons who through their inaction and even tacit support 
facilitated the commission of wrongs though they may have been in a 
position to oppose or denounce them, carry a par tic u lar form of re-
sponsibility that lies outside judicial guilt.6 How are bystanders to be 
judged, if at all? In some respects, bystanders point to the limits of ac-
countability, and bystander responsibility will be debated in the public 
sphere among po liti cal elites and civil society groups, as well as among 
individuals in private and semipublic places. However, their responsi-
bility falls outside the purview of courts, and this combined with the 
troubling fact that substantial public support, or at least acquiescence, 
is often necessary for po liti cal violence means that an understanding of 
responsibility will likely be highly contentious and politicized. Truth 
commissions may be able to explore at least some aspects of this, but 
ultimately bystander accountability will largely be contested in po liti-
cal and civil society, and among individuals.
Although all of these issues point to the limits of accountability, its 
importance should not be dismissed. Retribution helps promote the 
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rule of law and provides at least some recognition of victims, for it sig-
nals the importance of condemning those who harmed them while 
reinforcing values of human rights and dignity. Accountability is thus 
a crucial element in the larger project of reconciliation.
Recognition
A common legacy of po liti cal violence is the continued contempt and 
devaluation of victims. Often, victims are seen as having “deserved” 
their fate, particularly if they belong to groups that have been histori-
cally marginalized or disparaged (e.g., indigenous groups in Latin 
America). Such devaluation makes it diffi cult for reciprocal respect 
and tolerance— and hence, reconciliation— to develop, since these re-
quire that former enemies come to see one another as moral equals. In 
response, a society should seek to recognize the moral status of victims 
as equals, restoring their sense of dignity and establishing their legal 
rights as citizens. Such an idea of recognition is, certainly, tied to ac-
countability, since both pivot on reinterpreting victims as bearers of 
moral value and violators as deserving punishment. Nevertheless, 
while accountability is a crucial element of reconciliation for the rea-
sons discussed above, it does not, in and of itself, focus on victims. 
Prosecutions and other forms of retribution may provide victims a 
mea sure of justice, but these are not aimed primarily toward them. 
Indeed, following a successful trial, victims may still suffer disparage-
ment and marginalization while continuing to live with the terrible 
consequences of what happened to them.
Additionally, fellow citizens are less likely to view victims as equals 
while the state continues to ignore them. Recognizing victims as moral 
agents may help undermine apologist perpetrator narratives by recast-
ing the consequences of violence in terms of the victims’ experiences. 
This change in emphasis, from violators to those who suffered, can 
bring attention to the ways in which the endorsement of violent and 
exclusionary ideologies resulted in crimes with actual victims. This 
may erode the exclusionary po liti cal project of the perpetrators and, 
perhaps, create the possibility of achieving a more inclusive under-
standing of plurality and respect. In the following section I discuss the 
elements of a theory of recognition in transitional settings and then 
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follow with a consideration of some theoretical obstacles and problems 
peculiar to this context.
Theorizing Victim Recognition
Survivors’ reactions to a legacy of violence are complex and varied. 
Many may call for prosecutions of perpetrators, others may demand 
programs to help them cope with trauma, and still others simply prefer 
burying the past (Chakravarti 2008; Verdeja 2000, 2007). The varied 
responses point to the diffi culty of fashioning a general theory of victim 
recognition that holds across cases. Nevertheless, we can posit one objec-
tive: to restore victims’ dignity and provide adequate material support 
so that they may create meaningful lives, and do so in such a manner 
that neither patronizes them nor undermines their sense of moral 
agency. The goal should be to provide symbolic and material repara-
tions to victims while simultaneously not degrading them as impotent, 
lacking in agency, or incapable of achieving self- respect and worth.7
The debate surrounding the value of recognition has a long history. 
Most contemporary theorizations begin from the Hegelian position of 
identity construction based on a dialogical model of interaction. For 
theorists in this tradition, recognition is a reciprocal relation whereby 
subjects see each other as equals entitled to respect. Recognition is 
thus a principle aspect of subject formation. Beings become full indi-
viduals through mutual recognition, underscoring the fundamentally 
intersubjective (i.e., social) nature of identity formation. This idea that 
recognition through social praxis is fundamental to stable and healthy 
identities has been developed by a number of authors (Benjamin 1988, 
1995; Taylor 1994). Axel Honneth, for example, argues that a healthy 
notion of the self is a fundamental element of the good for individuals, 
and he elaborates the requirements for undistorted identity as consist-
ing of three key components: (1) self- confi dence, developed through 
affective relations between intimates and others who are emotionally 
proximate, (2) self- respect, accorded through the legal discourse of 
rights and implying the individual’s capacity for autonomous moral ac-
tion, and (3) self- esteem, developed through participation in commu-
nal activities and contributions to a meaningful, ethically substantive 
social life. These components are all developed through dialogical 
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interactions with other, equal subjects. Moreover, they are crucial for a 
healthy subject. Without them, the individual risks degenerating into 
pathologies of self- hatred and denigration (1996).8
Some thinkers take these insights signifi cantly further, arguing 
that the dynamics of individual recognition are mirrored at the macro 
level. Charles Taylor has discussed how patterns of individual misrec-
ognition parallel those of groups: If the self can suffer mistreatment 
through devaluation, the same holds for entire groups that are con-
sistently oppressed or suffer discrimination. They are unable to actu-
alize themselves satisfactorily, and natural cultural expression and 
maturation are truncated or, even worse, fatally arrested. For Taylor, 
“A person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if 
the people or society around them mirror back to them a confi ning or 
demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (1994, 25). Conse-
quently, certain groups require recognition of their uniqueness in 
some special, institutionalized manner, a claim that goes beyond the 
kind of recognition predicated on social equality— in other words, one 
that is difference- blind.
The criticisms of these approaches are well- known. Seyla Ben-
habib (2002) has persuasively argued that Taylor and others such as 
Will Kymlicka fall into traps of cultural essentialism, reifying group 
identities and privileging authenticity claims above basic justice con-
cerns. Nancy Fraser (2003) has criticized these overly psychologized 
multicultural approaches for a variety of reasons, including their in-
ability to defi ne satisfactory criteria for distinguishing between just 
and unjust authenticity claims (and the implicit essentialism this 
springs from), their reductive assumptions about the primacy of recog-
nition over injustices rooted in political- economic relations, and their 
inability to theorize from a more objective, so cio log i cal position that 
can distinguish between institutionalized/systematized patterns of 
subordination requiring justice and culturally salient differences that 
do not. Benhabib’s and Fraser’s observations are especially helpful in 
studying post- atrocity societies. Victim groups often make authenticity 
claims and special recognition demands in transitional settings. On 
the face of it, these claims appear quite legitimate, and indeed they 
often are; the individuals in question suffered devastating violations, 
offenses that may have been facilitated by historical patterns of cate-
gorical subordination and discrimination, but whose overwhelming 
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and immediate barbarity carry a poignant demand that we acknowl-
edge their experiences in some nontrivial fashion. The problem is in 
how we should acknowledge them, and what should be the criteria. 
Should we recognize victims as a way of enabling their ethical and 
moral self- realization, as Honneth would argue? While this approach 
may seem compelling, a theory of victim recognition based wholly on 
ethical self- realization runs into conceptual challenges because it is 
incapable of drawing the line between what constitutes satisfactory 
recognition and what exceeds it. Claims of self- realization, as Fraser 
points out, are “usually considered to be more restricted” than justice 
claims precisely because they are based on “historically specifi c hori-
zons of value” (2003, 28). The diffi culty  here arises with the potential 
development of so- called “cultures of victimhood,” where similar ex-
periences become a shared horizon of authenticity that demands cate-
gorical respect based not on the content of any par tic u lar claim but 
rather on the status of the speakers. In other words, in some scenarios 
victim group elites may transform their status as victims into a badge 
of irreproachable righ teousness used to make morally suspect claims 
(such as a right to oppress internal members), or point to their status as 
a way to dismiss otherwise valid criticisms or challenges. What if the 
elites of a par tic u lar group that suffered massive human rights viola-
tions, say an indigenous group, argue that proper recognition of their 
identity requires that the state not interfere with the internal subordi-
nation of a par tic u lar subgroup, such as women (Okin 1999; Warnke 
2000)? Should the state accede on the principle that this par tic u lar 
group was victimized and it now requires recognition? It is not uncom-
mon for a victim group to claim special recognition rights in the after-
math of massive violations, in effect trading on its moral capital to gain 
further rights, resources, or autonomy.
Of course, victim demands are not always morally dubious. Far 
from it. In fact they can often be sound, but the principle of ethical 
self- realization does not give us the conceptual tools necessary to de-
cide which claims are legitimate. For Taylor and Honneth, intersubjec-
tive recognition is a necessary condition for achieving undistorted, 
healthy identity. “The conception of ethical life,” writes Honneth, can 
articulate “the entirety of intersubjective conditions that can be 
shown to serve as necessary preconditions for individual self- 
realization” (1996, 173). However, to base a theory on claims of ethical 
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self- realization leaves us incapable of discriminating between justice 
claims and (nonuniversalizable) authenticity claims. A primary con-
cern should be to ensure that any model of victim recognition focus on 
questions of justice, or “right” (i.e., rather than the “good” entailed by 
an approach premised on ethical self- realization). Recognition of victims 
is crucial in transitional societies, but the aim should be for victims to 
reestablish their dignity and self- worth in such a way that permits 
them to be full participants in social and po liti cal life. This does not 
mean that all ethical claims are illegitimate. Rather, it means that 
these claims should be honored to the extent that they promote what 
Fraser (2003, 29) calls “reciprocal recognition and status equality,” a 
goal that is unachievable if victims continue to fi nd themselves ex-
cluded, marginalized, devalued, and forgotten.
Additionally, some theories of recognition tend to reduce all forms 
of injustice to symbolic misrecognition, while saying little about ma-
terial in e qual ity, except to consider the latter as a predicate form of 
injustice. Honneth subsumes the latter under the former when he 
writes, “the conception of recognition, when properly understood, 
can accommodate, indeed even entails, a modifi ed version of the 
Marxian paradigm of economic distribution . . .” (Fraser and Hon-
neth 2003, 3). However, victims often receive symbolic ac know ledg-
ment from the state, including an offi cial apology or monument in 
their in honor, but receive no material support. And yet, they are just 
as often left impoverished following mass violence, particularly where 
an entire ethnic group was targeted (e.g., the indigenous in Guatemala, 
blacks in South Africa). In this context, an apology is insuffi cient for 
social reintegration. Consequently, material in e qual ity requires theo-
retical elaboration in conjunction with symbolic forms, rather than 
being subsumed into the latter. The goal should be to recognize their 
experiences as a step toward overturning patterns of discrimination 
and violence.
Any theory of victim recognition, then, should include both mate-
rial and symbolic components, while avoiding claims of ethical self- 
realization to anchor it. As I have argued elsewhere, it does not follow 
that we must privilege liberal individualist rights and reject all collec-
tive claims (Verdeja 2008). That would miss the collective nature of 
violations, where groups  were targeted (however defi ned by the perpe-
trator) and abuses carried out systematically. It is necessary, however, 
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to distinguish between those policies that protect culturally essential-
ist claims and those that promote status parity among citizens. A theory 
that seeks status parity as a goal targets both symbolic misrecogni-
tion and material maldistribution. In terms of symbolic recognition, it 
should emphasize the elimination of cultural views that prevent indi-
viduals from recognizing each other as fellow citizens, to achieve what 
Fraser has termed the “intersubjective condition” of parity of partici-
pation (2003, 36). This requires the positive revaluation of “disre-
spected identities” and, more generally, cultural diversity, as well as 
the delegitimation of those social values that worked to justify violence 
and misrecognition (2003, 47). In terms of redistribution, it necessi-
tates addressing economic marginalization that prevents individuals 
from participating as equal citizens, and secures the “objective condi-
tion” of participation parity. This may include a number of initiatives, 
such as monetary compensation for abuse and increased development 
programs in places targeted by the violence. The ultimate goal is to 
restore victims’ dignity and self- worth so that they may participate 
fully in social, economic, and po liti cal life, achieving “reciprocal recog-
nition and status equality” with their peers (2003, 36). Without both 
material and symbolic strategies to correct past injustices, such a goal 
will remain unrealized. Achieving this goal requires both symbolic 
and material (i.e., redistributive) claims of justice. I use the terms vic-
tim recognition and victim ac know ledg ment in this broader sense of 
status parity (Fraser 2003) that includes both symbolic and material 
components.9
As I understand it, an account of victim recognition consists of four 
ideal- typical dimensions: “symbolic” and “material” along one axis (a 
typology of ac know ledg ment), and “collective” and “individual” along 
another (a categorization of recipients). These dimensions trace the 
scope and type of ac know ledg ment that should be accorded, and though 
different mechanisms are appropriate within each created space, they 
contribute to a coherent conceptualization of victim ac know ledg ment 
(Verdeja 2006). Below I introduce these four dimensions and follow 
with a discussion of the normative challenges that each faces.
In most cases of large- scale atrocity, crimes are directed at groups of 
some type, such as cultural, ethnic, religious, national, ideological, ra-
cial, or economic, and often, targeted groups cover different categories. 
In addition, targeted groups can overlap several different categories, 
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and violations may also be gender- specifi c (De Vito 2008; Jones 2006a, 
2006b). Because of this broadly collective dimension, victim ac know l-
edg ment requires theorization of a collective symbolic element. Rec-
ognizing this means publicly highlighting that violations  were part of 
an or ga nized, coherent strategy against designated collective “ene-
mies,” and not merely occasional “excesses” on the part of the perpe-
trators. Collective symbolic recognition requires recognizing both the 
way strategies of repression targeted victims as a group, and society 
and the state’s moral obligation to recognize their experiences and 
treat them as equal citizens. This means fi ghting discourses that blame 
victims for what happened to them. Such symbolic recognition can 
be made in many ways, including through offi cial apologies, public 
atonement, developing public spaces to honor victims, and establishing 
museums, monuments, and days of remembrance to promote and pre-
serve collective memory.
Crimes, of course, are not merely collective. Individual symbolic 
ac know ledg ment consists of the need to recognize victims as individu-
als and not simply place them in a residual category, thus reducing 
them to an amorphous group of passive, voiceless survivors. This in-
cludes drawing attention to how violence and repression affected indi-
viduals qua individuals, and reminds us that “victim experiences” are 
always more than the aggregate of similar stories, pointing to the im-
portance of recognizing actual persons who suffered in deeply personal 
ways. Such recognition can in practice be unattainable. Recognizing 
all victims in a meaningful sense is impossible when confronted with 
crimes of this magnitude, and not everyone can be given a space to 
speak publicly. Nevertheless, sensitivity to personal experiences is im-
portant because it underscores that victims are actual persons, not 
simply statistics. As the Argentine writer and torture survivor Jacobo 
Timerman (2002) reminds us, individual suffering is always more than 
a symbol of systematic crimes, and part of the pro cess of rehumanizing 
victims requires attention to this fact.10 Indeed, such recognition con-
tributes to reaffi rming their status as citizens, for it refl ects a sensitiv-
ity toward fellow humans that is a crucial element of any po liti cal order 
based upon demo cratic principles of equality and mutual respect. Cer-
tainly, symbolic individual recognition is not equivalent to the liberal 
demo cratic rights that accompany citizenship, but it is an important 
prerequisite. Without such recognition of individuals as individuals, 
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and as equals who deserve respect, it is unlikely that victims will main-
tain their status as citizens.
Symbolic recognition furthers victims’ sense of dignity and self- 
worth, while reaffi rming their place as fellow citizens— however, it 
does not address the material marginalization that is a common legacy 
of violence. Often, survivors are left impoverished by widespread or 
systematic violations, and special attention to their economic status is 
required if reparations are to be more than merely symbolic. Conse-
quently, reparations should include some form of material support that 
gives victims the capacity to lead meaningful and productive lives. One 
form this can take is collective material reparations. These reparations 
provide resources to victimized groups as a way of obtaining the mate-
rial basis and security required for them to participate fully in social, 
po liti cal, and economic life. They may include initiatives such as em-
ployment and housing assistance for groups whose economic situation 
was directly affected by the violence, physical and psychological sup-
port for trauma, and infrastructural investment in targeted communi-
ties (e.g., better roads, sanitation programs, rural education campaigns, 
credit allowances for economic development). Although the nature of 
the programs requires sensitivity to context and the par tic u lar needs 
of the victims, the programs share two characteristics: (1) they are 
for groups that  were targets of violence (and are thus collective) and 
(2) they are dependent on the redistribution of economic resources, 
with the aim of enhancing victims’ lives so that they may realistically 
pursue their life plans. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru indige-
nous groups  were the primary victims of po liti cal violence, and truth 
commissions called for signifi cant investments in public education, 
housing, employment, and economic development to offset the legacy 
of economic in e qual ity inherited from the civil wars. These mea sures 
can help raise the standard of living of the most damaged communities 
and contribute to reintegrating marginalized groups into society.
Combining reparations programs with broader development pro-
grams can be challenging. However, some theorists have argued that 
combining the two can have positive results.11 To be sure, society 
would most likely benefi t from increased economic development in 
poor areas. Nevertheless, combining these two programs can under-
mine the normative aspect of reparations, since doing so may sub-
merge the specifi cally moral dimension of reparative justice beneath 
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broader state policies to combat poverty (Wilson 2001). For many vic-
tims, reparations are a moral ac know ledg ment of wrongful suffering, 
and subsuming them into development strategies obscures this. What 
the state may consider reparations may very well be part of the duties 
it has toward its people as citizens. While employing a discourse of 
reparations may result in greater po liti cal and moral capital for state 
elites, it confuses the normative specifi city of reparations with broader 
obligations. Therefore, any reparations program should be sensitive to 
this risk, and should be crafted in such a way that maintains its dis-
tinctly normative dimension, for example, by explicitly invoking ele-
ments of symbolic recognition (e.g., apologies, days of remembrance), 
even if carried out simultaneously with general economic and infra-
structural development plans.
Finally, there is an individual material component to theorizing 
victim recognition. This, too, is a form of distributive justice, insofar 
as it addresses the importance of redistributing resources to victims, 
but places greater emphasis on the autonomy of individuals than the 
collective dimension discussed above. Of course, no compensation 
can substitute for death or torture, and in this sense money— or any 
reparatory measure— is always inadequate. But compensation can 
have an impact for eco nom ical ly destitute victims and show that the 
state’s recognition is not merely symbolic but also material and prac-
tical. Individualized reparation schemes normally include familial 
rehabilitation through access to medical, psychological, and legal 
ser vices, compensation for losses that can be mea sured fi nancially, 
economic redress for harms that are not easily quantifi able, and res-
titution of lost, stolen, or destroyed property. Individualized payment 
has the benefi t that it maximizes autonomy by allowing victims to use 
funds as they see fi t, and thus minimizes the paternalism inherent in 
collective material reparations (De Greiff 2006; Goodin 1989; Lo-
masky 1991).
Victim recognition is a crucial element of reconciliation. Whereas 
a commitment to truth seeking and to accountability has an impact on 
victims, a special focus needs to be given to individuals who suffered 
massive wrongs, not only as a way of reintegrating them into society 
as fellow citizens but also as a means of recognizing their worth and 
dignity as fellow humans— that is, as a way of according them moral 
respect.
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Rule of Law
The fi nal normative component of reconciliation as respect is the rule 
of law. Many commentators have identifi ed the reestablishment of the 
rule of law— understood as cogent general rules that constrain the ac-
tions of the state and establish minimum legal protections for the citi-
zenry— as an important element in demo cratic transitions (Hampton 
1994; Kleinfeld 2005; Nino 1996; Plunkett 1998; Scheuerman 1994). 
Adopting the rule of law refl ects the state’s commitment to preventing 
the recurrence of such violations by reforming relevant state institu-
tions, such as the judiciary and security apparatus. For transitional so-
cieties, however, it means more than this. It also means redrawing the 
boundaries of politics. Of par tic u lar importance is tracing some basic 
normative principles emphasizing that po liti cal differences will not be 
resolved violently— rather, po liti cal contestation remains bound within 
formal and informal spheres of deliberation and negotiation. Conse-
quently, there are two dimensions to the rule of law: one institutional 
and the other normative. Although I focus on the latter in this book, both 
elements are necessary for reconciliation, and I briefl y discuss the institu-
tional component below before turning to the normative aspect.12
Institutional Dimension of the Rule of Law
Institutional reform of the rule of law in post- atrocity societies normally 
addresses the judiciary, police/state security apparatus, and prison sys-
tem, though the specifi cs of this largely depend on the condition of the 
legal system at the point of the transition.13 These conditions can vary 
widely. Rama Mani (2003) has usefully outlined the relative function-
ality and legitimacy of different systems across numerous transitional 
cases. Mani notes that in some transitional cases, the legal system still 
operates, though its legitimacy has largely eroded after years of sanc-
tioning clearly abusive policies by the state. Specifi cally, the judiciary 
continues to function and refers to existing law and statutes. Trials, 
however problematic, are still held for po liti cal detainees. Neverthe-
less, the rule of law is employed as an instrument of repression by the 
state, and is considered illegitimate by broad sections of the popula-
tion. The state uses the law as a veil behind which it coerces the 
judiciary— and often the parliament, if one exists— for its own po liti cal 
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ends. Chile, Argentina, and South Africa fall under this rubric. In 
these situations, legal positivism is insuffi cient to guarantee pop u lar 
trust in the state’s commitment to the rule of law because the space 
between written law and pop u lar conceptions of justice remains so 
wide.
In other instances the rule of law may be signifi cantly weaker. 
 Here, a judiciary and legal order exists throughout the period of vio-
lence, but enjoys no autonomy or claims to impartiality. Most persons 
have no recourse to the legal system; the law becomes an instrument 
of power for corrupt elites. Public trust in the law disintegrates com-
pletely and the rule of law is progressively evacuated of any meaning, 
ultimately becoming a parody of itself. El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Zimbabwe fi t this category almost perfectly.
In yet other situations the entire legal system may collapse and 
no or ga nized system of law, however corrupt and illegitimate, sur-
vives. Under situations of chronic war and massive population dislo-
cation, a country can fall into chaos and power is exerted largely 
through direct violence and explicit coercion. In these conditions, 
formal legal systems are dismantled or dissolve on their own. Cam-
bodia under the Khmer Rouge and Somalia exhibit this situation 
most accurately— in neither country  were even traces of a legal order 
left after the violence.
This triptych is not meant to be exhaustive, and cases may show 
signs of all three stages at different historical periods. Identifying varia-
tions in the demise of the rule of law points to the multiplicity of ob-
stacles that reform efforts face, and it follows that different cases exhibit 
differing needs based on their contexts. Nevertheless, what unites all of 
these societies is the need for a robust, fair, and transparent legal order 
as an institutional sine qua non of long- term reconciliation.
In all of these scenarios, building public trust in state institutions 
is an important aim of reform. As such, the commitment to the rule of 
law is not only a technical matter of policy implementation and effi -
ciency but also a normative enterprise. The state fosters trust by show-
ing it recognizes the rights of its citizens and places clear, consistent 
limits over its authority. This includes respecting standard liberal rights 
such as freedom of speech and association; the right to personal bodily 
integrity and property; protection against arbitrary detention, arrest, 
or exile; freedom of movement; and other rights that place restrictions 
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on arbitrary state power. It should also include some basic rights that 
seek to maximize the individual’s ability to participate in the po liti cal 
life of his or her country, such as the right to vote.14
Normative Dimension of the Rule of Law
To the extent that the rule of law is a normative concept, it also directly 
engages with the constitution of the po liti cal realm. How do we under-
stand politics in a post- confl ict scenario? What are the limits of po liti-
cal contestation, that is, the boundaries between acceptable politics 
and violent coercion? The reforms discussed above, while fundamen-
tal, do not answer these questions. The commitment to the rule of law 
also highlights the ability of citizens to discuss and debate po liti cally 
relevant issues without turning to violence or threats of violence. In 
the aftermath of violence, it is not uncommon for groups to threaten to 
abandon the realm of debate if they feel that it is unlikely that they will 
achieve their aims. Even securing this liminal state can be exceedingly 
diffi cult, as recent experiences of violence and terror are likely to feed 
demands for vengeance and sow mistrust.
Admittedly, the idea of a liminal commitment to peace still falls 
short of the “rule of law” concept as normally understood in liberal 
demo cratic theory. This thin conceptualization has more in common 
with the agonistic notion of contestation found in the works of Schmit-
tians like Chantal Mouffe.15 For Mouffe, politics is characterized by 
“the vibrant clash of po liti cal positions and an open confl ict of po liti cal 
interests” that emerges from the basic friend/foe po liti cal category. Be-
cause democracy is never fully realizable in any substantive sense (say 
through the articulation of a Rousseauian “general will”), the best we 
can expect is a model that accepts the “impossibility of a world without 
antagonism” while demanding that “the opponent should not be con-
sidered an enemy to be destroyed but as an adversary whose existence 
is legitimate and must be tolerated” (1997, 4). That is, the most we can 
hope for is a po liti cal order that allows for as much contestation as pos-
sible without devolving into a violent politics of power. Mouffe’s under-
standing of politics as agonistic is helpful because it draws attention 
to the incompatibility of essentialist po liti cal claims and demo cratic 
politics: The attempt to fuse the two, through authoritarian mass mo-
bilizations and plebiscitary politics, is often the harbinger of future 
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po liti cal violence. But her understanding of politics as barely contain-
ing confl ict is normatively too thin, particularly in transitional situa-
tions where po liti cal discourse is already badly impoverished and there 
is little if any commitment to peaceful debate. Some deliberative demo-
crats have attempted to move beyond this liminal understanding while 
still maintaining the complexity and irreducibility that “radical demo-
crats” such as Mouffe emphasize.
David Crocker has been one of the most forceful defenders of de-
liberation in transitional settings. Drawing from the works of James 
Bohman and Amy Gutmann, Crocker argues that society “should aim 
to include public debate and deliberation in its goals and strategies for 
transitional justice” (2000, 108). Nevertheless, he is careful to note that 
the commitment to deliberation is not in itself a solution to pervasive 
inequalities or animosity. He acknowledges that it is unlikely that in 
“any given society, there will be full agreement about the aims and 
means for dealing with past abuses,” especially in a nation recently 
experiencing massive violence (2000, 109). But the goal of deliberation 
committed to the rule of law is to attenuate deep disagreements 
through public debate, allowing all affected sides to participate and 
seek “morally acceptable” compromises. In transitional situations, 
achieving this constitutes a signifi cant po liti cal victory. A somewhat 
stronger understanding institutionalizes deliberation through proce-
duralist mechanisms of legitimacy formation. This, in turn, requires a 
deliberative pro cess governed by principles of equality and reciprocity 
among participants and the right to initiate, debate, and question the 
content of discussion. The procedures themselves grant legitimacy to 
the outcome of debate. As Seyla Benhabib (1996, 72) notes, “Procedures 
can neither dictate outcomes nor defi ne the quality of the reasons ad-
vanced in argumentation nor control the quality of the reasoning or 
rules of logic and inference used by participants. Procedural models of 
rationality are undetermined.”16 Thus, the substantive good of social 
life must remain open; the model remains silent on what constitutes 
ethically appropriate social relations. This is one crucial difference in 
the construction of the po liti cal sphere between a demo cratic and a 
totalitarian regime. In the latter instance, laws and procedures are 
subordinated to the creation of an ethically homogeneous society, with 
all of the violence and “purifi cation” that this entails. In a demo cratic 
polity, the confl ict of values and interests is taken for granted, and 
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thus the procedural mechanisms in place to pro cess and contain them 
offer the grounds for legitimacy. The law, understood as a codifi ed se-
ries of procedural norms that both limit and permit the possibility of 
debate (i.e., limits debate insofar as it prohibits the recourse to vio-
lence, and permits debate by granting a space for deliberation free 
from coercion and threat of force), helps move a society from violence 
toward deliberation. The commitment to the rule of law, then, means 
agreeing to deliberate within a recognized system of rules rather than 
turning to violence to solve disagreements. As such, it is more robust 
than the liminal conception arrived at by Mouffe (1997), but remains 
wary of the integrative understanding of politics promoted by advo-
cates of “forgiveness in politics,” discussed in the fi rst chapter. This 
understanding of deliberation is essentially proceduralist: It focuses on 
the procedures developed through open and fair deliberation to give 
future decisions their legitimacy and binding power. 
While this notion of rule of law may seem theoretically overbur-
dened since it includes some of the normative criteria of deliberative 
demo cratic theory, I do not believe it is, at least not in the sense I use 
it  here. The commitments to robust debate through meaningful po liti-
cal participation can be satisfi ed only if basic principles of equality 
before the law are adopted and violence is rejected. It is in this sense 
that I use the rule of law to address the importance of peaceful, impas-
sioned debate to replace the politics of violence, and as a fundamental 
component of reconciliation. I do not mean it in a theoretically more 
substantive sense requiring a par tic u lar set of institutional mecha-
nisms and theoretical links between power, money, and solidarity, as 
found in, for example, Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms (1996). 
While these discussions are important, the theoretical postulates de-
veloped from analyzing consolidated, capitalist democracies are of a 
different order from the cases under study  here. Nor do I follow Hab-
ermas in positing a strongly rationalist grounding to deliberation. As I 
discuss in Chapter 5 on civil society, any theory of deliberation for 
post- atrocity societies cannot assume that competing groups mutually 
espouse rational rules of discourse, a commitment to forging consen-
sus, or even have shared background norms that allow for a common 
understanding of the rules of debate.
Alone, the normative dimension of the rule of law may seem silent 
on issues of social justice and the uneven po liti cal standing of different 
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participants. In the aftermath of massive po liti cal violence, a model 
that emphasizes deliberation without refl ecting on the material condi-
tions necessary to ensure that participants actually have some equal 
standing in debate could be accused of naïveté, or worse, deliberately 
perpetuating modes of domination under the false pretense of liberal 
(or discursive) equality. But in keeping with the fundamentally inte-
grative approach of my understanding of reconciliation, I emphasize 
that this goal must be understood in concert with the material compo-
nent of victim recognition discussed earlier. As indicated there, victims 
cannot be expected to make meaningful, dignifi ed lives and become 
full citizens without securing a substratum of material well- being. As 
such, the model proposed  here is not silent on social justice but merely 
separates it from the theoretically distinct concerns of the rule of law 
and deliberation (though of course, if debates about distributive justice 
become salient in the public sphere, the distinction is minimized). 
Furthermore, a commitment to the rule of law requires a certain mea-
sure of accountability, for only if authoritarian enclaves are removed 
and citizens are bound by principles of open debate without the threat 
of violence, can the rule of law as normative principle be achieved.17 It 
is, thus, constitutively interrelated with other principles.
I have laid out the principle elements of my theory of reconciliation, which centers on moral respect with the corollary norms of truth, 
accountability, victim recognition, and the rule of law. One may under-
standably ask whether this conception of po liti cal reconciliation is 
overly Kantian and Western. Does the focus on respect allow it to 
speak to societies whose cultural values are more communitarian and 
less focused on the individual? What of those places where morality is 
understood in collective terms and the individual is not at the center of 
moral theorizing? These are important concerns, and I should stress 
that I am not arguing for a full- fl edged theory of liberal reconciliation, 
premised on privileging the moral individual as conceptually prior to 
society. The concept of respect  here emphasizes the intersubjectivity 
of moral identity formation, and while it admittedly has conceptual 
roots in philosophical language associated with Kantian individualism 
and rationality, it is not reducible to its origins. Indeed, the basic moral 
categories of dignity and self- worth emerge in victim narratives in 
myriad post- confl ict settings across the world, even if they are not 
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framed in this specifi c language (Beah 2008; Hatzfeld 2008; Lifton 
1991; Szymusiak 1999). There are many moral vocabularies tied to 
par tic u lar religious, cultural, and philosophical traditions that speak to 
the importance of the individual’s dignity, and Enlightenment thought 
is only one of these traditions. In any case, my discussion of respect is 
neither premised on monadic individualism, as should be evident from 
my emphasis on intersubjective moral recognition as one of its corner-
stones, nor based on Kantian rationality devoid of emotional or expres-
sive content, as I showed in discussing the importance of phenomeno-
logical truth and recognition. My account of reconciliation as respect, 
then, should not be taken as an endorsement of liberal individualism or 
rationality over social theories of ethical life. I believe that reconcilia-
tion as respect is suffi ciently elastic to operate usefully in the types of 
cases under consideration  here. More importantly, perhaps, is the sim-
ple observation that survivors in numerous cultural contexts— from 
Latin America to Southeast Asia to Africa to North America— often 
frame human rights violations not only as physical and emotional 
harms but also as moral wrongs. That is, they experience and retell 
these harms in moral language premised on expectations of moral re-
spect, and their anger and resentment draw on the assumption that the 
perpetrators should have honored their claims to dignity and to moral 
personhood. It is this idea of respect as recognition of a person’s inher-
ent dignity that I am stressing  here and that emerges across settings of 
mass violence.
Establishing whether such reconciliation has been adequately 
achieved is obviously quite diffi cult. Of course, so cio log i cal studies, 
anthropological ethnographies, and surveys can offer much- needed 
insights into overall patterns (Gibson 2004), but  here I want to put 
forth a rough way to mea sure progress: When confl ict- era forms of 
po liti cal identifi cation are no longer the primary ways of determining 
po liti cal loyalty, some success has been achieved. Po liti cal violence and 
the rhetoric surrounding it depend on a strongly binary logic of iden-
tity. In- groups use language that constructs a tightly knit community 
while simultaneously disparaging and dehumanizing out- groups: This 
is po liti cal identity logic at its most theoretically elegant and empiri-
cally venomous. These distinctions can remain relatively stable, rein-
forcing systematic devaluation and social exclusion (Apter 1998; Levine 
and Campbell 1972; Staub 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Zimbardo 
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2004). While it is impossible (and undesirable) to remove all distinc-
tions and forms of differentiation from po liti cal life, since a constitu-
tive element of politics is in fact differentiation, we can say that mutual 
respect and tolerance have been achieved to the extent that previous 
loyalties (i.e., from the period of violence) are mitigated through the 
development of alternate, overlapping po liti cal identities. Thus, the 
traditional in- group/out- group distinctions are no longer evident, or at 
least are no longer primary. This does not mean that po liti cal contesta-
tion is over, that economic stability is just over the horizon, or that de-
mocracy is fi nally and thankfully  here. But it does mean that the most 
salient forms of po liti cal identity that characterized the era of violence 
can no longer mobilize the passion and viciousness they once did. This 
is a sign that former enemies are working together, even if only toward 
their new set of shared interests.
The conception of reconciliation as respect is intimately tied to the 
other normative concepts presented in this chapter. A culture that val-
ues tolerance and espouses deliberation rather than violence to resolve 
differences cannot emerge where the past is unexamined or where ter-
rible crimes are justifi ed. An honest and truthful understanding of the 
past is morally necessary, even though this can be painful for victims 
and unsettling for those who supported the perpetrators. Accountabil-
ity, too, is necessary, for without some sign that impunity is inexcusable, 
victims continue to feel marginalized and citizens are not particularly 
moved to treat one another as equals. Impunity, and the language of 
superiority and contempt that often accompanies it, refl ects a deep 
disdain for the rights of individuals. Closely tied to this is the impor-
tance of recognizing victims as moral equals and fellow citizens. With-
out meaningful efforts to recognize them, victims are likely to remain 
mistreated or ignored, receiving none of the respect and dignity they 
deserve. And the rule of law plays an important role in guaranteeing 
that personal rights will be respected, the state will remain bound by 
law, and po liti cal differences should be resolved peacefully, even if still 
contentiously. All of these normative concerns are important if recon-
ciliation is to mean more than merely the temporary absence of violence 
where the powers of the past remain able to intimidate and coerce 
their opponents.
The key concepts of reconciliation are normatively dependent on 
one another, and thus the manifestation of one requires the develop-
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ment of the rest. Each normative concept is related to the others— 
they engage one another and presuppose each other, thus achievement 
of one is only partial if not accompanied by the others. The multivalent 
model is integrative, in the sense that it includes all of the concepts as 
crucial aspects for its sound actualization. They are necessary to pro-
mote a conception of reconciliation understood as reciprocal respect, 
which is the most we can expect from transitional societies. The fol-
lowing chapters are devoted to showing how the concepts interact 
across social space and how they may reinforce or undermine the proj-
ect of reconciliation in different settings. We now turn to reconcilia-
tion at the level of po liti cal society.
❖
E
stablishing a new po liti cal order after mass violence is a delicate 
and fraught pro cess. The members of po liti cal society, the po liti-
cal elite, must balance a number of competing goals. They may, 
for example, choose to prosecute those responsible for crimes, there-
fore risking the dissolution of a fragile peace and the resumption of 
violence. Others may persecute their adversaries using the full power 
of the state, and thus weaken the rule of law. Leaders are also con-
fronted with the diffi cult decision of how to allocate resources, that is, 
the choice between the par tic u lar demands for victim reparations and 
the general needs for economic development. In addition, elites must 
work within the set of constraints that  were inherited from the transi-
tion. In some cases, there may be few limitations on their ability to 
pass preferred policies, as may happen in the aftermath of a war where 
one side decisively defeats the other; in other scenarios, they may be 
severely handicapped by concessions that  were given to previous elites 
who still retain some power.
While the particularities of the transition are important for gauging 
the range of possible policies open to leaders, there are nevertheless 
several ways elites can promote reconciliation. First, they can endorse 
peaceful po liti cal contestation over violence as the main means for 
dealing with confl ict. This entails rethinking the domain of politics in 
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such a way that replaces violence and threats with a commitment to 
respect pluralism and debate within the bounds of law. Combined 
with respect for the rule of law, such a change in elite po liti cal behav-
ior signals the population about the nature of post- atrocity politics.
Additionally, elites can infl uence interpretations of the past. They 
may spearhead efforts to recognize injustice and shape society’s un-
derstanding of its history by focusing on the origins of the confl ict and 
encouraging public debate about violence and responsibility. However, 
elites should resist ignoring prior violations or promoting social amne-
sia by encouraging citizens to turn away from the past, and should 
avoid equating reconciliation with agreement among themselves to avoid 
the diffi cult issues of guilt and justice. Because of their special place in 
the public realm, they have a responsibility to promote thoughtful and 
honest debate about the past.
Elites can further reconciliation by promoting museums, monu-
ments, and other public art— what Pierre Nora (1996) calls memory 
sites— that make the violent past part of a shared historical narrative. 
Such sites redefi ne how society relates to the past, and can engender 
the kind of passionate (and painful) debate necessary to undermine 
collective amnesia or triumphalist histories that implicitly legitimate 
violations. An additional important and increasingly pop u lar step 
elites may take is to offer a formal apology in the name of the state, 
or in the name of groups or institutions they represent (e.g., armed 
forces, former guerrilla movements), thus furthering the pro cess of 
recognizing the suffering of victims and achieving victim ac know l-
edg ment. Apologies give symbolic recognition of the suffering of indi-
viduals, and in the pro cess reaffi rm their moral worth and dignity in a 
strong, public manner. Because of their increasing popularity, in this 
chapter I focus on the normative status of public apologies. Public 
apologies have become particularly pop u lar in elite discourse over the 
past twenty years, and a detailed theoretical discussion of their 
strengths and weaknesses can illuminate a great deal about these at-
tempts at promoting reconciliation and its complex relation toward 
establishing successor legitimacy and achieving po liti cal aims. While 
this chapter discusses several actions po liti cal society can take, the 
subsequent chapter is devoted to a consideration of certain key state 
institutions— truth commissions and the judiciary— that also directly 
engage issues of reconciliation.
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Before turning to an analysis of elite actions and apologies more 
specifi cally, I provide a discussion of what I mean by po liti cal society 
and the general transitional constraints affecting elite action.
Po liti cal Society, Transitional Constraints, 
and Reconciliation
The literature on po liti cal society is large, and includes much disagree-
ment on the precise boundaries between formal po liti cal life and in-
formal po liti cal mobilization. Nevertheless, most po liti cal scientists 
differ more on their understandings of the relation between civil and 
po liti cal society than on the defi nition of po liti cal society per se. This 
makes it somewhat easier to arrive at a working defi nition than one 
found in civil society debates, where the very defi nition of civil society is 
open to some contestation. Scholars normally defi ne po liti cal society to 
include legislators (i.e., the executive and others who occupy decision-
 making positions in government), as well as the po liti cal parties to 
which these individuals belong. This requires a formal space such as 
parliaments where these elites compete through legitimate means for 
the exercise of control over public authority and state institutions. 
Their “primary goal is to win control of the state or at least some posi-
tion for themselves within it” (Diamond 1999, 221; Linz and Stepan 
1996). Po liti cal society is distinct from civil society, which includes 
those actors who are self- organized and who publicly mobilize to pro-
mote their values and interests with the ultimate goal of shaping public 
policy and discourse, but not the seizure of formal po liti cal power. Po-
liti cal society is also distinct from economic society, as the latter is 
primarily concerned with organizations dealing with production and 
distribution (J. Cohen and Arato 1992).
Their status means that po liti cal elites enjoy signifi cant infl uence 
on social and po liti cal debates over a nation’s treatment of its past. 
Elites help determine whether ignorance or meaningful refl ection be-
comes the accepted way of looking at the past, though they do not, by 
themselves, determine whether reconciliation occurs, as this includes 
a larger set of social actors and institutions. Elites can, however, frame 
public perceptions of victims and generally set the pa ram e ters for real-
istic and unrealistic expectations of reconciliation. Through public 
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speeches and actions, they establish the terms in which victims and 
others will be perceived, having a powerful effect on whether the tar-
gets of state violence will be considered full members of a new society 
or fall short of satisfactory moral and legal recognition. Thus, po liti cal 
society remains crucial for reconciliation.
Elite maneuverability to address the past is shaped by the par tic u-
lar nature of the transition. In some circumstances, particularly those 
following a war or revolution where one side is the clear winner, suc-
cessor elites enjoy more po liti cal space to institute new policies for 
reconciliation if they so choose, though they may be materially con-
strained due to war damage or general economic underdevelopment. 
Nevertheless, they are likely to encounter little if any elite po liti cal op-
position (e.g., as in the case of Rwanda). Many transitions, however, 
have not occurred in the aftermath of a complete overthrow but rather 
 were achieved through negotiation among different incoming and out-
going elite factions. Po liti cal scientists have called the agreements de-
veloping from these negotiations “pacts,” or explicit agreements by 
leaders of opposing sides to shape the rules of governance and power 
in ways that protect their par tic u lar interests (O’Donnell, Schmitter, 
and Whitehead 1986, 4:37). Pacted transitions occur where outgoing 
leaders still maintain suffi cient power to partially shape future po liti-
cal arrangements and protect themselves from certain threats. The 
consequences of such transitions are most obvious on the issue of ac-
countability. Often, powerful outgoing elites guilty of crimes demand 
some form of legal protection, such as an amnesty. This is a function, 
of course, of the exiting leaders’ relative power, and where they are 
weak their chances of securing protection are reduced (Huntington 
1993).
Consequently, successor elites faced with powerful opponents en-
joy limited options for securing accountability. The range of these op-
tions depends on the specifi cs of the transition. In Spain, Francoist 
groups negotiated from a position of power and secured an amnesty 
and commitment not to delve into the past, a situation that has only 
begun to change relatively recently; Uruguayan military leaders suc-
cessfully resisted civilian demands for justice, and an amnesty was re-
affi rmed through a pop u lar vote driven by fear of a coup. In Argentina 
the military lost much of its po liti cal capital after its defeat in the 
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Falklands War, and thus negotiated from a somewhat weaker position 
during the 1983 transition. Nevertheless, subsequent threats to launch 
a coup proved that the military still maintained signifi cant power, a 
view reinforced by the amnesty laws that followed (and  were not over-
turned until 2005). Chile represents perhaps the most remarkable case 
of a pacted transition, with a military securing amnesty and an in de-
pen dent bud get. For many Chileans, these  were necessary concessions 
for reinstating civilian rule and keeping a second coup at bay. Only 
within the last ten years, following Pinochet’s arrest in London in 
1998, have human rights trials even been considered possible. Govern-
ment leaders in Sierra Leone offered an amnesty and cabinet position 
to Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in the Lomé Peace Ac-
cords as a way of stabilizing the country, but even this gesture was 
unable to secure peace, and the country fell back into war until mili-
tary intervention led by the British largely defeated the insurgents 
(Barahona de Brito, González- Enríquez, Aguilar 2001; McAdams 
2001; Mason and Meernik 2006).
These examples illustrate how par tic u lar empirical constraints can 
shape the options open to transitional societies. Successor elites are 
often unable— or, given the constraints, unwilling— to seek robust ac-
countability or broad truth telling for fear that peace will collapse. 
Nevertheless, constraints are not impossibilities; they provide a limited 
domain of action, but action is still possible. There are options, even 
moral ones, which elites can use to promote reconciliation in some way, 
even under diffi cult conditions. In the following sections, I discuss sev-
eral of these options, with a focus on the use of public apologies.
Po liti cal Elites and the Normative 
Dimension of the Rule of Law
Po liti cal elites play an important role in reframing appropriate forms of 
po liti cal behavior, including emphasizing the importance of debate 
and deliberation over violence and respect for the rule of law. We 
should not dismiss the importance of such reframing. Where one side 
dominates the new state of affairs (e.g., as in Rwanda or Cambodia), 
rejecting authoritarian rule in favor of inclusive politics is less likely, 
especially where leaders see po liti cal affi liation in absolutist terms and 
there are few restraints on imposing single- party rule. Successors may 
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consider power a legitimate spoil of victory to be used on enemies, as 
consistently shown by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Conversely, 
pacted transitions may result in an ossifi ed po liti cal culture where con-
tinued mistrust and hatred prevent the emergence of the reciprocal 
norms of respect and openness to po liti cal compromise. The violence 
of the previous era is displaced into politics, and authoritarian apolo-
gists continue to equate po liti cal success with resisting demo cratic 
politics and power sharing. The possibility of securing a sustainable 
po liti cal order in these conditions is low, since signifi cant tensions re-
main. Of course, even if leaders adopt nonviolent po liti cal negotiation, 
the broader population may remain unmoved. Elite cooperation is 
important, undoubtedly, but even this may result in a demo cratic defi -
cit if leaders are perceived to work together for their own benefi t and 
the broader population enjoys little ability to infl uence them (a com-
mon perception, for example, in Nicaragua).
What then, can we expect from po liti cal elites? At the very least, 
leaders should show their commitment to the rule of law and renounce 
violence. This requires accepting the limits of contestation (i.e., vio-
lence is eschewed in favor of deliberation), and stating a commitment 
to the general “rules of the demo cratic game.” Leaders should accept 
basic laws that limit state power and acknowledge the right of all sides 
to compete for power. This requires more than merely stating these 
commitments; leaders must reaffi rm them through practice, for only 
by doing demo cratic politics are these basic norms and values rein-
forced over time (Linz 1978).
Elites shape po liti cal culture, and through their actions and speech 
signal to the population what kinds of behavior are proper in demo-
cratic society.1 Establishing the necessary norms of po liti cal engage-
ment is possible only when important actors are unwilling to oppose 
the legitimacy of demo cratic and constitutional rule. Undoubtedly, 
there will almost always be spoilers and others who advocate vio-
lence; the key is to marginalize them suffi ciently so that they do not 
represent a threat to the fl edgling demo cratic state and the adoption of 
demo cratic norms. Crucially, then, major elites from across the po liti-
cal spectrum must act in ways that show respect for the rule of law and 
the new po liti cal order. Adopting a deliberative form of politics shows 
such a change in behavior. The deliberative approach, as is well- known, 
is centered on the communicative power of civil society— it both 
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checks and gives legitimacy to po liti cal society discourse. Neverthe-
less, some of its theoretical claims are helpful  here to understand how 
elite discourse should be framed. The core of the approach is its em-
phasis on public deliberation among a broad scope of actors to develop 
appropriate state policies. Obviously, deliberation is not endless nor 
“unfettered,” if by this we mean that there are no rules guiding dis-
course and decision making; elites in parliament operate in what Nancy 
Fraser (1997, 90) calls “strong publics, whose discourse encompasses 
both opinion formation and decision making.”2 Thus, in addition to 
deliberation they are tasked with reaching binding conclusions, or 
laws. Furthermore, these actors deliberate within a set of rules (e.g., 
basic procedures for debating, making decisions on legislation). But 
the point  here is more general. A new parliamentary body containing 
profound cleavages should adopt the basic norms of debate and open-
ness to input from the public.3 Opponents develop new relations among 
one another to the extent that they are forced to give reasons for poli-
cies and laws and work to secure at least some degree of consensus on 
common challenges. Such a new relationship can be rather thin and 
instrumental, and not signal deep agreement or the disappearance of 
distrust. In fact, a small but important accomplishment is simply ac-
cepting terms on how to disagree with one another. Nevertheless, 
spirited debate can signal to the population what constitutes proper 
po liti cal behavior. In a parliamentary setting, elites are forced to inter-
act with one another in the search for mutually acceptable ends, and 
over time and through rounds of negotiation and argument they may 
come to see that po liti cal success need not always be mea sured in 
zero- sum terms. Rather, the legitimacy of par tic u lar policy outcomes 
should be seen as a product of the durability and legitimacy of the 
rules or practices of debate, so that disagreement and contention oc-
cupy a prominent but not necessarily destructive role in po liti cal life. 
In this regard, the turn toward deliberative politics represents a major 
shift from a politics based on violence and coercion, that is, where 
rightness is equated with power.
Elites must also endeavor to reestablish, or establish for the fi rst 
time, public trust in the state. At the very least, the state should have 
clear limitations on its power and show respect for the rights of its citi-
zens, as well as ensure citizen access to politics through voting and 
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holding offi ce. Rebuilding public trust takes a great deal of time, and 
its success is not amenable to easy mea sure ment. Furthermore, trust 
can be damaged by other events that are not directly related to human 
rights, such as severe corruption (Philip 2008; Reno 2008). Some of 
this probably is unavoidable and should be expected. Western consoli-
dated democracies rarely enjoy deep and sustained public trust in state 
institutions, and it is naïve to expect more from fragile, transitional 
societies. Rather, what we should aim for is the generation of basic so-
cial trust in the main state institutions associated with past violence, 
such as the police, armed forces, and the judiciary. The judiciary must 
be autonomous and function transparently according to basic rules of 
due pro cess and security forces must remain under the control and 
authority of civilian leadership. Po liti cal society more generally also 
must show itself responsive to public will. Indeed, the rule of law aims 
to “lessen the risk of conferring trust, by lending assurances to expec-
tations about how others will behave. Creating trust is thus a long- 
standing purpose of legal rule and institutions” (Osiel 1997, 38), which 
can be promoted only if elites are committed to enforcing the rule 
of law.
Securing the rule of law and showing a commitment to debate and 
demo cratic practice are undoubtedly important— achieving these 
goals constitutes a signifi cant step away from the threat of violence. A 
society emerging from war or severe authoritarian rule can take some 
mea sure of confi dence that these are important accomplishments, par-
ticularly when considering the alternatives. But elites can do more and 
should be expected to do so. More substantively, leaders should be 
tasked with bringing to public attention past wrongs that have remained 
hidden and retelling national history to incorporate these experiences. 
By bringing these experiences to the public, leaders can start a larger 
discussion about the consequences of abuses. They can also confront 
and resist consistent denials about the past to help the public overcome 
the painful and damaging silence that often follows violent histories. 
Without elite recognition, abuse remains a topic relegated to private 
discussion and solitary suffering, given little attention in schools or in 
the media.
Mere recognition, of course, is not enough. It is not uncommon for 
leaders to acknowledge violations but then treat them superfi cially; 
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more is required if the justifi cations of perpetrators are to be interro-
gated, resisted, and overturned. Michael Ignatieff (1996, 113) has 
called the past an “argument,” that is, a narrative that is interpreted 
and fought over in many ways. Po liti cal leaders can contribute to these 
arguments by encouraging critical investigations of the past, highlight-
ing the experiences of victims, and calling for public refl ection on 
complicity and responsibility. This is more than simply the recognition 
of past wrongs in some passive sense; it highlights the need to con-
demn wrongs and those who committed them, and requires deeper 
and broader refl ection on issues of responsibility and obligation toward 
fellow citizens. It entails a shift in how society sees itself and the obli-
gation that citizens refl ect on who is part of their moral community.
Public memory projects can begin this pro cess of reinterpretation 
and refl ection. These can include monuments, memorial parks, and 
museums that serve as signposts to give shape and contour to broader 
historical memory. Some authors note their importance by claiming 
that “people are forgetful and need their social memory bolstered by 
powerful mnemonic devices,” and “monuments are needed to transmit 
it across generations” (Savage 1994, 129). These projects are not, of 
course, fi nal statements on the past, and should not be seen or used as 
such, though the temptations can be strong; as both moral and po liti-
cal devices, they are part of a larger struggle over collective memory 
and identity. Rather, they should be understood as encouraging citi-
zens to refl ect critically on the past, fomenting public discussion and 
deep moral refl ection. Public memory sites not only honor victims and 
acknowledge their suffering but also demand a reassessment of soci-
ety’s obligations to its members. In this respect, then, they are critical 
devices, for they question what kinds of historical interpretations are 
normatively appropriate. But they are also symbolically laden, for they 
serve a ritualistic role in reconceiving society’s sense of itself. This is 
clear in the tendency of victim memorial sites to draw our attention to 
how the abuses  were wrongs not only against specifi c individuals but 
also against society as such. Placing victims at the center of such narra-
tives challenges society to rethink the moral consequences of past vio-
lence, and its own responsibility for the abuse. Nevertheless, no public 
memory site can give a defi nitive, authoritative history; individuals ap-
proach the past from different perspectives and consequently draw 
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different interpretations about its signifi cance. Memory sites cannot 
determine these interpretations, as tempting as this may be, but they 
can situate them by providing a framework for making sense of history. 
In Chile, a public park and memorial was created on the site of one the 
military’s most infamous torture centers, Villa Grimaldi, and today it 
serves as a physical marker of a reconceived social imaginary, offering 
a stark and powerful counter- memory to the triumphalist discourse of 
the Pinochet regime and its apologists. In Argentina, the state- backed 
Museo de la Memoria has functioned as a place where survivors’ myr-
iad individual stories are connected to the larger events of the Dirty 
War, and the exhibit allows such personal stories to resonate with the 
larger public in the creation of a new history. In Sierra Leone and Li-
beria, incoming governments have sought to reposition victims at the 
center of understanding their civil wars to draw attention to the conse-
quences of violence.
While civil society actors undoubtedly play a role in creating and 
shaping historical memory, elites enjoy a special status— and thus 
responsibility— for promoting public memory projects. In their ca-
pacity as leaders, they can mobilize state resources to create monu-
ments and museums, thereby conferring offi cial legitimacy to critical 
refl ection. To be sure, remembering is neither static nor passive, and 
certainly cannot be commanded; individuals do not simply place pre-
existing memories in ready- made frameworks. Remembering is a dia-
lectical pro cess whereby memories infl uence broader understandings 
of the past while simultaneously shaping those broader understand-
ings, and in this sense individuals as well as communities have complex 
relationships with their histories. Memory sites can play a role in these 
dynamics by helping question ossifi ed historical understandings. 
Through these sites and public speeches, leaders help engender a mor-
ally sensitive refl ection on events that still remain raw and traumatic.
Of course, memory sites do not guarantee such refl ection. When 
used by leaders for explicitly po liti cal ends or building social solidarity 
with little attention to actual historical events, they can be amount to 
little more than an alternate, equally simplistic and problematic “mon-
umental history,” to draw on Nietz sche’s felicitous phrase (1997 66). 
Replacement only reifi es a new “correct” interpretation, preempting 
refl ection (Mosse 1991; Winter 1995). Memorials can introduce a new 
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narrative that seeks interpretive closure. As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
critical history positions itself as interrogator of self- serving “monu-
mental” accounts that legitimize violence. These earlier accounts are 
the primary historical understanding that new leaders and civil society 
seek to dismantle or replace through questioning their accuracy and 
showing how they created a framework for dehumanization while ex-
cluding some citizens from the moral order and the broader constella-
tion of rights. The danger is that an alternative narrative may emerge 
whose primary function is to legitimize the new regime while doing 
relatively little to question the past with the necessary care and depth 
that is required. There is a common pattern  here: Elites provide an ac-
count that bolsters their actions and beliefs through selective historical 
references by downplaying problematic or contradictory facts. A com-
mon version of this characterizes the previous regime as fundamentally 
“evil,” while the present regime represents a national rebirth (led, of 
course, by the new leaders).4 While such an approach does, in its way, 
deal with the past, it does so on rather con ve nient and strategic terms: 
It eschews critical appraisals in favor of simple narratives of redemp-
tion, which unsurprisingly give current elites signifi cant symbolic capi-
tal and legitimacy for their own po liti cal projects. At their worst, these 
memory strategies provide little impetus for us to take on the obligation 
to remember, losing their proper normative content and becoming po-
liti cal weapons of new leaders in their ongoing struggles with their op-
ponents and efforts to distance themselves from the past.5 That the 
needs and interests of the present help determine how we understand 
our history makes this danger all the clearer. Nevertheless, this danger 
is in some ways unavoidable, as Maurice Halbwachs (1992), the great 
theoretician of collective memory, reminds us. Po liti cal society’s con-
tributions to reconciliation are only part of the larger project, and 
thus should not be allowed to defi ne the entire pro cess of social re-
construction. Indeed, what becomes apparent is that po liti cal society 
is a necessary level for reconciliation, but is insuffi cient on its own.
Po liti cal Society, Consensus, and Exclusion
The diffi culties surrounding memorials underscore a larger issue con-
cerning po liti cal society. Clearly, it is desirable that leaders support 
peaceful, demo cratic deliberation and stay wedded to the rule of law. 
Po liti cal Society ▪ 77
Nevertheless, elites must remain responsive to civil society, and not 
only to one another. Elite consensus, however, is frequently attained 
through exclusion; leaders achieve stability by ensuring that pop u lar 
sentiments remain marginalized and contained. Elites operating in 
formal po liti cal publics (e.g., parliamentary bodies) must allow input 
from civil society, and although they are involved with state power 
and “cannot afford to subordinate strategic and instrumental criteria” 
(J. Cohen and Arato 1992, ix) of decision making to the open- ended 
communicative activity of civil society, they must be responsive to the 
latter. It is not uncommon for both previous and incoming elites to 
work on establishing rules of the game aimed at stability and self- 
interest while limiting exposure to and input from civil society. While 
this may lessen po liti cal violence and threats from antidemo cratic 
forces, it can also have damaging consequences for reconciliation and 
demo cratic consolidation. The consequences of this for democracy 
have been discussed extensively (Linz and Stepan 1996; Menéndez- 
Carrión and Joignant 1999);  here I want to point to a specifi c problem 
related to reconciliation: Privileging consensus may lessen sustained 
refl ection in favor of superfi cial ac know ledg ment of past wrongs. In 
order to secure legitimacy of the fl edgling state, po liti cal leaders agree 
to not look into the past too deeply, or do so only superfi cially. This is 
roughly what occurred in Uruguay, when the new leadership agreed to 
not interrogate past events for fear of upsetting what it considered to 
be a fragile po liti cal order (Barhona de Brito 2001; Weschler 1997). 
The result was the repression of historical inquiry (and with it, the 
nonrecognition of victims) in favor of future tranquility, and only rela-
tively recently have public debates about the years of military rule be-
come common, a pattern echoed in Spain and Mozambique. Or, alter-
nately, elites may provide a new history that follows the redemptive 
narrative discussed above in reference to memorials— that is, they may 
emphasize the “harmonious” relations of the present by emphasizing 
past divisions and horrors, with little examination of the exclusions 
necessary to achieve the present condition.
A critical history must resist attempts at self- serving historical 
closure— both the narratives used to justify past violations, as well as 
those employed in the present to establish the legitimacy of the new 
state (and, by implication, the new leaders); both risk replacing real 
historical investigation and refl ection with the strategic use of truth for 
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po liti cal ends.  Here, then, we see the danger of normatively overbur-
dening po liti cal society. Leaders can undoubtedly help catalyze and 
frame debates about the past, and their participation is crucial for rec-
onciliation; however, civil society must remain cognizant of the limita-
tions and motivations. This is not to say, of course, that elites act only 
for strategic ends and are unconcerned with moral issues. Rather, it is 
to highlight the constraints and incentives in po liti cal society that can 
distort or otherwise mitigate broader moral refl ection. The desire to 
secure legitimacy for the past or the present affects what stories are 
privileged in the public domain, and thus it is crucial that civil society 
groups monitor leaders and pressure them to confront diffi cult and po-
liti cally uncomfortable truths.
It is vitally important, then, to not assume that elite consensus 
constitutes reconciliation. Civil society must be able to infl uence elites 
and encourage them to face the moral challenges of the past in an 
adequate manner. As David Crocker (1999) has argued, civil society 
actors can help raise and defi ne the normative issues that transitional 
societies face. They can generate public debates about responsibility 
and guilt that are avoided by elites, and ensure that debate is not pre-
emptively closed or “settled” by leaders. Furthermore, they can pres-
sure the government for accountability for the worst abusers, recogni-
tion for victims, and reform of abusive state institutions. Civil society 
expands and deepens discussion about the past well beyond what 
elites would prefer. Thus, while leaders should be tasked with engag-
ing histories of abuse, we should be disabused of the thought that 
their actions are suffi cient to achieve meaningful reconciliation. Their 
political- strategic calculations can limit the possibility of justice and 
historical refl ection and may result in a superfi cial understanding of 
the past.
What emerges from this discussion is that po liti cal society can con-
tribute to reconciliation in several ways: by promoting a po liti cal ethic 
of deliberation and nonviolence, supporting the rule of law, and pub-
licly raising issues about the past through debate and the creation of 
memory sites. In the following sections I discuss one particularly pop-
u lar device: the offi cial apology. A careful analysis of apologies can 
highlight the symbolic power elites have at their disposal for further-
ing reconciliation, but also highlight the limits of this power. This 
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analysis also shows how a series of key po liti cal and moral aims can 
come together in normatively complex ways.
Official Apologies
Offi cial apologies for past wrongdoing have become increasingly pop u-
lar among elites, who see them as an ethically appropriate way of deal-
ing with violations while establishing the grounds for a society to 
achieve some form of closure. Their popularity is apparent from the 
number of situations in which they have been employed.6
At the very least, an offi cial apology publicly expresses responsibil-
ity and regret for serious wrongs, with the ultimate goal of reconstruct-
ing badly damaged relations.
In this section, I discuss several normative aspects of offi cial 
apologies and provide a qualifi ed defense of their use in transitions. 
While I do not provide anything like a full theory of apologies  here (I 
do so in Verdeja 2009b), I do believe that we can make some general 
claims of what a normatively satisfactory apology would look like, 
and draw from this some contributions it can make to broader soci-
etal reconciliation.
Conceptualizing Apologies
While apologies are occasionally promoted as an important means for 
“moving a society forward,” they are certainly not without their de-
tractors. Some commentators have dismissed them as an easy way to 
mitigate feelings of guilt while granting a sense of self- satisfaction for 
confessing wrongs (Bowman 1998; Leo 1997; Steel 1998; Taft 2000). 
Indeed, they often seem insincere, given more to the expectation that 
the past can be left behind painlessly rather than as an attempt at con-
fronting the moral consequences of past violations. An apology may 
make us aware of mass atrocities, but certainly this is not a complete 
response, in itself, to such violations. Many survivors of mass violence 
feel that there is an almost constitutive impossibility of closure on past 
injustices, that is, one that can be ameliorated perhaps through truth 
telling, punishment, and reparations, but one that a speech act on its 
own cannot fully repair.
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Nevertheless, neither the danger of insincerity nor their popularity 
should dissuade us from considering an apology’s value. Victims often 
demand that the state not only publicly acknowledge their suffering 
but also accept responsibility for it. As such, apologies include ele-
ments of truth telling, victim ac know ledg ment, and— to the extent 
that responsibility is taken— accountability. But this is not the  whole 
extent of their value. Beyond this, apologies may signal more than 
mere ac know ledg ment of past wrongs and provide a way of envisioning 
a new moral relationship between victims, perpetrators, and bystand-
ers. As such, they involve a kind of deeply symbolic “ritual cleansing,” 
in the words of Stanley Cohen (2001, 236). This transformation is (per-
haps unsurprisingly) often associated with religious language, particu-
larly Christian language. As Cohen notes, there is a constellation of 
closely associated terms that appear when we speak of apologies in the 
context of massive atrocity: “expiation: making amends for previous 
sins; exorcism: expelling evil forces by invocation of the good; expur-
gation: purifi cation by removing objectionable matter; the many vari-
ations of contrition, confession, atonement and repentance” (2002, 
174) Echoing Cohen, Nicholas Tavuchis (1991) has shown how the 
imagery of transformation through atonement and purifi cation is a 
powerful and suggestive one for victims and (repentant) perpetra-
tors, for it points to the gravity of the crimes (i.e., sins) that require 
contrition.
In the Christian tradition in par tic u lar, the notion of apology re-
written as confession carries a central position, for it is intimately tied 
to the faculty of forgiveness and the creation of a new relationship be-
tween transgressor and victim. Theologian Martin Marty (1998) ar-
gues that the apology and forgiveness serve as exemplary instances of 
the transformative capacity of the spirit, signaling the beginning of a 
change in the relationship between the transgressor and the victim on 
the one hand, and a change in the relationship between the sinner and 
God on the other.7 Some Christian theologians have argued that such 
an understanding of apologies could work in the public realm, and call 
for a transformational notion of apology heavily based on scriptural 
interpretations of confession and righting of wrongs. Public leaders 
should fashion their apologies as a sincere confessional act that tran-
scends the bitterness of past confl ict in an effort to open a space for a 
new future (Johnston and Sampson 1994).
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The merit of this argument is that it highlights how apologies 
should be something beyond the mere instrumentalism of “moving on” 
by requiring sincere refl ection and public discussion about past ac-
tions. It requires, however, further theoretical elaboration to connect 
the apology to practical po liti cal challenges. Erving Goffman (1971) 
has offered a secularized version stripped of the more overt ontologi-
cal requirements of its religious connotation. For Goffman, a proper 
apology contains several elements: It must express embarrassment or 
dismay, awareness of knowing what conduct was expected, recognition 
of the appropriateness of a sanction, rejection of the harm, a commit-
ment to pursue a proper course of conduct in the future, and a com-
mitment to do penance or offer restitution. Missing from Goffman’s 
account is an explicit ac cep tance of responsibility for the wrongdoing 
(though it runs through all of his points), and a discussion of offi cial 
apologies, a point I return to in a moment. What is important about 
Goffman’s account is that while it avoids the deep ontological shift 
implied by more religious approaches, it retains the crucial normative 
aspects of apologies: the recognition of the dignity and moral worth of 
victims; a public expression of remorse and ac cep tance of responsibil-
ity; and a commitment to change future relationships, which may in-
clude some form of reparation.
Drawing on these points, we can begin outlining the core elements 
of an apology. An apology is different from an excuse, which implies 
the transgression was unintentional, or a justifi cation, which admits 
only limited culpability by pointing to external conditions that made 
the violations necessary. Rather, an apology is a speech act that con-
veys “an expression of sorrow or regret” both to the victim, and where 
appropriate, to a broader audience (Scher and Darley 1997; Tavuchis 
1991, 23). The wrongdoer acknowledges the legitimacy of the rule or 
norm that was violated, admits responsibility, and expresses genuine 
remorse for the harm caused to the victim by the transgression. In this 
respect, an apology is a type of what John Searle (1969, 20) calls “ex-
pressive speech acts,” insofar as it primarily expresses regret or sorrow 
for what was done. Furthermore, it signals recognition of the victim’s 
moral claims to dignity and respect. Unwillingness to apologize for a 
serious wrong conveys that the victim is unworthy of such moral re-
spect, and this could arguably be said to constitute a second wrong 
(i.e., that of nonrecognition). An apology may not fully restore a broken 
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relationship, particularly one with a long history of violence and mis-
trust, but it does represent a type of moral redress for past actions, as 
Martin Golding (1984– 85) has argued.8
A second dimension of an apology is material, or practical. An 
apology should include a commitment to some form of restitution or 
compensation that binds the speaker to some set of future actions. I 
call this the need for practical redress. Without a practical component, 
an apology amounts to little more than a hollow symbolic statement, 
achieving little real transformation in the status of victims. Apologies 
with no practical commitment to future change are problematic pre-
cisely because an apology carries with it a promise of future reform, 
even if only implicitly. The recognition of a past act as a transgression 
implies rejecting such actions in the future.
As a future- oriented component of an apology, the commitment 
to change behavior creates a promise. A promise, of course, can be 
broken; it is a normative rather than empirical constraint. It binds 
the actor to future behavior that ought to be followed. Nevertheless, 
the important point  here is that the promise contained in an apology 
means that the apology is not fully instantiated when it is given; an 
apology should be understood not simply as an act but as a pro cess 
including a commitment to a future relationship. Issuing an offi cial 
apology is a brief act but does not exhaust the apology itself; it re-
quires changes to ensure that the past is not repeated.
An apology, then, contains both moral and practical dimensions. It 
is a fi rst step in recognizing the victim as a moral person with legiti-
mate claims to moral respect, and furthermore implies a promise on 
the part of the transgressor to make some form of reparation. More 
generally, apologies are both past- and future- oriented; they direct our 
attention to a past act (or series of acts) and cast them as wrongs while 
also drawing our attention to the necessity of establishing a future re-
lationship where such transgressions will not occur.
Official Apologies
An offi cial apology acknowledges state responsibility for a serious 
moral wrong (or wrongs) that remains salient in current po liti cal life. 
As Ridwan Nyatagodien and Arthur Neal (2004, 470) state, “the [offi -
cial] apology is an admission that those in positions of authority failed 
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to act when action was necessary, and recognizes that blameworthy 
behavior was ignored, rewarded, or in some way excluded from norma-
tive sanction.” Additionally, it attempts to reform the relationship be-
tween the government and the population by underscoring a change in 
future governmental policy (Digeser 2001; Harvey 1995). While there 
can be numerous motives behind an offi cial apology, it is not uncom-
mon for (at least some) po liti cal elites to endorse apologies for moral 
(i.e., rather than merely political- instrumental) reasons. An offi cial 
apology ought to refl ect a sincere future commitment to certain norms 
and an ac know ledg ment of past injustices.
Certainly, the deep symbolism of apologies, combined with their 
quick and easy public dissemination, make them choice tools for po liti-
cal elites seeking a powerful way to respond to complex social issues. 
What could be easier and cheaper than apologizing? Such a risk of po liti-
cal manipulation remains a serious threat. Some scholars downplay their 
po liti cal instrumentality and prefer to theorize apologies as devices that 
can recast moral relations between estranged groups or individuals, and 
thus they play a central role in promoting reconciliation (Casarjian 1992; 
Couper 1998; Muller- Fahrenholz 1997; Suchocki 1994). I am hesitant to 
follow these thinkers, however, for the very use of apologies by elites in 
deeply politicized contexts requires that we identify the relation be-
tween their instrumental and moral aims, and focus on whether they 
can satisfy, to some extent, both moral and po liti cal demands.
As an illustration of the uses of offi cial apologies, consider Chilean 
President Patricio Aylwin’s apology for crimes committed by his pre de-
ces sor, dictator Augusto Pinochet. In 1991, President Aylwin publicly 
presented the fi ndings of Chile’s offi cial Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission Report and proffered an offi cial apology in Santiago’s National 
Stadium, where many arrests and tortures had occurred during the fi rst 
weeks of military rule. He chose a location that was symbolically laden, 
indicating the seriousness with which the new state took the violation 
of rights. Speaking in his offi cial capacity, Aylwin (1995, 171) referred 
to disappearances as “executions” by “agents of the state,” and forcefully 
condemned past violence while committing his government to the re-
spect and defense of human rights. The fact that the president, rather 
than a subordinate, apologized, highlighted the importance of having a 
speaker with suffi cient authority and symbolic stature apologize (a pre-
rogative of elites), and also refl ected a re orientation of the main values 
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in the new Chile. Indeed, through his apology, Aylwin signaled to the 
public the importance of recognizing the moral worth of victims and 
the need to refl ect on society’s complicity in the violence of the past.
With this example in mind, we can identify several contributions 
that offi cial apologies, and elite discourse more generally, can make to 
reconciliation. Most importantly, apologies publicly affi rm the moral 
status of victims. As noted by Trudy Govier (2002), apologies focus 
public awareness on victims and communicate to the community the 
necessity of reframing moral obligations. Such reframing requires that 
victims be treated as po liti cal, legal, and social equals deserving recog-
nition of their moral status. Clearly, apologies do not accomplish this 
on their own, and Aylwin’s apology should not be mea sured according 
to this expectation. At best, they can begin a pro cess of moral refram-
ing and repositioning victims as equals; however, this requires sincere 
engagement and refl ection by the community as a  whole and encour-
agement by leaders over a long period of time (Schaap 2005). Never-
theless, drawing public attention to the moral value of victims, as Aylwin 
did, represents an important fi rst step. This public affi rmation of dig-
nity and equal moral worth— of victim recognition, in the sense that I 
have used the term in this book— is perhaps the most important con-
tribution an apology can make, and highlights the importance of elite 
discourse in promoting reconciliation.
Second, and closely related to victim recognition, an apology raises 
questions about basic social norms and values, and places these in the 
center of public debate. Under authoritarian or genocidal regimes, 
harassment, abuse, massacre, and terror are offi cially sanctioned meth-
ods of dealing with certain minorities or po liti cal enemies, and soci-
ety’s basic moral grammar is rewritten to cast all opponents of the 
regime as “deserving” of what they get. An apology helps reframe state 
actions as wrongs that violate basic social norms, and thereby force a 
society to confront these abuses and refl ect on their consequences for 
state- society relations and the very conception of national identity. 
Aylwin explicitly condemned the behavior of the state and reaffi rmed 
the importance of human dignity and respect that had been violated 
by Pinochet’s government. Aylwin also enjoined fellow citizens to re-
fl ect on what kind of society they want and which values they hold 
dear. Obviously, an offi cial apology given by an elite cannot secure the 
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adoption of human rights, national consensus on basic values, or recon-
ciliation. But it can generate public debate about what those values 
ought to be by recasting the terms of deliberation.
Third, and less directly, an offi cial apology can promote an alter-
nate and critical reading of history. Melissa Nobles (2008) has con-
vincingly shown that apologies reshape the meaning of the past by 
 re- situating victims at the center of interpretations of history. While an 
apology cannot achieve such a critical re orientation on its own, it im-
plicitly redraws the topography of historical truth, and thus redirects 
public attention to the importance of engaging critically with the past. 
Aylwin’s apology sought to catalyze a discussion about how citizens un-
derstood what it means to be Chilean, and the moral obligations they 
may have toward fellow compatriots. This was, of course, a fi rst step in 
promoting a historical reckoning, but the apology sought to contribute 
to a much broader debate about national identity and history.
Elite apologies, then, can perform at least three key tasks. First, 
they promote the restoration of victims’ sense of moral value and rep-
resent a fi rst step at integrating them as citizens. Second, apologies can 
generate public refl ection and debate about social norms by refocusing 
public discussion to their violation and requiring a new consideration 
of desired relations between the state and society. Third, they can 
make critical reinterpretations of history necessary by reframing the 
past and consequently undermining apologist historical accounts. 
These are real accomplishments, but they are obviously not the same 
as societal reconciliation. Much more must happen for a society to be 
reconciled, including commitments to accountability, the elimination 
of impunity, and the long- term promotion of the norms of respect and 
tolerance among citizens. Indeed, without real governmental policy 
changes, skepticism about the effi cacy of apologies is appropriate. 
Apologies should be one part of a broader reckoning with the past.
The Illocutionary Problems Surrounding 
Official Apologies
While the discussion up to now has been relatively positive in its treat-
ment of apologies, their po liti cal uses by elites raise several concerns. 
Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd (2002) have helpfully identifi ed 
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a number of these challenges, but  here I focus on a few that specifi -
cally confront offi cial apologies. These are tied to their illocutionary 
status and tell us something about the elites’ role in reconciliation.
The fi rst challenge concerns whether survivors consider the apol-
ogy satisfactory. In personal scenarios, there is an individual who can 
choose whether to accept the apology. He or she may decide that it was 
inadequate— it was insincere, it minimized culpability, and so on; re-
gardless, the individual maintains the ability to accept or reject it, and 
thus retains his or her moral autonomy. Contrary to Minow’s (1998, 
115) stricture that offi cial apologies should allow for “a stance that 
grants power to the victims to accept, refuse or ignore the apology,” in 
an offi cial apology there is no identifi able addressee who accepts or 
refuses it. Certainly, some survivors may come forth as representatives 
of victims, but the notion that they can accept an apology (much less 
grant forgiveness) for all victims is morally problematic, for it ignores 
those victims who may choose to reject it. The absence of an identifi -
able addressee with the power to accept or reject the apology means 
that its positive illocutionary force (i.e., the perception that it is a fait 
accompli) faces little challenge. I purposefully refer to the apology’s 
illocutionary, not perlocutionary, character. While it may seem that of-
fi cial apologies are perlocutionary speech acts— that is, they must per-
suade or convince the listener and do not simply gain force from the 
utterance of the apology (an illocution)— the lack of an identifi able ad-
dressee means that, practically speaking, once the apology is uttered 
the speaker can claim that the apology was in some sense “successful” 
and that it was “accepted” by the victims. This is not to say that there 
is no perlocutionary component; rather, it is to draw our attention to 
the illocutionary dangers contained in this par tic u lar type of speech 
act. From the state’s perspective, of course, this illocutionary aspect 
can be po liti cally attractive. A public offi cial can apologize and argue 
that the apology itself already places the nation on a course toward “rec-
onciliation.” The impossibility of total ac cep tance and the space this 
provides for po liti cal exploitation are ineradicable, constitutive weak-
nesses of offi cial apologies, at least from a normative point of view.
A second concern is that an offi cial apology instantiates some form 
of forgiveness, or at any rate mitigates the ability of victims to make 
future legitimate grievances. Aylwin (1995, 171), for example, asked for 
“forgiveness from the victims’ relatives,” and many Chileans consid-
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ered his apology suffi cient for the state to be “forgiven” and allow soci-
ety to move forward. Offi cial apologies, then, may be construed as al-
ready bestowing an element of forgiveness on the speaker and the 
represented institution, such as the state or some agency of the state 
implicated in abuses. Citizens who  were not victims may argue that an 
offi cial apology is a suffi cient statement of the state’s ac cep tance of re-
sponsibility and marks at least a partial clearing of the historical slate. 
Thus, apologies may be seen by some as carry ing a surplus of illocu-
tionary force; not only is the apology itself instantiated when given but 
it may also imply some degree of forgiveness, or at least the belief that 
some past actions have been adequately addressed and therefore any 
additional demands by victims are seen as an attempt at using their 
position to demand irrelevant and undeserved privileges.9
Nevertheless, there is a legitimate counterclaim: If an offi cial, say 
a prime minister or president, does in fact sincerely apologize and ask 
for forgiveness from victims, should there not be an obligation or at 
least a legitimate expectation of forgiveness? Do sincere symbolic ges-
tures that acknowledge responsibility and seek forgiveness require, at 
a minimum, that victims explain why it is reasonable to continue their 
resentment?10 Many theoretical formulations include an assumption 
that forgiveness should follow a properly sincere apology, and if the 
apology is sincere, one could plausibly argue that forgiveness can rea-
sonably be expected. Joanna North (1998) and Margaret Holmgren 
(1993) have both argued that forgiveness following an apology is not 
only reasonable but in fact signifi es the victim’s ability to recover his or 
her self- esteem by expressing his or her agency. As such, the concep-
tual formulation that connects the apology and forgiveness also in-
cludes salutary consequences, namely, the reaffi rmation of the victim’s 
sense of self- worth. The problem with such an understanding is that 
the apology is treated as a discrete act that is complete upon enuncia-
tion, with a clear expectation of what should follow immediately there-
after. This, it seems, ignores the apology’s future or forward- looking 
component discussed earlier— that is, that it demands a change in fu-
ture behavior by the state, and therefore represents the beginning of 
a pro cess rather than a singular event. Insofar as it begins such a pro-
cess, the expectation that forgiveness should immediately follow an 
apology is misplaced, for it implies that there has indeed been a change 
in relations between the state and the victims (and society, for that 
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matter), when in fact this change remains to be seen. Perhaps an-
other way to put it is this: Only if the state makes good on its promise 
to change, can forgiveness be considered an appropriate response. 
This change takes time and patience, but it can occur. In any case, an 
offi cial apology should not be equated with closure. It points toward a 
commitment to change, but does not exhaust the change itself.
The fi rst two points deal with two interrelated illocutionary pitfalls 
surrounding apologies: one concerning the risk that some victims will 
be ignored because of the theoretical inadequacy of an addressee, and 
the other concerning the very real possibility that an apology may in-
clude its own instantiation— forgiveness may be considered to follow 
the apology almost automatically. In both cases, the inability of survi-
vors to address the apology is at stake. A third and crucial point con-
cerns the status of the speaker who is apologizing.
Many philosophical conceptions of apologies focus on their con-
tent and formulation rather than the authority of the speaker. In Goff-
man’s (1971) defi nition the status of the speaker is not addressed at any 
length, nor is it in Marty’s (1998), except to say that the apology should 
be given by the person responsible for the transgression. Normally, it is 
assumed that the person apologizing is authorized to do so and thus 
the issue becomes whether the apology is properly formulated. Such 
approaches underplay the crucial contextual aspect of apologies that 
give them a large part of their symbolic power and illocutionary force. 
In the case of an offi cial apology, a properly sanctioned authority (i.e., 
a po liti cal elite who is vested with the power to speak in the name of 
the state), must enunciate it. Indeed, illocutionary acts gain their sym-
bolic power not only from the force of words but also from the status 
of the speaker. Consequently, an offi cial apology is not merely a free-
standing statement with internally generated legitimacy. As Pierre 
Bourdieu (1995, 107) has argued, “the power of words is nothing other 
than the delegated power of the spokesperson, and his [sic] speech— 
that is, the substance of his discourse and, inseparably, his way of 
speaking— is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the 
guarantee of delegation which is vested in him.” An apology fi nds 
much of its power in the status of the person who gives it— in our case, 
the po liti cal elite who speaks on behalf of the state. The diffi culty in 
transitional situations arises when the apology is given by a successor 
elite who is not responsible for ordering past crimes, but nevertheless 
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has taken the mantle of authority to speak in the name of the state and 
thus apologize on the state’s behalf. To be credible, the speaker must 
assume the position of representative of the state, a symbolic move 
that must resonate with the population. This is largely possible be-
cause it is the offi ce (e.g., of the presidency, the prime minister) that is, 
in a certain sense, apologizing in the name of the state. The individual 
performs the speech act in his or her offi cial capacity, and thus it is the 
state that is making symbolic amends for past crimes. Whether this is 
successful (i.e., whether a par tic u lar elite is judged successful in con-
veying the state’s apology) depends not only on whether the apology is 
well crafted but also on whether the elite is considered a legitimately 
endowed speaker. This issue of authority also has consequences for the 
legitimacy of the new state.
Official Apologies and State Legitimacy
The consequences for state legitimacy are well illustrated in the case 
of Chile. When Aylwin apologized, he explicitly acknowledged the 
state’s responsibility and apologized as president, in the pro cess posi-
tioning himself as a uniquely endowed speaker who could acknowl-
edge responsibility to victims, their relatives, and the population as a 
 whole. The offi cial apology offered a mea sure of ac know ledg ment and 
rehabilitation of victims. In doing so, Aylwin gave an important ex-
pression of responsibility in transitional contexts, and also provided a 
remarkable example of the diffi culties of successor regime responsi-
bility and the challenges of legitimacy elites face. When a successor 
regime expressly repudiates earlier state actions through an apology, 
it is both distancing itself from the previous authoritarian government 
and establishing a link of legitimacy to the past, insofar as its privi-
leged position as apologizer (to coin an ugly word and avoid the am-
bivalence of apologist) indicates its authority to speak on issues of the 
past and pass judgment on state actions. Aylwin (1995, 171), in fact, 
explicitly spoke “as President of the Republic.” Thus, the offi cial apol-
ogy seeks to establish a continuity of state authority and responsibility 
while simultaneously stating its rejection of the previous government. 
This double movement is part of a broader effort at founding a new 
po liti cal order (rejection of the past) while claiming the right to do so 
legitimately (demanding to be recognized as the legitimate successor 
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authority); as such, successor elites are forcefully making a claim of 
separation and continuity with the past, with all of the symbolic 
 ambivalence that this entails. In this sense, it shares much with the 
debates over successor justice and, more broadly, constitution making 
in transitional settings.
Undoubtedly, apologies do not carry the weight of constitution 
making and successor trials, but they do highlight explicitly the tensions 
of both rejecting and embracing a morally compromised legitimacy. 
While they can symbolize a break with the past, they also underscore 
the normative ambiguity surrounding elite claims to legitimacy, and 
thus to their elite status. In order to displace this ambiguity, apologies 
are given in the name of the state and the authority to perform it is 
thereby secured. Whether this is successful in practice depends, of 
course, on whether the population as a  whole— and survivors in 
particular— accept the displacement. In the case of Chile, Aylwin’s 
apology drew public attention to past violations and helped catalyze a 
public debate about national identity and responsibility. Nevertheless, 
many victim and survivor groups considered it only a fi rst step toward 
additional reparations and redress, and remained frustrated with the 
lack of accountability that followed his apology (Loveman and Lira 
2000; Verdeja 2000).
P olitical society plays a particularly privileged role in reconciliation because leaders command the respect and loyalty of their followers 
and are thus in a unique position to shape social attitudes and beliefs. 
A primary contribution they can make is to underscore the importance 
of a peaceful politics that takes seriously contestation, debate, and the 
rule of law as well as the rejection of violence to solve differences. 
“Leaders,” Michael Ignatieff writes, “give their societies permission to 
say the unsayable, to think the unthinkable, to rise to gestures of rec-
onciliation that people, individually, cannot imagine” (1998, 188). This 
is perhaps too strong a formulation, but he is right to note that without 
elite support for peace and mutual respect, these values are unlikely to 
take root in the broader population. The behavior of leaders marks the 
boundaries of demo cratic contestation, what is acceptable and what is 
not, and infl uences civil society and individuals alike. Elites’ expres-
sions of remorse and their affi rmation of the rights of citizens make it 
more likely that these issues will be taken up by fellow citizens, while 
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creating a space for debate about responsibility, complicity, and the 
legacies of violence.
Such actions, nevertheless, do not guarantee transformations on 
other levels. While elites can help shape discourse and behavior 
throughout society— and, in fact, are shaped by them too— the relation-
ship is a complex, dialectical one, as has been argued in this chapter. A 
more complete understanding of reconciliation is possible only if we 
move to other levels as well. In the following chapter, I investigate the 




his chapter explores the use of institutional mechanisms to 
foster societal reconciliation. Although the vast majority of con-
fl icts in the twentieth century  were never followed with prose-
cutions of those responsible for the most signifi cant violations, and while 
few authoritarian leaders have faced trial for their abuses, the century 
also witnessed the emergence of the principle that serious human 
rights violations should be punished through a legal pro cess, rather 
than with simple revenge. The development of international human 
rights law and the establishment of occasional tribunals refl ect a change 
in how nations understand past violations and their legacies. Indeed, 
considering the devastation of the past one hundred years, it is perhaps 
not surprising that a global human rights discourse has developed and 
matured, espousing fundamental ideals of human dignity and respect.
Nevertheless, this development was never guaranteed. The Nurem-
berg and Tokyo trials following World War II and the UN Genocide 
Convention (1948) established the principle that perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity should be tried and punished for their actions, but 
the Cold War put human rights concerns in a deep freeze for nearly 
forty years. In the Soviet- American bipolar world, human rights rheto-
ric was manipulated for po liti cal purposes and was rarely if ever the 
motivating force behind foreign policy (Ball 1999).
Institutional and Legal Responses
Trials and Truth Commissions
4
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Human rights law is today the weakest component of international 
jurisprudence, certainly much weaker than international business or 
trade law. Still, there is no doubt that with the end of the Cold War, hu-
man rights discourse has gained strength. The past two de cades have 
seen two international war crimes tribunals established, for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the former Yugo slavia (ICTY), and additional tribunals 
have been created in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia. The 
fi rst permanent global criminal court, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), came into being in the early years of the twenty- fi rst century. 
Furthermore, domestic courts around the world have taken up the 
challenge of prosecuting human rights violators as a way of meaning-
fully engaging the past and reestablishing the rule of law. “Retributive” 
justice has become a guiding norm for human rights supporters around 
the world.
Tribunals have not been the only institutional response offered by 
human rights advocates. Over the past three de cades, there have been 
increasing calls for the establishment of truth commissions to compile 
offi cial histories of oppression and recognize victims. Nations around 
the world have adopted truth commissions, in many guises, as a way to 
come to terms with painful pasts. Generally eschewing formal trials 
(often because of po liti cal constraints), commissions have focused on 
restoring the dignity of victims and survivors and producing a defi ni-
tive historical account by espousing what advocates call “restorative” 
justice in their quest for societal reconciliation.
This chapter considers how nations have attempted to come to 
terms with their violent history through the use of tribunals and truth 
commissions, by assessing their contributions and limitations for rec-
onciliation. This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I discusses the 
normative underpinnings of tribunals and truth commissions, retribu-
tive and restorative justice, respectively. While I fi nd this distinction 
ultimately unsatisfactory, I begin  here (which is how the debate con-
tinues to be framed) before moving on to an alternative formulation. I 
consider the justifi cations, promises, and limits of both retributive and 
restorative justice, and assess their contributions to reconciliation. Part 
II identifi es factors that affect the viability of tribunals and truth com-
missions, and emphasizes the importance of contextual constraints 
on their implementation and use. I conclude with qualifi ed support 
for both institutions, arguing that (1) they are not mutually exclusive 
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(either theoretically or practically) but rather often complementary 
and (2) they are important but by no means suffi cient instruments for 
social reconciliation. I contextualize the importance of this social level 
by showing the impact that institutional mechanisms can have on soci-
etal reconciliation. The importance of this level for the norms of re-
spect, accountability, rule of law, and truth telling is emphasized, but 
what also emerges is the insuffi ciency of this level for broad- based 
reconciliation.
Part I: Normative Foundations
To assess tribunals and truth commissions requires some criteria for 
evaluation. In Chapter 2, I discussed and defended a plurality of nor-
mative concepts that give greater theoretical substance to the idea of 
reconciliation as respect. In this chapter, I employ these concepts as a 
mea sur ing device to analyze tribunals and commissions, and to indi-
cate where the former may require additional support to further the 
goal of reconciliation.
Because the retributive- restorative justice debate is in reality cen-
tered on the practical impact of trials and truth commissions, I focus 
on these institutions in my discussion. This is valid, I believe, for at 
least two related reasons. First, in practice the debate often shifts be-
tween abstract notions of “justice” and their empirical manifestations, 
indicating that the real discussion to be had must also include a discus-
sion about the institutional mechanisms themselves. Second, the ab-
stract debates in reality are not free- fl oating but are grounded in the 
actual exigencies of transitional settings where trials and commissions 
have played a major role (indeed, the restorative justice model is seen 
by some as having developed post- hoc to legitimize truth commissions, 
though this characterization is unfair and historically inaccurate). With 
this in mind I focus on restorative justice through the mechanism of 
commissions and retribution through the mechanism of trials.
Retributive Justice and Tribunals
While the modern effort to prosecute human rights violations has 
its roots in the Nuremberg tribunal following World War II, it is with 
the demo cratic transitions starting in the 1970s in southern Eu rope, 
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continuing through the Latin American transitions of the 1970s and 
1980s, and moving into the 1990s in Eastern Eu rope that trials for se-
rious human rights offenders came to dominate discussions of how to 
deal with violent legacies of authoritarian rule or civil war. In practi-
cally all of these cases trials  were seen from a domestic perspective as 
national responses to national challenges, and international tribunals 
like Nuremberg  were considered unlikely or otherwise inappropriate. 
Because many of these transitions  were pacted and shaped by amnes-
ties, the trials  were often limited in reach and scope, and it was not 
uncommon for prosecutions to start and stop fi tfully. These attitudes 
changed with the end of the Cold War and the massive bloodletting in 
Rwanda and the former Yugo slavia, which prompted the international 
community to establish two international tribunals. Arguably, these 
new courts  were partly a chastened response by foreign powers to the 
fact that they had done little to stop the wars, but although limited in 
territorial and temporal jurisdiction, these trials have sought to re-
suscitate the primacy of international law for the most horrible viola-
tions. Both tribunals have made signifi cant contributions to interna-
tional law, giving greater substance and nuance to the defi nitions of 
crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and 
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions), the legal under-
standing of victim group categories, and the concept of intentionality 
at the heart of genocide. Since their establishment, international hu-
man rights law has moved in several slightly parting or at least paral-
lel directions.
First, we have witnessed the creation of so- called “hybrid” tribu-
nals with international backing that combine, to differing degrees, 
domestic and international jurisprudence and include both interna-
tional and national judges. There have been a number of these courts, 
including the Serious Crimes Panels of the District Court of Dili in 
East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, “Regulation 64” Pan-
els in the Courts of Kosovo, the War Crimes Chamber of the State 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and most recently the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The Iraq Special Tribunal, 
later changed to the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, is occasionally 
referred to as a hybrid, though its international component is largely 
American.1 These hybrid courts have been established where there is 
little domestic capacity to deal with mass crimes and international 
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technical and legal assistance is necessary for legitimate prosecutions. 
Unsurprisingly, there is much variation across the courts: While the 
Kosovo and Bosnian tribunals are fi rmly entrenched in domestic law, 
the Cambodia and Sierra Leone courts are based on substantial inter-
national cooperation with national governments. The Iraqi tribunal for 
its part has been largely isolated from international input.
Second, we have seen traditional domestic courts drawing on in-
ternational law and jurisdiction, however unevenly, with renewed 
vigor in an effort to bring international norms into a national setting. 
In Belgium, Argentina, and Spain, to cite a few examples, national 
courts or investigative judges have sought to employ principles of uni-
versal jurisdiction (or expanded versions of national jurisdiction, such 
as the so- called passive and active personality principles) to try seri-
ous human rights crimes. Lastly, a permanent ICC has been created 
with near universal jurisdiction to try war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, and eventually crimes of aggression. Some of the 
most interesting developments in human rights law have occurred in 
these international and hybrid fora, and while national courtrooms re-
lying on domestic law will undoubtedly continue to be useful venues 
for prosecution, the internationalization of human rights law has be-
come particularly important for understanding the possibilities of ac-
countability (Sriram 2005).
These various tribunals and approaches have signifi cant differ-
ences but they are all rooted in the principle of retributive justice, 
which privileges the importance of trying and punishing perpetrators. 
The line between retributive justice and vengeance, however, can of-
ten seem to be a thin one. While vengeance may seem to imply some-
thing like proportionality in punishment, it risks degenerating into 
wanton violence and cruelty. Retributive justice distinguishes itself 
from vengeance through procedural and substantive requirements that 
constrain the actions of the prosecutor— or avenger— and provide 
some protections to the accused. The rule of law, in other words, is the 
key difference between retribution and vengeance. Retribution in this 
chapter is used in this sense, that is, as a type of institutionalized, pu-
nitive response based on the rule of law. This formulation serves as an 
important heuristic device and moral ideal to orient our discussion of 
post- atrocity justice.2
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Following Minow (1998), there are several criteria that retribution 
must satisfy if it is to remain within the bounds of the rule of law and 
not degenerate into vengeance: (1) a commitment to redress past abuses 
using generalized, codifi ed, preexisting standards; (2) the use of a for-
mal institution characterized by impartiality and transparency with 
due pro cess protections; (3) the state’s commitment to prosecute indi-
viduals only in terms of specifi c crimes for which there is valid evi-
dence; and we could add (4) the power to impose a binding sentence 
on the defendant that amounts to more than public censure lacking 
coercive force.
Advocates of retributive justice offer several justifi cations for trials:
1. Following severe violence, basic notions of justice demand 
that violators be punished for their actions. This notion 
of retribution is non- consequentialist; it places no empha-
sis on the social consequences of its actualization and ap-
peals instead to notions of “just deserts” (Kant 1998; Nozick 
1981).
2. Victims are acknowledged and regain dignity and moral 
worth when their violators are punished publicly for their 
crimes. Trials reaffi rm the moral status of victims by show-
ing the world that their demands for justice are legitimate 
(Neier 1998).
3. Identifying and punishing leaders of crimes against hu-
manity places individual guilt on key actors and institu-
tions. By identifying individual leaders as perpetrators, 
claims of collective guilt that associate crimes with an entire 
ethnic or national group are minimized (Prunier 1997).
4. Trials may mitigate demands for vengeance and redirect 
them into institutionalized and fair proceedings for account-
ability, minimizing the likelihood of vigilantism (Shklar 
1964).
5. Trials create a public record of crimes by collecting and 
questioning evidence (Bass 2000).
6. Tribunals further the domestic rule of law, the basis for 
a demo cratically stable and peaceful society (Robertson 
2000).
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7. Trials satisfy a duty deriving from international law (both 
treaty- based and customary) to prosecute serious violations 
of human rights (Damaska 2008; Orentlicher 1990).
8. Trials deter future abusers, signaling to leaders what may 
happen to them if they terrorize their populations (Roth 
1999).
The main purpose of a trial is to assess culpability and punish the 
wrongdoer if guilt is proven. Although they work to some extent to 
recognize victims, they are driven by the importance of establishing 
accountability. They do this by using higher standards of evidence and 
due pro cess protections for defendants than truth commissions, which 
are not, after all, judicial organs. Nor should trials be seen merely as 
revenge. Defendants may be acquitted, as they occasionally are, but 
what makes a prosecution legitimate is that due pro cess considerations 
are followed. In this respect, while prosecutions may focus on retribu-
tion they do so, ideally, within the framework of the rule of law, and 
thus contribute to the establishment of a Rechtsstaat, or a po liti cal or-
der based on law. Trials should be protected from po liti cal interference 
and focus instead on examining mass atrocity through a consideration 
of relevant norms and rules.3 Furthermore, by identifying specifi c per-
sons and agencies as violators, advocates say, tribunals lessen the stigma 
of collective guilt (e.g., of all Serbs or Germans). Focusing on individu-
als highlights that mere membership in a par tic u lar identity group 
does not mean culpability.
There are, however, several signifi cant challenges to using trials. 
The fi rst concern is the scope of prosecutions. At best, a judicial system 
can prosecute only a certain number of violators, which is a signifi cant 
problem in the face of massive human rights violations like genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and similar crimes that depend on the par-
ticipation and coordination of a large number of perpetrators. The 
normative claim that accountability promotes the rule of law by hold-
ing criminals responsible for their actions is thus only partly realizable; 
these crimes are often too extensive with too many participants to 
make complete criminal justice feasible. Confronted by this limitation, 
trials are sometimes used to prosecute high- level intellectual authors 
of crimes, their immediate subordinates, and those responsible for the 
most shocking atrocities. The UN ad- hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the 
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former Yugo slavia have largely followed this strategy, though their 
mandates do not limit them to this. Whom to prosecute is not only a 
normative concern generally but also a practical challenge for interna-
tional tribunals: The ICTR has faced considerable criticism from 
Rwanda for claiming the right to prosecute the main architects of the 
genocide and trump domestic trials in Rwanda’s judicial system. The 
ICTY, too, spearheaded the prosecution of high- level leaders, includ-
ing Yugo slavian President Slobodan Milošević (who died in custody) 
and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, though it has also prose-
cuted low- level perpetrators like Duško Tadić who committed particu-
larly atrocious crimes. But even if a balance between international and 
domestic prosecutions is achieved, how far should prosecutions go 
in principle? As Raymond Aron has noted, the lines are rarely clear, 
and it is diffi cult, at best, to distinguish between prosecutable and 
non- prosecutable individuals. “How far is the search for the guilty to 
be carried? To what degree are the duties of obedience or national 
 solidarity to be considered as absolving excuses?” (1967, 115). The 
counter- problem also exists: Rather than having only high- level leaders 
prosecuted, only a handful of subordinates responsible for an espe-
cially horrifi c crime are tried, as if the extent of violence began and 
ended with a few vicious, rogue units. In this scenario, trials are rightly 
viewed as a mechanism benefi ting major perpetrators by scapegoating 
low- level functionaries.
Some of these concerns over scope and individualization have 
been mitigated through the employment of so- called collective liabil-
ity principles like command responsibility, which permits the prose-
cution of military commanders (and in certain circumstances po liti cal 
leaders) for crimes committed by their subordinates, thus expanding 
the range of legal culpability beyond those who are the immediate 
perpetrators up to and including their superiors. The focus on hierar-
chical culpability has been complemented by recent ICTR and ICTY 
decisions that employ the novel legal doctrine of joint criminal enter-
prise (JCE). Under JCE, individuals can be found guilty for crimes 
they did not directly physically commit if prosecutors can show that 
defendants had a common design or plan to commit a crime, intended 
the objective of the plan, and participated in the crime in some way 
(Ambos 2007; Danner and Martinez 2005).4 The merit of JCE doc-
trine is that it takes seriously some of the complexity surrounding 
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contemporary mass crimes by moving beyond highly individualized 
and selective understandings of culpability to encompass the system-
atic and collective nature of violations typical of modern warfare and 
genocide. There are, to be sure, concerns with expanding legal culpa-
bility in such a way, and assessing responsibility requires a careful fo-
rensic reconstruction of events and relations between perpetrators 
(whether hierarchical or “horizontal”), inference of criminal intent, 
and other contextually sensitive criteria for assessing vicarious re-
sponsibility, all of which are particularly challenging where express 
written orders or other corroborating evidence are unavailable. Nev-
ertheless, the new openness to more complex understandings of legal 
responsibility means that modern jurisprudence has attempted to 
tackle some of the concerns inherent with the extreme individualiza-
tion of guilt. Some of these theories of collective liability, like command 
responsibility, have been employed widely in criminal prosecutions 
and will likely continue to evolve to take into account complex human 
rights violations. However, even with these advances trials will always 
have a relatively limited scope of applicability, as they can be  expected 
to prosecute only a relatively small proportion of violators in situ-
ations of mass crimes. Their limited scope should give us pause in 
 expecting them to carry the normative weight of accountability for 
reconciliation.
A constrained evidentiary scope places limits on the kinds of nar-
ratives that can be employed in trials. Marie- Benedicte Dembour and 
Emily Haslam (2004) have noted, quite convincingly, that a trial’s 
 focus on specifi c facts of a perpetrator’s responsibility may distort 
historical accounts that would situate par tic u lar instances or cases of 
violence within a larger context.5 Thus, rather than give us more in-
formed understandings of patterns of violence, trials may artifi cially 
separate events from one another. The structure of a trial— of a pro-
cedurally just trial, at least— creates this imposition, which is defensi-
ble on its own terms but says little about how to connect discrete 
events to general historical assessments. Moreover, this evidentiary 
constraint means that only certain types of truth claims are considered 
admissible— that is, those pieces of evidence that are directly quantifi -
able or pass a standard of forensic “objectivity” are accepted. Dembour 
and Haslam note that these types of evidentiary requirements also 
distort witness testimony, as victim witnesses only occasionally provide 
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information that can easily be subjected to a “true/false dichotomy” 
(2004, 156). Some major trials such as Adolf Eichmann’s have allowed 
victims to recount their suffering and thus paint a historical picture of 
the confl ict through the lens of personal anguish, but these cases have 
been heavily criticized for weakened evidentiary and procedural stan-
dards (Douglas 2001). The ICC’s founding statute (United Nations 
1999, art. 43, sec. 6) allows for more extensive victim participation in 
its trials (as well as reparations), but it is still too early to say how this 
will look in practice, and in any case the ICC’s position represents the 
exception to the trend. In contemporary tribunals committed to basic 
due pro cess, witnesses are rarely invited to provide extensive unstruc-
tured accounts of their experiences. Their testimonies are sought for 
the specifi c purpose of prosecution (or defense), and counsel unsur-
prisingly use them strategically. As sites for the construction of histori-
cal memory, then, trials risk distorting public understandings of the 
past, for the evidence provided in a courtroom is selected to prosecute 
par tic u lar individuals and not serve as the primary interpretive frame-
work of the confl ict.
Regardless of the efforts to ensure that prosecutions are fair, the 
problem of po liti cal manipulation is a constant threat. Trials are exem-
plary rituals insofar as they communicate that certain acts are so ter-
rible that they rise to a level requiring clear and strong moral (and 
 legal) condemnation. Selective prosecutions focusing on these types of 
violations indicate that these actions will not be tolerated in the future 
and that the state is committed to new norms of human rights. This is 
fundamentally a didactic element of prosecutions; they teach the na-
tion the wrongness of certain actions and behavior in a theatrical way 
(Osiel 1997). But they also signal the limit of judicial mechanisms for 
achieving justice. And trials as exemplary per for mances of punishment 
can be dangerous; the line between legitimate select prosecutions and 
show trials is a thin one. In transitional settings, courts are not in de-
pen dent institutions immune from po liti cal pressures and strategies. 
Prosecutions are po liti cal symbolic acts meant to separate the new re-
gime from the previous one. However, the strategic use of trials to 
further some other end— be it to establish the conditions of legitimacy 
for the incoming government, renew social solidarity through the 
 persecution of identifi able enemies, or “teach” a civics lesson about 
atrocity— carries the serious risk that the rule of law will be usurped. 
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Consider the Moscow show trials or more recently the Iraqi Shia gov-
ernment’s interference in Saddam Hussein’s trial and execution.
I doubt the po liti cal component of transitional trials can be 
eliminated— indeed, even the UN tribunals’ efforts to use ostensibly 
neutral language in court proceedings and statements confl ict with 
their commitment to promote the liberal discourse of human rights. 
Aiming to completely depoliticize courts would probably only result 
in masking, to some extent, their explicit normative commitments or 
the interests of the actors who established them. The challenge is to 
balance the protection of the rule of law and its basic principles of 
due pro cess and impartiality with the distinctly epideictic and ritual-
istic aspects of trials as institutions that condemn the actions of per-
petrators and affi rm basic rights. This problem of politicization is a 
constitutive problem— that is, it cannot be eliminated at a theoretical 
level but can only be reduced and mitigated in the practical applica-
tion of prosecutions.
An additional problem concerns retroactivity. On occasion, cer-
tain violations may technically have been legal when they  were com-
mitted. Prosecuting these acts violates the basic legal principle of nulla 
poena sin lege, so there can be no punishment where there is no law 
prohibiting an action. Certainly, when confronted with massive viola-
tions the ex post facto challenge seems grotesque because it runs coun-
ter to basic moral intuitions of justice and responsibility. Nevertheless, 
it is an important consideration, for the rule of law requires fi delity to 
basic principles of justice if it is to create a Rechtsstaat. This was one of 
the challenges raised against the Nuremberg trials, which sought to 
punish Nazi leaders for some crimes that  were not— legally speaking— 
recognized as such. Indeed, the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart 
criticizing prosecutions of Nazis and Lon Fuller defending the trials 
on moral law grounds set the terms of discussion between positivism 
and natural law in relation to war crimes prosecutions for several de-
cades (Fuller 1958; Hart 1958; Kelsen 1947). But while retroactivity 
does pose a problem for prosecutions, its importance is, I think, often 
overstated. Over sixty years after the precedent- setting trials at Nurem-
berg and de cades of treaty and customary human rights law, as well as 
a signifi cant corpus of case law emerging from the ICTR and ICTY, it 
would be diffi cult to argue that genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and the most fundamental violations of human rights can 
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still be legally defended. Indeed, Nuremberg is often cited as estab-
lishing that perpetrators can be prosecuted for knowingly committing 
crimes recognized by the international community, even where no 
specifi c laws exist to bar such activities. The development of a robust 
body of human rights and humanitarian law since the end of World 
War II, and the existence of a UN convention (1968) specifi cally re-
jecting statutes of limitations for grave crimes, all point to the miti-
gated salience of the problem of retroactivity.
Although these challenges are notable and the fi rst three, at least, 
are in a certain sense ineradicable, they do not undermine prosecu-
tions so much as indicate their conceptual limitations. Pointing out the 
limits of prosecutions means that tribunals are important but not suf-
fi cient instruments on their own for accountability; they need to be 
complemented with other forms of accountability at other social levels, 
such as debates in civil and po liti cal society about responsibility and 
culpability. Nevertheless, trials play an important role in reconcilia-
tion, for without prosecutions to punish extensive violence, impunity 
remains strong and the rule of law remains weak. Combined with ad-
equate due pro cess protections they can serve as legitimate devices for 
promoting justice in transitional societies, and to this extent we can say 
that trials form the locus of accountability for reconciliation (I address 
the problem of amnesty further below).
What then of the relationship between trials and victims? Antonio 
Cassesse, the ICTY’s fi rst president, offered a rather wishful reading of 
the contributions of retributive justice to victims: “When the Court 
metes out to the perpetrator his just deserts, then the victims’ calls for 
retribution are met; by dint of dispensation of justice, victims are pre-
pared to be reconciled with their erstwhile tormentors, because they 
know that the latter have now paid for their crimes” (1998, 3).
Underlying Cassesse’s claim about the power of trials is the as-
sumption that victims’ moral need for recognition will largely be met 
through the dispensation of retributive justice, thus encouraging them 
to forswear vengeance and move toward reconciliation. Trials, in other 
words, are meant to right past wrongs and return a sense of moral 
worth to victims. They are an important arena for punishment, but it is 
far from obvious that prosecutions directly contribute to tempering calls 
for vengeance or providing victim recognition. A courtroom can func-
tion as a public space for victims to tell their stories and their testimony 
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combined with other forms of evidence can forcefully challenge 
charges that victims fabricated or exaggerated their experiences. None-
theless, we should be wary of claims that the trials can somehow be 
“healing.” Eric Stover’s important ethnographic research at the ICTY 
shows that victims often risk being retraumatized when confronting 
their tormentors, particularly during cross- examinations, which can be 
emotionally overwhelming and ultimately damaging to their self- 
esteem and psychological health (2005). Part of the confusion  here is 
that a signifi cant body of psychological research shows that victims can 
receive some therapeutic benefi ts from recounting their experiences 
in supportive settings, and prosecution advocates have taken this to 
mean that courtrooms can further witness healing by allowing victims 
to accuse their violators directly as part of a personal catharsis. But it is 
not at all evident that trial testimony has this effect. While it may be 
the case that testifying may have a short- term cathartic effect for some 
witnesses, psychological and medical anthropological studies show 
that healing requires more than the emotional abreaction following 
public testimony in a courtroom (Summerfi eld 1995). For some vic-
tims, testifying may have few detrimental consequences, but for many 
it can force them to relive painful experiences in a hostile environment 
where opposing counsel can trivialize or dismiss their testimony while 
questioning the authenticity of their experiences. Retraumatization is 
not uncommon and in a confrontational institutional setting like a 
courtroom victims can feel abused, humiliated, and used. Rather than 
provide moral recognition, a trial can further devalue victim witnesses 
unwittingly, especially if there are no additional support structures for 
witnesses following their testimony, which typically are lacking. This is 
perhaps the weakest aspect of trials, and underscores the importance 
of complementing their work with other state initiatives that deal spe-
cifi cally with victims.
However, the very existence of public prosecutions can generate 
public debate about social obligations toward victims— trials, in other 
words, both legitimate victims’ claims and redirect public attention 
toward them. In this sense, trials may foster sustained deliberation 
about the past and a reconsideration of previously held truths about 
the period of violence, as well as the place of victims in society, well 
beyond the particularities of a specifi c court case. Victor Turner calls 
these types of trials “social dramas,” or cultural events that undermine 
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and render problematic general beliefs while demanding refl ection on 
previously given categories for making sense of the past:
Since social dramas suspend everyday role playing, they inter-
rupt the fl ow of social life and force a group to take cogni-
zance of its own behavior in relation to its own values, even to 
question the value of those values. In other words, these dra-
mas induce and contain refl exive pro cesses and generate cul-
tural frames in which refl exivity can fi nd a legitimate place. 
(2001, 92)
Though Turner’s notion of cultural framing is at times rather mecha-
nistic (in no small part due to his reliance on Emile Durkheim), he is 
right to underscore how prosecutions can create conditions for citizens 
to think about alternative conceptions of victimhood. Thus, though trials 
may not address victims directly, they establish and create an intelli-
gible framework that allows for debate to take place about responsibil-
ity, complicity, the status of victims, and what is owed to them.
Trial rec ords also create a public account of past wrongs. The 
Eichmann trial produced a wealth of information on the or ga ni za tion 
of the Final Solution, and the Auschwitz trials identifi ed the gruesome 
pro cess of extermination that was paradigmatic of the Holocaust 
(Douglas 2001; Whitmann 2006). The Raboteau case in Haiti un-
earthed signifi cant information on the internal or ga ni za tion and oper-
ation of the United States– backed Front for the Advancement and 
Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) death squad, and perhaps most impres-
sively the UN tribunals for the former Yugo slavia and Rwanda have 
amassed an enormous amount of material on the civil wars in those 
countries (Concannon 2001). The prosecution of the intellectual au-
thors of crimes should include the investigation of the agencies, bu-
reaucracies, or groups they lead; this in turn can provide some insight 
into the or ga ni za tion and operation of violence. In this way, tribunals 
contribute to the larger project of creating a factual account of the 
past. Nuremberg, for example, amassed a staggering amount of infor-
mation on the Schutzstaffel (SS) and gave historians a rich archival 
fund with which to reconstruct the Holocaust. Even Arendt, who op-
posed justifying trials on any grounds other than their retributive ca-
pacity, noted approvingly, “Even today, eigh teen years after the war, 
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our knowledge of the im mense archival material of the Nazi regime 
rests to a large extent on the selection made for prosecution” (1967, 
231). Furthermore, the fact that fair trials have a high standard for 
admission of evidence has led some commentators to argue that its 
“truth” carries greater weight than that found in truth commission re-
ports. This depends on the tribunal and commission in question, of 
course, but the fact that fair trials include high evidentiary standards 
means that trial evidence may be considered credible.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, the construction of “truth” 
after mass atrocity is a fraught enterprise, and this is especially the 
case in successor trials. While truth production in a trial includes a 
didactic element— trials, after all, signal to the population the wrong-
ness of certain actions— it ought to be limited by the strictures of the 
rule of law: Individual defendants, for example, should be held respon-
sible only for their actions, and not those of others who fall outside 
their control or knowledge; and only evidence directly related to a case 
should be presented. This can be hard to accomplish, however, be-
cause successor trials always provide a par tic u lar interpretation of the 
past. Ben Gurion, for example, wanted the prosecution of Eichmann to 
be told against the backdrop of crimes “against the Jewish people,” as 
part of a rethinking of Jewish history (Lahav 1992, 559– 561). And the 
charter of the Tokyo trial stated that “the tribunal shall not be bound 
by technical rules of evidence [ . . .  ] and shall admit any evidence that 
has probative value,” essentially permitting the introduction of mate-
rial that may not be specifi cally germane to the case at hand (Minear 
2001, 118). The diffi culty lies in drawing a connection between the 
par tic u lar acts of specifi c individuals and general historical develop-
ments, without stating the criteria used for inferring such connections. 
The problem is an important one that highlights a diffi cult obstacle 
faced by trials. It further points us to the importance of looking at 
other complements in other mechanisms and at different social levels.
Truthful accounts in reconciliatory pro cesses should be rooted in 
facts, but all facts must be interpreted. Clearly, we should oppose trials 
that merely paint perpetrators as evil without stating actual charges or 
without backing them with relevant evidence. But framed by the re-
quirements of the rule of law, courts can identify hidden cases of abuse 
and identify those responsible for them. These public rec ords are not 
only factual but also po liti cal, as they shape public deliberation about 
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responsibility and collective norms. This is desirable because trials re-
affi rm basic values that  were violated in the past. We should demand 
the most convincing and reasonable interpretations of events and re-
sponsibility in any par tic u lar case, and encourage civil society to turn 
to the evidence in constructing and debating new understandings 
about the past. The hermeneutic aspect of truth formation— where 
par tic u lar events delineated in a case help inform broader social un-
derstandings of the past— means that trial rec ords contribute to this 
project because of the legitimacy they carry, but are not the prime locus 
for it.
Trials may also promote the rule of law by eliminating existing au-
thoritarian enclaves that are holdovers from the previous regime. 
Through prosecutions of human rights violators who may still have 
some po liti cal protections, trials signal that the new regime is commit-
ted to holding all perpetrators accountable. Combating impunity is 
closely related to the Janus- faced aspect of tribunals; while they face 
the past through judgment, they also turn to the future by showing the 
necessity of a new legal regime founded on a respect for rights. This 
can have an important, transformative effect as trials signal that gov-
ernment power must be held within certain limits and individual rights 
must be protected from capricious state behavior.
In Chapter 2 I discussed how the rule of law is understood as a 
normative concept that entails a commitment to the principle of non-
violence and the pro cessing of po liti cal confl ict through legitimate 
procedures of deliberation framed by a basic rights model. Successor 
trials inform this by helping creating a space for public deliberation 
about rights, responsibility, and what it means to live under the rule of 
law. Nevertheless, transitional regimes are often constrained by am-
nesties. As such, the retributive impulse of prosecutions is blunted and 
the rule of law is undermined. Given how common amnesties have 
become, in the following section I discuss the uses and limitations of 
amnesties in transitional scenarios.
The Problem of Amnesties
If justice requires accountability, then amnesties— which give legal 
immunity to persons who should be tried for violations— are nearly 
always unjust. By limiting prosecutions preemptively, the demand for 
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accountability is undermined and impunity is strengthened. However, 
amnesties of some sort are a part of many transitions, and their rela-
tionship to reconciliation deserves attention.
The diffi culty lies in balancing the pragmatic need to secure a 
stable transition with the normative demand for legal and moral ac-
countability. At their most basic, amnesties are understood as practical 
compromises with at best no moral weight whatsoever, though in some 
instances amnesties have been subsumed into the broader search for 
reconciliation. The South African case is illustrative. As Richard Wil-
son (2001, 99) and others have noted, “According to the Interim Con-
stitution of 1993, the only function which the TRC had to fulfi ll in 
pursuit of reconciliation was to grant amnesty in a spirit of ubuntu 
[humaneness] and understanding, for po liti cally motivated acts within 
a specifi c period of time.” In such an approach, amnesty is transformed 
into a tool of social regeneration, blunting the call for destructive ven-
geance. Accountability, the rule of law, and victim recognition are cast 
aside in favor of securing some degree of peace. John Dugard (1997, 
284) reads the South African case as demanding a coercive form of 
reconciliation over justice, resulting in a reconciliation that “minimizes 
the memory of apartheid,” and “it is not clear that [reconciliation] 
takes adequate account of the interests of the victims of apartheid.” 
Dugard is correct, provided we accept such a defi nition of reconcilia-
tion. In any case, though amnesties may guarantee po liti cal stability in 
the near and possibly mid- term, it is not clear that they contribute to 
reconciliation in the long term. And this is not merely a semantic 
quibble. Amnesties undermine the rule of law and signal that the inter-
ests of victims can be sacrifi ced for the common good of stability. The 
issue  here may be one of timing: For instance, it may be necessary to 
defer prosecutions because a new government is too weak to  confront 
powerful violators, as happened in Argentina and Chile. A stronger 
claim, made by Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, is that once amnes-
ties are made, “institutions based on the rule of law become more fea-
sible” (2003– 2004, 6). The evidence for this is mixed, however, and 
while it may be the case that in par tic u lar circumstances amnesties are 
necessary for securing a demo cratic transition, there is no compelling 
normative reason why they should continue to be honored when the 
demo cratic regime has become more secure. As Argentina, Chile, 
Peru, and a number of other countries have shown, pursuing prosecu-
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tions after demo cratic rule has been consolidated can be both feasible 
and morally defensible. At most, amnesties should be seen as deferring 
justice, not eliminating it.
Given that amnesties may be necessary, is there a way to make 
them more palatable, or to have them serve the interests of justice? 
One of the dangers with amnesties is that their distinctly pragmatic 
nature is often subsumed under a rhetoric of forgiveness, where they 
are seen as an institutionalized form of forgiveness. By passing an am-
nesty, leaders may be perceived as saying, “Let us bury the past and 
begin a new future.”
Amnesties, however, are pragmatic devices, not moral responses to 
injustice, and there is a great deal of differentiation among them. They 
differ primarily on whom or what they place outside the domain of 
prosecution. Some are explicitly act specifi c, that is, they protect some 
crimes, such as murder or terrorist fi nancing, but not torture or kid-
napping. Algeria’s 2006 amnesty, for example, exempted only those 
insurgents who had supported or fi nanced terrorism but had not been 
involved directly in terrorist attacks (it did, however, provide a blanket 
amnesty for the security forces) (Human Rights Watch 2006). The 
United Nations recognized only certain acts as amnestied in Sierra 
Leone’s 1999 amnesty, exempting crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, and other serious violations of international law (Annan 
1999). Other amnesties specify a temporal range for protection, indi-
cating that crimes committed during the designated time period are 
protected from prosecution. This is perhaps the most common way of 
framing an amnesty and was typical in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mozambique. Nevertheless, even these blanket temporal amnesties 
may overlook certain crimes: In a novel reading of Argentina’s amnesty 
not intended by its authors, judges ruled that the military’s kidnapping 
of the children of the disappeared constituted ongoing crimes and thus 
 were not covered by the 1986 and 1987 amnesty laws (Verdeja 2009). 
Other amnesties give immunity to certain classes of actors and protect 
all members of a certain group or institution, such as the armed forces 
or internal security forces. Peru’s (1995) amnesty protected all mem-
bers of the security forces and civilians (but not insurgents) who  were 
the subject of a complaint, an investigation, a trial, or an imprisonment 
for human rights violations from the beginning of the war in 1980 to 
the enactment of the law (Amnesty International 1996). Even  here, 
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however, there may be some differentiation such as extending amnesty 
to insurgent combatants but excluding the top leadership, as happened 
in the 2000 amnesty in Uganda offered to the Lord’s Re sis tance Army 
(amnesties  were later extended in 2003, 2006, and early 2008) (Ariko 
2008). A variant of the actor approach is to provide conditional immu-
nity to par tic u lar individuals rather than entire groups or institutions, 
as in South Africa. But South Africa’s individualized focus has been 
the exception: Most amnesties have combined elements from these 
various approaches, offering immunity to entire groups for a range of 
crimes committed during a specifi ed time period.
Only conditional, individualized amnesty, I think, can be defended 
morally to any extent. The South African amnesty provides an impor-
tant illustration: Amnesty was not part of the collective erasure of 
memory, as in Uruguay, but was given only to those individuals who 
confessed their actions completely and truthfully.6 By testifying for im-
munity, they publicly incriminated themselves and laid bare the evils 
of apartheid. Those who chose not to confess risked prosecution, 
though in reality this was rare. Nevertheless, this conditional compo-
nent of amnesty helped undermine justifi cations for apartheid and 
showed its awful practices and legacy to the South African people. 
Those who testifi ed had their reputations destroyed and experienced a 
mea sure of public accountability and punishment. As Bert van Roer-
mund has written, amnesty served as “a way of covering that uncovers 
the meaning of what has happened” (2001, 178). In South Africa, am-
nesty was tied to truth seeking and justice.
Amnesties may be morally defensible if they assist other moral 
goods, such as truth telling. If granted on an individual basis through 
public testimony, a conditional amnesty can help the investigative work 
of a truth commission while also shaming perpetrators who otherwise 
will receive no punishment. Nevertheless, amnesties, even conditional 
ones, should be used sparingly, for they also symbolize the state’s will-
ingness to trade on the moral dignity of victims by sacrifi cing it to the 
interests of stability.
Where amnesties appear fully entrenched, international law and 
courts become a possible alternative venue for securing retributive 
justice. International law does not recognize domestic amnesties for 
serious human rights violations, and the ICC’s principle of “comple-
mentarity” to national courts allows it to prosecute crimes where the 
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state is either incapable or unwilling to hold trials. Using the ICC or 
international law, however, is not without challenges; depending on 
the context, an indictment from an international tribunal may under-
mine a carefully crafted peace accord or otherwise weaken the likeli-
hood of ending a war. The ICC’s recent indictment of top Lord’s Re sis-
tance Army leaders has arguably pushed back the possibility of bringing 
the war in Uganda to an end. While amnesties should always be re-
sisted, dismantling them requires a careful consideration of various 
contextual factors, including the likelihood of the resumption of con-
fl ict. The point  here is that if amnesties are given they should be con-
ditional, and eventually they should be overturned or rendered legally 
invalid, either by a domestic court (preferably) or by an international 
tribunal.
In general, then, we can say that retributive justice, as actualized 
in trials, focuses on accountability and creating an accurate and credi-
ble record of past violations, as well as contributing to the rule of law 
by rejecting impunity. Restorative justice, articulated through truth 
commissions, shifts the focus to victims and offers a broader account of 
the past than that found in trials, thus providing an important comple-
ment to the retributive impulse driving prosecutions.
Restorative Justice and Truth Commissions
Over the past several de cades, outgoing rulers have created amnesties 
to protect themselves from subsequent prosecution. In Latin America 
alone, numerous amnesties have been enacted: Chile (1978), Brazil 
(1979), Guatemala (1996), Argentina (1986, 1987), Uruguay (1986), Nic-
aragua (1990, 1991, 1993), El Salvador (1993), and Peru (1995). Where 
amnesties  were passed, truth commissions have been established in 
lieu of prosecutions. While traditionally commissions served as alterna-
tives to trials, in recent years they have served a complementary role, 
addressing issues that courts have been unable to handle adequately.
A truth commission is an offi cial investigative body with a man-
date to study violations that occurred during a par tic u lar time 
frame in a specifi c country. A commission normally exists for a rela-
tively short period of time (i.e., a few months to a few years) and 
produces a fi nal report of its fi ndings that may also include recom-
mendations. Its main task is to create an offi cial account of past 
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abuses.7 The techniques for amassing evidence can be varied and 
may include forensic anthropological investigations, depositions from 
a wide array of persons, and archival research. Furthermore, com-
missions may include a series of institutional reform and reparations 
recommendations in order to help prevent such abuses in the future. 
At the core of a commission’s work is a commitment to acknowledg-
ing victims and restoring their sense of dignity and moral worth. 
Thus, advocates argue, truth commissions are seen as paradigmatic 
examples of restorative justice.
There are several differences between truth commissions and tri-
bunals. Truth commissions generally lack subpoena powers and cannot 
prosecute perpetrators. Justice as criminal punishment is eschewed for 
the production of a history that explains violations in the context of 
broader social and po liti cal pro cesses. Over the past few de cades, truth 
commissions have become quite pop u lar. Over twenty- fi ve commis-
sions have been established since the early 1980s, and the more suc-
cessful ones have included prestigious citizens (e.g., authors, public 
 intellectuals, lawyers) as commissioners, lending greater legitimacy to 
the commission’s work. Unlike trials, commissions tend to be receptive 
to civil society input and often receive information and testimony from 
the NGO community and other interested parties, giving commissions 
a special place between civil society and the formal state.
Supporters offer several justifi cations for using truth commissions 
and pursuing restorative justice.
1. The primary purpose of such commissions is to produce an 
accurate public record of a country’s past crimes, through 
archival and forensic truth seeking complemented by inter-
viewing survivors and perpetrators (Boraine 2001).
2. Advocates point to the therapeutic benefi ts of truth com-
missions. By providing victims with a sympathetic public 
platform to present their stories, commissions contribute to 
their personal healing and offer a phenomenological or ex-
periential truth that complements archival and forensic 
truth (Krog 1998).
3. Concomitantly, the public pre sen ta tion of survivors’ sto-
ries incriminates perpetrators, offering a kind of punish-
ment akin to that found in a trial and achieving a powerful 
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symbolic punishment through the shaming and public stig-
matization of violators (Kiss 2001).
4. Public testimonies contribute to societal refl ection and, 
ideally, healing in society itself, helping restore and affi rm 
the demo cratic values of respect and tolerance, and “re-
pair” the “torn social fabric” (Tutu 1999).
5. Lastly, because of their systematic analysis of patterns of 
abuse and relevant institutions, commissions can provide 
policy recommendations for institutional reform and re-
structuring, as well as reparations programs for victims 
(Crocker 2001).
Truth commissions seek to create an accurate report of past crimes. 
They “clarify uncertain events, and lift the lid of silence and denial 
from a contentious and painful period of history,” in the words of Pris-
cilla Hayner (2001, 25). Because of a combination of investigate tech-
niques, including archival research, interviews, and fi eld investigations 
(e.g., unearthing mass graves), commissions are well positioned to pre-
sent a particularly complex and rich history of abuse. This combination 
of numerous investigate methods and access to often secret informa-
tion can provide a comprehensive macro perspective that is frequently 
lacking in transitional contexts. Argentina’s truth commission docu-
mented the disappearances of nearly 9,000 persons, providing a fuller 
picture of the atrocities committed during that country’s “dirty war” 
(Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared 1986). Peru’s 
truth commission report documents a twenty- year confl ict between 
guerrillas and the state that resulted in an estimated 69,000 deaths, 
nearly three times the previously estimated number (Peru 2003). South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation report (1999) detailed thousands of 
cases of torture, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses that had re-
mained hidden throughout the apartheid period. These reports can 
complement trial rec ords by establishing general patterns of violations 
that may be overlooked in prosecutions, and their wider investigative 
focus makes them ideal for analyzing the institutions and policies be-
hind systemic abuse.
In certain instances, as Priscilla Hayner (2001) and Mark Free-
man (2006) have pointed out, commissions do not uncover crimes so 
much as publicize what is known but could not be stated openly. By 
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publicizing atrocities, commissions confront offi cial denial and the cul-
ture of impunity that protects violators. A commission’s report can en-
courage debates about responsibility and complicity, and in the pro cess 
force a society to rethink its obligations to its fellow citizens who  were 
victimized. They do not, of course, offer a fi nalized account of the 
past, but they can “narrow the range of permissible lies” (Ignatieff 
1996, 113).
A reasonably accurate historical understanding is necessary for the 
other normative goods to take root. Accountability is impossible if ba-
sic facts, including who the perpetrators are, remain hidden or other-
wise unknown. Reparations, too, require knowledge of who the victims 
are if they are to be inclusive and morally defensible. Without a some-
what accurate, empirically based account of the past, there is less like-
lihood that shared social space can be created, or that former enemies 
will ever accept alternative histories as any more than lies or willful 
misrepre sen ta tions.
Clearly, amassing facts is not enough; the truth must be publicly dis-
seminated and generate public debate. Because they occupy a unique 
place between the state and civil society and enjoy signifi cant media 
attention, truth commissions are well situated to engender debate and 
are able to legitimize civil society programs about the legacies and 
challenges of the violence. Both the South African and Peruvian com-
missions conducted public hearings to gather victim testimony around 
their respective countries, and they successfully used the media to dis-
seminate their hearings. Commission reports are not fi nal accounts of 
the past, but rather often serve as an important fi rst step at under-
standing the history of violations and attendant culpability, and may 
even spur broader debates about moral responsibility. Researchers 
continue to add to and modify the commission fi ndings, as the cases of 
Chile and Argentina show, but this does not detract from their particu-
larly important role in catalyzing debate at all levels of society, from 
elite politics to civil society to interpersonal relations. They can pro-
vide a baseline of historical understanding by identifying primary ac-
tors, events, and patterns, and consequently undermine denials.
Truth commissions do, however, face some serious limitations. 
Though retroactivity is not a problem, scope and politicization are 
challenges. The scope of investigation is a par tic u lar challenge, as most 
commissions must consider an enormous range of crimes during their 
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relatively short life span. Given their limited period of operation, nor-
mally two years or less, and their often tight bud gets, most commis-
sions can investigate only a few hundred cases while briefl y mentioning 
perhaps a few hundred others. Even well- funded and professional 
commissions such as South Africa’s and Peru’s are faced with choosing 
among thousands of violations that bring charges of instrumentaliza-
tion. Which cases are paradigmatic examples of violations? Which best 
represent the crimes committed and highlight abusive policies? How 
 were they chosen?
Politicization is equally problematic; it is a concern that emerges 
with the way in which a commission frames its account of the confl ict 
and the evidence it marshals in doing so. Truth, as we have seen, is 
inseparable from pro cesses of interpretation and storytelling, and com-
missions are tasked with presenting— and re- presenting—a narrative 
account that makes sense of the past, given the information they are 
able to collect. By documenting violations committed by all belliger-
ents they may fi nd that one side is responsible for the majority of 
crimes, or in any case, a disproportionate number of them. Commis-
sions are not neutral and their normative aspects cannot be suspended 
by turning to supposedly neutral, non- contextual standards. Never-
theless, po liti cal manipulation has remained a problem for many com-
missions, and only institutional and bud getary autonomy as well as 
cultivating relations with broad sectors of civil society can provide at 
least some protection from explicit state interference (Freeman 2006).
The key concern over commissions is whether they provide a satis-
factory form of accountability. Some observers remain skeptical about 
a commission’s ability to secure meaningful accountability because 
they cannot prosecute violators (Llewellyn 1999; Robertson 2000). As 
products of po liti cal compromise, they remain incapable of providing 
the robust justice found in courts. Undoubtedly, countries have often 
established commissions when it seemed clear that prosecutions would 
be impossible due to amnesties. Other scholars, however, have de-
fended commissions’ ability to achieve accountability in moral terms, 
as an alternative to formal retributive justice. Elizabeth Kiss (2001), 
for example, has claimed that while formal legal punishment may not 
be a possibility open to commissions, the focus on victims and their 
suffering effectively condemns perpetrators publicly, bringing some 
mea sure of justice. While Kiss may perhaps overstate this point, truth 
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commissions do contribute to accountability in several ways. David 
Crocker (2001) has noted that they may provide evidence for future 
trials, shame perpetrators publicly by tying them to abuses, and make 
well- informed recommendations for judicial reform. Because their 
work includes the systematic investigation of crimes, the evidence they 
amass can be useful for prosecutions, and in several cases commissions 
have provided their fi les to prosecutors to be used in future prosecu-
tions. In Peru, Argentina, and Chile prosecutions have either followed, 
or are expected to follow (eventually), the publication of the fi nal 
 report. The Guatemalan Commission on Historical Clarifi cations 
(Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico 1999) fi nal report specifi -
cally recommended prosecutions in its concluding chapter, and in Si-
erra Leone and East Timor, trials and commission investigations pro-
ceeded together, though there were jurisdictional confl icts over sharing 
information.
More specifi cally, the identifi cation of violators in a fi nal report 
functions as a sort of symbolic punishment by publicly shaming and 
undermining their self- serving stories of courage and patriotism. The 
importance of shaming, especially when specifi c actors are tied to par-
ticularly horrendous acts, is certainly a kind of punishment. South Af-
rica’s fi nal report powerfully condemned the apartheid regime by 
drawing on a wide array of archival and testimonial evidence in sup-
port of its claims, and those who  were associated with the regime’s 
crimes suffered public condemnation and humiliation.8 Pinochet re-
portedly remained angry and humiliated until the end of his life over 
charges that he was responsible for massive crimes, even though he 
was never found formally guilty. It may be preferable that commissions 
actually name perpetrators in their fi nal reports, establishing a tighter 
link to individual responsibility than would be the case with generic 
references to institutional culpability; commissions in Chad, East 
Timor, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, among other places, 
enjoy this authority. This has the benefi t of furthering truth telling, 
accountability, and possibly even victim ac know ledg ment, since it ties 
a face to actual atrocities. El Salvador’s commission realized that given 
the existing amnesty, naming perpetrators would be the closest it 
would come to assigning individual responsibility, and thus published 
names in its fi nal report. In some cases, however, perpetrators cannot be 
named but the evidence clearly points to them, achieving something of 
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the symbolic punishment evident above. In settings where trials are 
impossible because of transitional constraints, humiliation can serve as 
an important proxy for formal justice. Nevertheless, “naming names” 
faces some serious drawbacks: Accusations can be made for a number 
of personal or po liti cal reasons and the opportunities to defend oneself 
publicly and forcefully are few and often inadequate. Particularly 
where multiple sides committed violations in a civil war or where a 
large part of the population was complicit in state domination (e.g., as 
in Eastern Eu rope), naming risks overemphasizing the responsibility 
of some while allowing others to avoid unwelcome publicity.
Finally, commissions can give helpful recommendations for judi-
cial reform by identifying corruption and politicization that can 
facilitate— and legitimize— further abuse. In Peru, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala, commissions have pointed to compromised judiciaries as 
key agents for human rights violations. Their work in identifying judi-
cial co- optation and recommending comprehensive reforms is im-
portant for accountability and the rule of law. Commissions, of 
course, cannot replace trials as the locus of accountability but they can 
function in a complementary relationship with courts. Rather than 
seeing them in confl ict— an increasingly anachronistic and simplistic 
view I discuss further below— they should be understood as poten-
tially compatible.
Since the mid- 1990s, a number of commissions have followed 
South Africa and incorporated public hearings, welcomed by scholars 
as a primary device for extending recognition to victims.9 Much re-
cent scholarship has extolled the supposed social healing dimension 
of victim testimony by arguing that allowing victims to recount their 
experiences will strengthen social relations and contribute directly to 
reconciliation. The dynamics of public social catharsis are strongly 
disputed, and it is not at all clear that public hearings have such a 
 directly positive impact on either victims or society (Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2002). Part of the diffi culty in this debate appears to be the 
assumption that commissions are the only locus of victim recognition. 
Framed in such a reductive way, it is unsurprising that complete victim 
recognition is not achieved through the brief public testimony of some 
survivors before commissioners. A more realistic view sees commis-
sions as an initially central location for victim recognition that pro-
vides a public and protected space where they recount their stories 
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and experiences. But victim testimony gives concrete, emotionally 
charged perspectives on lived suffering, and may generate public de-
bate and refl ection on the past. Furthermore, public testimonies de-
mand that victims be recognized as bearers of moral worth (and legal 
rights)— people who can no longer be ignored or marginalized in the 
interest of stability. Thus, public testimony may draw the attention of 
an uninformed or skeptical public and begin a diffi cult pro cess of so-
cial reexamination and refl ection, but its actual benefi ts for victims is 
signifi cantly less clear. In any case, while a trial may draw on victim 
testimony, its focus on prosecutions means that victims at best serve an 
ancillary capacity in that forum and meaningful victim recognition 
there is unlikely.
Commissions may also recommend reparations for victims and 
their families. As discussed in Chapter 2, reparations can take a num-
ber of forms: They can be symbolic or material, and collective or indi-
vidual. They may, for example, give individuals medical or psychologi-
cal assistance, or provide them with fi nancial compensation for physical 
harms and destroyed property and goods. Although reparations cannot 
give a morally complete answer to abuse they can positively affect the 
livelihood of victims and clearly signal the state’s ac know ledg ment of 
its responsibility for crimes. A number of commissions have recom-
mended reparations, and in South Africa, Argentina, and Chile they 
 were provided with precisely these goals in mind (Hayner 2001; Ver-
deja 2006). Nevertheless, reparations face a number of problems that 
speak directly to the issue of victim ac know ledg ment. For example, do 
individual material reparations address the need of survivors for moral 
recognition? It is diffi cult to give an answer in the abstract, so instead 
we must to turn to the recipients themselves.  Here, the responses are 
often contradictory, with some recipients arguing that reparations 
qualify as a form of moral redress and others rejecting payments as a 
crude form of self- exculpation on the part of the state (Verdeja 2000). 
While welcoming just compensation, victim groups often fear the state 
will use individual payments as an excuse to ignore victims in the fu-
ture, arguing that they have been adequately compensated for their 
suffering. Rather than use reparations as a strategic mea sure to neu-
tralize public debate or isolate victims, they should be crafted to ex-
press the state’s awareness of its responsibility and contribute to devel-
oping public trust in government institutions over the long run.10 
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Reparations are legitimate to the extent that they are not perceived as 
merely cheap responses to violence but rather recast compensation as 
a form of moral recognition by the state. A truth commission’s endorse-
ment of reparations can help generate public awareness of the depth of 
violence and its symbolic and practical legacies, while forcing a reti-
cent population to refl ect on its obligations to its fellow citizens.
Commissions are signifi cantly less successful, however, as institu-
tions promoting the rule of law. The rule of law is most clearly promoted 
in the judiciary, through fair and transparent trials that systematically 
uphold existing laws and norms. Truth commissions, of course, do not 
guarantee substantive or procedural due pro cess protections or other 
defendant rights, and for these reasons they should not (and do not) 
serve as venues for prosecution. They can further the rule of law only 
indirectly, by recommending reform of problematic state institutions, 
prosecutions of abusers, removal of corrupt or otherwise unqualifi ed 
justices, and strengthening individual legal rights. Because these can 
only be recommendations truth commissions have no binding power 
to carry out these policies— they must depend on the will of po liti cal 
leaders, which is often a despairing thought.
I discussed earlier the importance of truth for reconciliation, 
since without an understanding of who did what to whom any possi-
bility of reconciling former enemies is likely to fail. In this, truth com-
missions can undoubtedly play an important role. On occasion it is 
argued that commissions are crucial if society is to overcome the deep 
divisions of the past. The strength of this argument is diffi cult to 
gauge: Reconciliation is a long, uneven pro cess that may benefi t from a 
truth commission but it also requires reconciliatory efforts at po liti cal, 
social, and interpersonal levels. Provided that commissions not be nor-
matively overburdened— provided, that is, that we do not expect them 
to achieve all of the goals of reconciliation alone— they may contribute 
in the long run to societal reconciliation by recasting issues of respon-
sibility, victim recognition, and accountability against the background 
of historical evidence of atrocity. Their position between the state and 
civil society may allow them to function as facilitators for long- term 
reconciliation.
Tribunals and truth commissions, and retributive and restorative 
justice more generally, share a number of goals: They seek to uncover 
past atrocities, hold perpetrators accountable, acknowledge victims, 
120 ▪ Chapter 4
and promote the rule of law. They differ, however, in emphasis: The 
retributive approach promotes accountability over victim ac know ledg-
ment, while restorative justice endorses the importance of recognizing 
victims and rebuilding social relations over the prosecution of perpe-
trators. This does not mean that they are essentially contradictory; on 
the contrary, they may be compatible, and it may be in fact desirable 
that they operate together under certain transitional contexts. Vasuki 
Nesiah (2006) has argued that it may be best to stagger their imple-
mentation to avoid contradictory aims, beginning with commissions 
and then focusing more narrowly on legal approaches. The benefi t of 
this is that broader patterns of violence are identifi ed and publicized 
before pursuing individual cases of wrongdoing, thus mitigating the 
possibility of highly particularized accounts of wrongs that displace 
our understandings of the systemic and institutional dimensions of 
 repression and violence. Commissions provide a wider context for un-
derstanding the actions of individual perpetrators and chains of com-
mand, and trials can devote their resources to the most extreme cases 
and their orchestrators.
Staggering may indeed be benefi cial. However, when prosecutions 
and commissions work concurrently, as in East Timor and Sierra  Leone, 
sharing information can bring with it a host of practical and normative 
problems. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
([SLTRC] 2004) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone ([SCSL] 2003) 
 were established separately with the expectation that they would work 
to address the country’s violent legacy. The commission encouraged 
violators, witnesses, and victims to speak in public hearings as part of 
its mandate to create “an impartial historical record” and promote na-
tional reconciliation. The commissioners saw their work as fundamen-
tally different from, but in harmony with, the SCSL:
The Special Court is also in search of the truth, but the Court’s 
truth will necessarily be limited to the criminal responsibil-
ity of the accused. . . .  The Special Court and the TRC [Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission] have essentially different, al-
though complementary, roles to play. Whereas the TRC cannot 
replace judicial investigations into the criminal responsibility 
of those that [sic] bear the greatest responsibility, the Special 
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Court is not as well suited for a broader inquiry into the causes, 
nature and circumstances of the confl ict. (Sierra Leone Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission 2004, vol. 1, ch. 3, para. 11)
This institutionalized division of labor, however, did not work very 
well in practice. Many Sierra Leoneans  were concerned that self- 
incriminating testimony given before the commission would later be 
used in the SCSL’s prosecutions, and numerous ex- combatants refused 
to participate in the hearings. The two institutions also disagreed over 
the use of amnesties and whether the court’s subpoena power would 
extend to the commission’s fi les (Schabas 2004). Many hearing partici-
pants remained confused about the differences between the court and 
the commission and  were unclear about what was expected and per-
mitted in commission testimony. Tim Kelsall notes that these confu-
sions and fears produced testimony that was “rarely able to get beyond 
detached, factual statements on the part of victims and half- truths, 
and evasions and outright lies on the part of perpetrators” (2005, 380). 
This is not, however, merely a case of institutional clashes. Rather, it 
shows how the institutionalized pursuit of two differing normative 
goals— truth and accountability— can come into confl ict. The SLTRC’s 
legitimate commitment to truth telling was hampered by the court’s 
legitimate desire to amass evidence for prosecution, thus affecting and 
ultimately distorting the testimony at public commission hearings and 
satisfying neither the truth nor accountability. Any move to broaden 
the historical understanding of the civil war would invariably require 
par tic u lar information about individual combatants and their actions, 
but in a confl ict with mass atrocities and the likelihood of prosecution, 
many people  were unsurprisingly unwilling to participate in public 
hearings. The result was a pro cess of strategic truth telling that was 
heavily shaped by the threat of trials. Can these competing institu-
tional aims be brought into harmony in future settings? Perhaps, but 
this requires answering some diffi cult po liti cal questions that have 
consequences for truth and accountability. Who should mediate the 
relationship between the institutions? Who prioritizes goals when they 
clash, and how should they be prioritized? Should commissions name 
alleged perpetrators in their fi nal reports, even when courts fail to 
prosecute them on narrow technical or procedural grounds? Doing so 
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risks producing two competing historical accounts and differing (and 
possibly contradictory) assessments of individual responsibility; if the 
procedural protections and evidentiary requirements of courts are 
taken seriously it would be highly problematic, at the very least, to dis-
card acquittals in favor of a lower commission standard based on more 
fl exible testimonial rules. And what if a commission has confi dential 
evidence conclusively showing an individual’s culpability or innocence? 
Should it share this with the court, even if not explicitly requested by 
the court? These are not merely technical questions about jurisdiction 
and mandate; instead, they pose fundamental challenges for the types 
of truths and accountability that are ultimately produced. Staggering 
these institutions may mitigate in the short term some of the concerns 
about information sharing and insulate the commission from public 
perceptions that testimony will be used in trials, while at least main-
taining the possibility of future prosecutions.
Even if these institutional clashes can be lessened, complementar-
ity is not always easily achievable. There are a number of other factors 
that constrain the use of truth commissions and tribunals and affect 
their ability to promote reconciliation.
Part II: Practical Constraints
The previous section identifi ed the theoretical issues at stake in em-
ploying tribunals and truth commissions in post- atrocity societies. But 
the options available to transition architects are not so extensive; they 
must work within specifi c po liti cal, social, and economic pa ram e ters 
that constrain their choices. In this section, I consider several factors 
that play a critical role in assessing the viability of tribunals and com-
missions, and, more importantly, help us calibrate their contributions 
and limitations to reconciliation— and how this level is both necessary 
and insuffi cient for larger reconciliation.
Degree of Institutionalization and 
Legitimacy of Previous Regime
The degree of institutionalization and legitimacy of the perpetrating 
regime affects the likely success of efforts to seek legal recourse for 
po liti cal crimes. Institutionalization means at least three things: (1) the 
Institutional and Legal Responses ▪ 123
regime rules through the use of formal and bureaucratic mechanisms, 
so that different aspects of governance are managed and coordinated 
by various departments; (2) it has penetrated civil and po liti cal society 
systematically and deeply; and (3) it seems stable and durable.11 Insti-
tutionalized perpetrator regimes are essentially Janus- faced: They 
 assemble complex legal justifi cations for their actions, bureaucratize 
violence, and generally rationalize repression, yet also engage in extra-
 legal terror against po liti cal opponents and the broader population, 
particularly through the use of secret police, death squads, disappear-
ances, and massacres.
Institutionalization is normally accompanied by an increase in le-
gal justifi cations for crimes through the emergence of a large body of 
state- security law, and in this sense we can say that a perverted “rule of 
law” exists.  Here, rules, edicts, statutes, executive orders, administra-
tive decrees, and legislation all work to justify what is essentially a ter-
roristic regime, giving a kind of legal patina to an otherwise despotic 
state. Concomitantly, the state employs its military and security appa-
ratus to violent ends, often working outside (but in harmony with) the 
established legal framework. The upshot may be a large body of law 
and archival evidence identifying the or ga ni za tion and systematization 
of state- sponsored violence. The more institutionalized and central-
ized the terror, the more likely it is that a signifi cant body of documen-
tation delineating the coordination of bureaucracies and security forces 
will exist. Of course, the peculiarities of a negotiated transition may 
make acquiring this information diffi cult, particularly if the perpetrat-
ing institutions manage to retain some degree of autonomy. In Chile 
and Argentina, the armed forces  were fairly successful at retaining 
control of rec ords on their “dirty wars,” though what has emerged indi-
cates that in both instances the state’s violence was highly rationalized 
and bureaucratized. In South Africa, the armed forces and national 
police destroyed many of their rec ords of death- squad activity, and the 
militaries of Central America have simply refused to hand over damn-
ing internal documents.
Nevertheless, systematized state terror complemented by a robust 
body of documentation can facilitate the truth seeking and prosecu-
torial goals of tribunals, and thus institutionalized regimes make 
good candidates for trials. Strong and well- documented links be-
tween superiors and subordinates illuminate hierarchies of legal (and 
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moral) responsibility, making it more likely that prosecutions will be 
successful.
But institutionalization poses obstacles as well. Complex, multi-
layered systems of repression complicate the criminal- legal under-
standing of responsibility (i.e., normally understood as predicated on 
individuals and not institutions). If the perpetrator regime  were highly 
institutionalized, with a wide web of repression implicating numerous 
bureaucracies and agencies (e.g., as in South Africa and Eastern Eu-
rope, in different ways) and enjoying widespread support or at least 
acquiescence— and thus arguably legitimacy— then prosecution of 
 individuals can be vulnerable to charges of selectivity: Only some vio-
lators face prosecution, while the majority (i.e., normally the higher- 
echelon violators) will escape justice. Where these considerations hold, 
a commission may offer an important complement to prosecutions by 
illuminating how repression entails the cooperation of numerous coor-
dinated institutional actors.
In de pen dence and Fairness of the Judiciary
In some transitions, the judiciary remains an enclave of the past regime, 
signifi cantly limiting the ability of victims to obtain redress. In these 
instances, trials are unfeasible, and truth commissions may be the only 
viable domestic institutional response, at least until (or whether) the 
judiciary is reformed. Nevertheless, there are alternatives: regional or 
international fora, such as the Inter- American Court of Human Rights 
and the ICC, and, under certain conditions, case- specifi c tribunals as-
sembled by the United Nations. This latter approach requires UN Se-
curity Council support, which in turn poses numerous practical ob-
stacles. The apprehension of some major powers, particularly the 
United States, toward the expansion of universal criminal jurisdiction 
impedes the success of the ICC, though as mentioned earlier the hy-
brid tribunals like the SCSL may be viable.12 Regardless, the recon-
struction of the national judiciary remains the best hope for domestic 
accountability and a crucial prophylactic against future impunity. 
Eliminating impunity requires an in de pen dent and well- run judiciary. 
Because accountability is situated at this level, a weak judicial system 
can fatally undermine the likelihood of reconciliation, thus leaving 
authoritarian enclaves intact.
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Extent of Perpetrator Population
In some instances, there exist relatively few overt perpetrators and 
many “benefi ciaries,” or persons who benefi t from the po liti cal circum-
stances without actively participating po liti cally. In South Africa, for 
example, apartheid benefi ted all white South Africans, regardless of 
their po liti cal affi liations or relations to the state. The apartheid gov-
ernment enjoyed the tacit support of much of the (Afrikaner) white 
population, although many  were not active oppressors. Other cases are 
markedly different. The po liti cal terror of the Hutu Power regime in 
Rwanda included the active participation of many Hutu civilians— 
thus, the perpetrator population was high relative to the number of 
benefi ciaries. The same can be said of Cambodia. Although the Khmer 
Rouge ruled through terror and did not enjoy wide- ranging support 
outside their own ranks, there  were few benefi ciaries of the regime 
who  were not implicated in gross human rights violations.
In all of these cases, tribunals can offer an important, though lim-
ited, contribution to accountability. Where there are relatively few 
overt perpetrators and many benefi ciaries, the latter cannot be held 
legally accountable; however, it would be misguided simply to ignore 
their moral responsibility. A truth commission can serve as an impor-
tant complement to trials by highlighting that complicity and re-
sponsibility go well beyond the narrowly understood notions of crimi-
nal liability that are characteristic of criminal prosecutions. In South 
 Africa, the commission investigated the role that business, legal, med-
ical, religious, and other professional communities played in support-
ing the apartheid regime. Investigations of this sort illuminate the 
wide support that some terroristic states enjoy by morally implicating 
benefi ciaries and countering claims that the latter  were ignorant of 
the state’s violence. Nevertheless, even this is insuffi cient; a robust 
public sphere open to critical refl ection is an important resource for 
ensuring that state institutions like the judiciary or commissions do 
not wholly determine complex normative issues of responsibility and 
perpetrator defi nition. As the following chapter makes evident, civil 
society actors can raise many of the diffi cult questions of responsi-
bility, such as the moral status of bystanders and benefi ciaries, in 
ways that are not possible through trials and even truth commission 
investigations.
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Mode of Transition
A key element in assessing what type of institutional response to pur-
sue is the mode of po liti cal transition between regimes. While I dis-
cussed this earlier, some points bear repeating: Where the transition is 
achieved through a complete victory in war or other radical break with 
the past, successor elites have the po liti cal capital to impose trials with 
little concern for the desires of their enemies. The Tokyo and Nurem-
berg tribunals, as well as the domestic successor trials in Rwanda, un-
derscore the wide latitude that victors have in pursuing retribution. 
Where the transition is tightly “pacted,” or negotiated, trials are less 
viable po liti cally. Previous elites may still retain enough power to 
trump the possibility of trials, either through the creation of an am-
nesty or the threat of renewed violence.  Here, truth commissions have 
been offered as an alternative response to the past, investigating elites’ 
actions and shaming them through the publication of a truth report 
identifying their crimes.
Material, Financial, and Personnel Resources
Both trials and truth commissions are expensive, and poor countries 
emerging from a confl ict with a devastated infrastructure and weak 
economy may be unable to pursue these expensive institutional re-
sponses, at least not without signifi cant foreign support. Tribunals, in 
par tic u lar, are especially costly. A trial of a high- level perpetrator can 
cost millions of dollars, making numerous trials diffi cult to justify from 
a strictly bud getary perspective, particularly when a country is faced 
with myriad other pressing humanitarian concerns and some of those 
funds could be used to alleviate the plight of survivors and others. In-
ternational funding is often diffi cult to secure, and there may be few 
qualifi ed personnel to carry out a trial. The Rwandan genocide left 
only a handful of lawyers in the country, creating a seemingly insur-
mountable obstacle to formal domestic prosecutions (indeed, Rwanda 
turned to the use of gacacas, an alternative, allegedly “native” legal 
system that could pro cess the accused in quicker succession). With a 
shortage of attorneys to prosecute— much less defend— suspects, the 
likelihood of fair trials is seriously diminished. It would be a mistake, 
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of course, to choose commissions over trials simply on bud getary 
grounds. To do so would make a mockery of the principle of a moral 
response, thus delegating the moral calculus to the rather profane 
level of fi nancing. Nevertheless, bud getary constraints are constraints. 
South Africa spent approximately $18 million a year on its commis-
sion, a sum unmatched by any other similar body, and commissioners 
nevertheless felt their work was underfunded. So, too, with the UN- 
sponsored truth commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala (Lester 
2000).
Closely related to the above resource factors is po liti cal will. Does 
the successor regime have the will and commitment to actually pur-
sue and sustain a rigorous, institutional response? Human rights ad-
vocates have often found a great deal of rhetorical governmental sup-
port for their ambitious projects, only to realize later that the regime 
has no interest whatsoever in matching its words with deeds. The lack 
of interest is, unsurprisingly, refl ected in the lack of money and re-
sources available for tribunals and commissions. Uganda assembled 
two commissions— in 1974 and 1986— that  were duly ignored by the 
state, and Ec ua dor’s 1996 commission ended inconclusively after fi ve 
months, without producing a report of its fi ndings. Zimbabwe’s 1985 
state- sanctioned commission, investigating state repression in the Mata-
beleland, never released its report; the government quashed its publi-
cation, claiming the fi ndings would unleash “ethnic confl ict” (Freeman 
2006; Hayner 2001). Po liti cal will and suffi cient resources are crucial 
if institutional responses to the past are to succeed. Otherwise, they 
will amount to nothing more than empty promises.
Possibility of Future Social Unrest through the 
Use of Trials and Truth Commissions
There exists the very subjective factor of predicting—reckoning may 
be a more appropriate term— whether tribunals or commissions will 
contribute to the resumption of violence, be it through coup, civil war, 
or revolution. Po liti cal elites must engage in a delicate calculus to 
ascertain whether certain kinds of institutional responses may lead 
to a renewal of violence. Highly pacted transitions tend to result in 
authoritarian enclaves in politics, the economy, and occasionally the 
128 ▪ Chapter 4
armed forces, thus reducing the possibility of trials. Truth commis-
sions may offer the only possibility of a moral response without result-
ing in renewed confl ict and retributive efforts will have to be pursued 
in the international arena, with all of the great- power pitfalls that en-
tails, or be pushed into an uncertain future. But negotiating the straits 
of pacted transitions does not entail the abandonment of justice. 
Rather, it requires the espousal of novel forms of accountability, truth 
seeking, and victim recognition as a means of promoting the pro cess of 
reconciliation. It also points to the importance of civil society in pro-
moting reconciliation.
Salience of Specific Cultural and Religious 
Discourses for Furthering the Cause of 
Reconciliation
Trials and truth commissions should draw from par tic u lar local dis-
courses that can strengthen their legitimacy. Archbishop Tutu (1998) 
often turned to Christian notions of forgiveness as a primary virtue in 
dealing with perpetrators, and local leaders frequently called for a col-
lective spirit of ubuntu, roughly meaning “humaneness,” to emphasize 
the importance of reestablishing just and meaningful social relations. 
These notions and others offer a deep discursive source that can feed 
broader efforts at encouraging mutual respect. Drawing on local dis-
courses can help ensure that reconciliatory efforts will have greater 
 resonance in the population. One novel approach has been to draw 
on traditional practices of confl ict resolution to bring communities 
together.
Traditional Justice Mechanisms
This chapter focused on the role of former trials and truth commissions, 
which represent two of the primary institutional responses to mass 
atrocity in post- confl ict settings. Nevertheless, responses have also 
taken a decidedly autochthonous turn, especially in sub- Saharan Africa, 
and  here I say a few words about these important recent developments. 
My comments are limited because there still remains relatively little 
ethnographic and comparative scholarly work on these  developments. 
In Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, state 
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offi cials and local leaders have encouraged traditional practices to rein-
tegrate former combatants and rebuild social relations. These practices 
are quite varied but are based on complex rituals that aim at social heal-
ing and truth telling and include extensive community participation. 
They often include some component of accountability, such as the re-
quirement of a confession, community labor, or reparation, but with the 
exception of Rwanda’s gacaca do not rely on formal punishment per se, 
such as a prison sentence. Their primary point in common is that they 
eschew the formal rational legalism typical of international and West-
ern human rights law for informal communal traditions that are highly 
ritualized. The use of traditional practices stems from a common con-
cern that formal courts are incapable of addressing the full extent of 
atrocities and their social effects, and consequently alternative ap-
proaches are needed. International courts like the ICTR and the ICC 
are often perceived as remote, expensive, and largely irrelevant, and do 
not speak to the concerns of affected societies. Even domestic trials, 
many argue, may have little impact on the immediate needs of survivors 
and communities or are otherwise incapable of handling the enormous 
number of persons implicated in the violence. Truth commissions may 
appear less remote, but a commission rarely gives sustained attention to 
any one locality; its interest is in producing a report on national patterns 
of violence, not necessarily micro- level reintegration. Ideally, these tra-
ditional approaches focus on preexisting local or regional customs for 
resolving confl ict and maintaining (i.e., reestablishing) social solidarity 
on morally acceptable grounds. Some of these practices, such as the 
Ugandan ritual of having child soldiers step on an egg, dramatically 
capture par tic u lar cultural rituals of social repair (Baines 2007). They 
are also all communal: They depend on the participation of the entire 
community, as the assumption is that the violence has harmed not only 
individuals but the community as well. The question, naturally, is “How 
successful are these approaches for promoting reconciliation, and are 
they more effective than courts or commissions?”
It seems to be too early to tell, largely because these traditional 
approaches are so different from one another and have not been em-
ployed systematically over long periods of time in any one place. In-
deed, many of them are hardly traditional: While all appeal to tradition 
as a source of legitimacy, some are signifi cantly different than their 
pre de ces sors though they remain at least partly rooted in traditional 
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practices, such as the modern mato oput ceremonies in Uganda or the 
magamba rituals of Mozambique, but others represent fundamentally 
new institutions, like the Rwandan gacaca. Nevertheless, the ethno-
graphic work on these institutions show mixed results (Huyse 2008).
In Mozambique, for example, the government did not pursue ex-
plicit reconciliation or retributive policies following the civil war, but 
communities in the central part of the country drew on local practices 
and customs to develop their own reconciliatory approaches centered 
on the magamba (spirits of dead soldiers returning to the land of the 
living to seek justice). These highly ritualized ceremonies require that 
the perpetrator accept responsibility for wrongs before the magamba 
and the community, and after a show of contrition, village priests, or 
curandeiros, drive away the magamba and begin the pro cess of restor-
ing social bonds. By taking responsibility and explaining their actions, 
perpetrators help return dignity to their victims and repair badly dam-
aged communities. The magamba ceremonies appear to enjoy pop u lar 
legitimacy, and recent ethnographies show that many family members 
of victims have responded positively to the reintegration rituals and 
accepted that the contrition shown by ex- combatants represents at 
least a modest form of moral recognition for the deceased (Igreja and 
Dias- Lambranca 2008).
In Rwanda, the response has been signifi cantly different. The origi-
nal Rwandan gacacas  were village- based institutions meant to settle 
community disputes including theft and property damage (and possi-
bly manslaughter), but not mass murder. They  were presided over by 
local elders held in high esteem, the inyanga- mugayo, and their deci-
sions carried the weight of customary authority. In 2002 the Rwandan 
government established modern gacaca to pro cess the enormous num-
ber of perpetrators in jail after the genocide, and the program was 
implemented nationally in 2005. These new gacaca hear cases involv-
ing common killers, torturers, and looters, but not rapists or the archi-
tects of the genocide, who instead are tried in domestic courts or by 
the ICTR (Rwanda 2008). Like their pre de ces sors, modern gacacas 
meet in a public setting where perpetrators are confronted by victims 
and other accusers in a relatively free- fl owing exchange, and commu-
nity leaders mete out a punishment (including prison) and call for repa-
ration. But the differences between the two types of institution are 
profound, and a number of observers point out that the contemporary 
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gacaca enjoy little connection to their pre de ces sors. Indeed, the claim 
that they are “traditional” appears to be an effort by the government to 
enhance their legitimacy; they  were essentially developed from the top 
down and imposed on local communities. Modern gacaca judges rarely 
enjoy the authority of elders (a sizeable minority of whom have been 
implicated in the genocide), and the extensive violence seems to have 
destroyed the legitimacy of many traditional customs and institutions, 
including the legitimacy of the gacaca themselves (Ingelaere 2008; 
Kirkby 2006). Furthermore, many victims risk retraumatization in ga-
caca hearings and face the prospect of having to live next to their tor-
mentors after the latter have paid what is often considered a relatively 
small reparation or served a brief period in prison. Many accounts in-
dicate that in these sessions victims are often ignored or disparaged 
and rarely receive meaningful recognition, and there are few programs 
in place to support their psychological needs after testimony, though a 
national fund for victim support has been established. Recent studies 
also show that in many cases gacaca hearings have increased intracom-
munal confl ict (Waldorf 2006).
One of the primary diffi culties facing these community justice 
mechanisms is the scale of the violence, which they are ill- equipped to 
handle. This is, of course, also a problem for formal judicial systems, 
but these traditional mechanisms often developed to handle signifi -
cantly lesser transgressions where the background cultural norms re-
mained intact. The scale of violence, however, can tax the norms on 
which these institutions rely for legitimacy. The complicity of local 
leaders in the violence also weakens the traditional authority struc-
tures at the center of the reconciliation ceremonies, thus leaving many 
participants angry, dismayed, and skeptical of community justice.
International human rights organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch (Roth and Desforges 2002) and Amnesty International (2002) 
have criticized some of these traditional approaches for their weak 
commitment to accountability and failure to employ explicit and cod-
ifi ed due pro cess criteria. Some of this is misplaced: All of these 
 approaches contain an element of accountability. In the magamba cer-
emonies perpetrators are required to accept guilt for their actions, and 
in the gacaca punishment can include prison sentences of several years. 
In Burundi, the bashingantahe, a traditional confl ict- resolution cere-
mony, explicitly requires ac cep tance of responsibility. Nevertheless, 
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because few of these institutions have codifi ed rules of procedure, ex-
plicit evidentiary criteria, or formal protections for the accused, they 
seem to lack the due pro cess protections of formal trials. Even the ga-
caca, which have formal rules, suffer from undertrained judges and 
assistants and signifi cant participant confusion on the pro cess and ex-
pectations of the hearings. Some of these accountability problems may 
be mitigated over time, as the specifi cally practical and institutional 
challenges that traditional approaches face are better understood.
A more pervasive limitation concerns their appropriateness in eth-
nically diverse societies. The traditional practices in Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone, and Uganda are quite culturally specifi c, and do not translate 
well into other cultural milieux in their respective countries. This is 
partly a source of strength, as their cultural specifi city means that they 
may resonate strongly with par tic u lar communities and thus (poten-
tially) enjoy enhanced legitimacy, but it also points to their inherent 
limitations; different communities have different traditional confl ict- 
resolution rituals and may not be able to deal with intercommunal 
confl icts. Indeed, the wars in Sierra Leone and northern Uganda 
crossed national borders and ethnic groups, but traditional mecha-
nisms have not been very effective in dealing with intercommunal vio-
lence (Alie 2008; Ojera 2008).
A fi nal point relates directly to the issue of recognition. A primary 
focus of these institutions is to provide meaningful recognition of vic-
tims. To the extent that survivors are included as active participants in 
these ceremonies, their experiences and claims to dignity can be ac-
knowledged. Unlike formal trials, many of these institutions focus 
primarily on the suffering of the community and the need to rebuild 
it, and thus emphasize traditional restorative justice rather than legal-
istic retribution. Nevertheless, many of these tradition- based institu-
tions are male dominated, and indeed at least part of their legitimacy 
comes from the authority of male elders. Women and youths are often 
marginalized in hearings, both as victims and as witnesses, and older 
male testimony is often given greater weight than women’s testimony 
(Burnet 2008). Some of this has changed recently, with women enjoy-
ing more authority in Sierra Leonean and Rwandan hearings, but en-
suring greater participation for and ac know ledg ment of women and 
younger participants requires rethinking some of the primary gender 
assumptions at the root of traditional justice. 
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In any case, it seems too early to know defi nitively how successful 
these traditional approaches will be.
W hat then, can we say about moral respect and institutional re-sponses to the past? The centrality of moral respect in recon-
ciliation demands that institutions be used to protect rights, promote 
the rule of law, and acknowledge the injustices committed against fel-
low citizens. Trials promote respect by combating impunity and show-
ing the public that individuals retain claims of moral worth and dignity 
that cannot be abandoned for some higher, common “good.” Through 
prosecutions, the importance of a rights culture is reaffi rmed and 
 unaccountable power is challenged. More importantly, through prose-
cutions trials publicly express the inherent moral value of victims, indi-
cating that it was wrong to turn them into instruments of some “higher” 
purpose by using them to achieve some other ends. The centrality of 
individual moral value, and the concomitant rights that translate that 
value into legal discourse, are captured through human rights trials.
Nevertheless, it is clear that trials may create more instability and 
more hatred in the short term. They forcefully distinguish between 
wrongdoers and victims, and undermine the central claims of per-
petrators by showing the consequences of their beliefs and actions. 
Under such conditions, it is unlikely that social relations will be har-
monious, or that former enemies will embrace one another, certainly 
not in the sense given by Tutu and others. But without remaking the 
po liti cal and moral landscape, as contested and painful as this may be, 
no signifi cant reconciliation is likely. Reconciliation, after all, is not 
about a deep moral embrace; it is a state of affairs where erstwhile en-
emies accept one another as moral beings with legal standing, includ-
ing the right to participate freely and equally in po liti cal and social life 
without the fear of violence and coercion. Trials can contribute to this 
precisely by returning some degree of dignity to victims and curtailing 
impunity.
Truth commissions, perhaps more than tribunals, can refashion 
public views of victims. Public testimonial spaces provide the opportu-
nity of rehumanization while offering alternative stories that indict 
misleading historical accounts. Of course, much like trials, commis-
sions may be divisive, as well. They re- situate actors in our historical 
imaginary and moral understanding, placing formerly admired leaders 
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and their subordinates in the camp of moral, if not legal, opprobrium. 
This instability carries with it very real risks, but seems necessary if a 
community is committed to respecting all of its members and recog-
nizing the wrongs of the past. The idea of reciprocal moral recognition 
that is at the heart of respect becomes worthless if parts of the popula-
tion remain marginalized and devalued— cast out in the interests of 
others. Commissions carry some of the diffi cult load of reconciliation 
by placing victims at the center of discourses of the past, forcing a so-
ciety to rethink its obligations to its fellow citizens, and sharply con-
testing given and unexamined public truths.
These institutional responses are important for the reconciliatory 
project, but they cannot achieve moral respect on their own. Indeed, 
none of these goals is possible without elite support. As discussed ear-
lier, elites must show a willingness to engage the past, discuss responsi-
bility and complicity, and show the po liti cal leadership necessary to 
reconcile a pained nation. By adopting a politics of debate and refl ec-
tion over a politics of violence and fear, elites can signal the population 
about the importance of refl ecting on the fi ndings of trials and commis-
sions. Through their words and their actions, they can give greater le-
gitimacy to the work of these institutions. Civil society, too, must foster 
respect. Respect and the rule of law require a transformation of the 
thin notion of accommodation into a thicker conception of mutual rec-
ognition; this is something that commissions can encourage because of 
their special position between the state and civil society. They repre-
sent a powerful call for continued public deliberation and refl ection, 
though of course such engagement often falls outside of a commission’s 
control. Indeed, as I have discussed in this chapter, commissions— and 
to a greater extent, trials— provide closed histories of the past, as re-
ports must eventually be published and judges must eventually reach a 
judgment. However, these documents may deepen the pro cess of moral 
refl ection in civil society, and catalyze further public engagement over 
responsibility, justice, and what it means to recognize fellow citizens as 
moral equals. Individuals, too, must fi nd ways of addressing complex 
personal issues of responsibility, revenge, forgiveness, and moral trans-
formation, and ultimately adopt principles of mutual respect if the bit-
terness of the past is to be left behind in some morally defensible way. 
Institutional responses may not be able to secure  reconciliation or 
achieve respect— indeed, there is often a danger of expecting too much 
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from them too quickly— but the imprimatur of the state that they enjoy 
provides these institutions with an added  legitimacy that can positively 
shape the social imaginary. For both approaches, respect can be se-
cured only in a po liti cal order that recognizes all members of society as 
moral equals, as recognized bearers of moral worth and dignity; as 
Mamdani puts it, the boundaries of inclusion are “life itself” (1998).
❖
P
olitical scientists have traditionally studied demo cratic transitions 
from the perspective of po liti cal elites by focusing on their abili-
ties to promote stability and governance while protecting peace 
from the spoiling tactics of disaffected opponents. The four- volume 
work Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead 1986) oriented much of the subsequent work written on 
analyzing elite fragmentation and its consequences. Civil society re-
ceived attention only after signifi cant divisions between elite “soft- 
liners” and “hard- liners” became insurmountable. Along these lines, 
po liti cal scientists have examined the contributions of elites in foster-
ing reconciliation as a pro cess of balancing civil society pressures and 
maintaining social stability by strategically using trials and truth com-
missions to promote moral and po liti cal ends while securing the legiti-
macy of a fragile new state (Gill 2000). Scholars have focused less on 
civil society actors’ roles in promoting reconciliation and their interac-
tions with elites and the state in these struggles.
Nevertheless, the role of civil society in reconciliatory efforts is not 
merely incidental or epiphenomenal, but is fundamental. Civil society 
can expand the domain of po liti cal contestation and ask diffi cult ques-
tions that leaders may prefer to ignore, while forcing elites to address 
fundamental issues and challenges. Although the state apparatus is, of 
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course, crucial for implementing retributive mea sures, providing for-
mal recognition of victims through redistributive and other programs 
and maintaining the rule of law, civil society is also important for recon-
ciliation politics. Civil society is necessary for publicizing past atrocities 
and generating public discussions about them, publicizing state com-
plicity, promoting moral recognition, and contributing to the broader 
normative goals of rule of law and mutual respect among citizens.
Some po liti cal scientists have begun to focus on the importance of 
civil society. In her comparative analysis of justice policies in Chile and 
Uruguay, Alexandra Barahona de Brito argues that the different out-
comes in the two countries can be explained by the strength of the 
human rights movement and the Catholic Church, and their ties with 
po liti cal parties. Whereas in Chile the Church enjoyed signifi cant 
moral capital and allied itself with the cause of human rights groups 
early on: “In Uruguay there  were no state- autonomous institutions 
such as the Church, or powerful rights organizations capable of suc-
cessfully challenging party inconsistencies. The human rights organi-
zations  were too weak to press for a different outcome” (1997, 193). 
Barahona de Brito’s work points to the importance of civil society for 
transitional politics, an importance best understood as part of a dialec-
tical relationship with the state— one not equal in terms of power (for 
obviously the state maintains coercive capacity in most circumstances 
and is, in any case, the locus of formal power)— but nevertheless very 
real and important for reconciliation. This relationship will become 
evident in the following pages.
In this chapter, I discuss the role of civil society in reconciliation in 
several steps. First, I outline three important conceptions of civil soci-
ety and discuss their respective strengths and weaknesses for under-
standing the peculiarities of societal reconciliation. Using one of these 
as a normative- analytical tool, I then turn to an analysis of the role of 
civil society actors in the public sphere and delineate how they can 
promote reconciliation by infl uencing po liti cal discourse and action at 
the institutional and po liti cal society levels. Next, I discuss some broader 
normative contributions civil society can make through the promotion 
of mutual respect, recognition, and the rule of law. Finally, I note sev-
eral diffi culties that emerge when advocates rely too heavily on civil 
society for reconciliation: (1) the problem of an over- politicized, oppo-
sitional civil society that undermines the effi cacy of state consolidation 
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and rule; (2) the problem of internal differentiation and authoritarian 
enclaves in civil society (and the retrograde impulses this can engen-
der); (3) a civil society that loses its critical potential and becomes 
eviscerated of any communicative or infl uential power; and (4) the 
broader problem of normatively overburdening this social level for 
 attaining reconciliation. In keeping with my general thesis that recon-
ciliation must develop across four social levels, I discuss how civil soci-
ety is strongly connected with developments elsewhere, and thus is a 
necessary but insuffi cient element of reconciliation.
Theorizing Civil Society
The concept of civil society has a long, complex pedigree. For early 
thinkers through the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, it meant 
all social life outside of state institutions (Keane 1988; Ehrenberg 
1999; Hodgkinson and Foley 2003). In par tic u lar, it referred to the 
institutions, groups, and activities that  were mostly autonomous from 
state regulation. Market relations, for example,  were traditionally at 
the center of the idea of civil society, and this understanding still rep-
resents a particularly infl uential and powerful model. Today, however, 
many po liti cal theorists and scholars view civil society and the associa-
tional life it encompasses as distinct from both the economy and the 
state, though the actual defi nition of the term is widely contested 
(Walzer 1995; Fullinwider 1999).
For my purposes, civil society refers to a space of social relations 
autonomous from the state where groups and movements create new 
alliances, further their interests and views, and engage with one an-
other to shape public and elite opinion with the aim of infl uencing 
state policy and public discourse. Civil society is also where more uni-
versalistic bonds of solidarity are created and re created, remaining in 
tension— sometimes productive, sometimes not— with particularist 
identities and claims that resist the construction of a broader social 
“we,” as Jeffrey Alexander has argued (2006, 42). It is, ultimately, a 
domain of public participation in debates over issues that are impor-
tant to society as a  whole as well as a space for the creation of identity 
and meaning, and while civil society actors do not exercise formal 
power, they can nevertheless mobilize the public and ultimately affect 
social policy. As this is not an uncontested conceptualization, I sketch 
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three relevant views of civil society:1 (1) a liberal interest- based view, 
defi ned by competing groups seeking to infl uence the state and fur-
ther their own sectoral interests; (2) a participatory/oppositional model 
that emerged during the period of oppositional social movements in 
communist East Eu rope and authoritarian Latin America, referred to 
as a “self- limiting” revolution by Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron, two 
of its greatest elaborators; and (3) a “discourse theory” model, which 
sees civil society as distinct from the state but nevertheless serving as 
an important sphere of deliberation and infl uence that can inform 
state policy. Although these are not completely distinct models of civil 
society, they highlight different perspectives on its role, with differ-
ent consequences and expectations as to the ultimate function of civil 
society.
Liberal Civil Society
The classic liberal model of civil society emphasizes the importance of 
freedom from the state. In this view, life is divided into two spheres: 
one public, characterized by the state and its attendant coercive capac-
ity; and the other private, where we exercise freedom and pursue our 
(pre- social) interests. The latter sphere is civil society, which is largely 
the same as the private market domain. For the liberal, the public and 
private spheres are largely incompatible, and to the extent that the 
former encroaches on the latter, liberty disappears. The currency of 
the state is power; the state can at best enforce certain limited, basic 
conditions for individual fl ourishing (e.g., guaranteeing peace, con-
tracts) but unchecked it can easily move beyond its legitimate domain 
and restrict the freedoms of individuals. There can be no profi table 
relations between the two spheres in such a view, and thus the only 
desirable social arrangement requires carefully restricted state power.
Furthermore, society is broadly understood as a series of binary 
relations: freedom and power, people and the state, and market and 
the government, with each element in opposition to the other. Because 
freedom is located in the private sphere, individuals fi nd self- 
actualization and happiness there by pursuing their needs and inter-
ests with as little interference from the state (and others) as possible. 
To the extent that the state may be engaged, it is to promote par tic u lar 
interests of certain sectors of society (i.e., interest groups); no general 
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public interest or common good is articulated or even considered nec-
essary. It follows that relations in civil society are contractual relations, 
which allow individuals to secure the goods they want and satisfy the 
needs they have through mutually benefi cial contracts. Relations be-
tween civil society and the state are also largely contractual; the state 
may, in some instances, be able to provide certain ser vices that cannot 
be secured in the private domain. The market is seen as the primary 
arena for the distribution of goods and ser vices due to its superior ef-
fi ciency but the overriding danger of unchecked state power requires 
individuals to remain wary of government promises to provide too 
much, as this is the fi rst step on the short road to serfdom.
Such a radically binary view of state- society relations requires a 
strong scheme of individual rights to protect people from government 
power. Unsurprisingly, then, the interest- based model has often in-
cluded the strongest defense of individual liberties possible by present-
ing them, at least in one formulation, as trumps against the utilitarian 
policies of the state (Nozick 1974). But what is particularly important 
for our purposes is how this framework conceives of the individual 
as largely an economic being, homo economicus; one who equates 
freedom with the unhindered possibility of pursuing economic inter-
ests with little concern for fellow citizens. While this may represent 
freedom in a Hobbesian sense— the lack of “impediments” means 
 liberty— it results in a very impoverished notion of civic life with little 
if any concern for social cooperation, collective action, or solidarity. 
The idea of citizens having a stake in society or having an interest that 
transcends their narrow individual desires is largely absent  here. Even 
the more attenuated version of liberalism found in Robert Dahl’s the-
ory of polyarchy, which identifi es the bedrock of democracy as the in-
stitutionalization of formal repre sen ta tion through periodic voting and 
the separation of governmental powers, remains skeptical of any con-
ception of civil society that considers public will beyond interest- based 
politics. Indeed, in this formulation, civil society consists of a network 
of polyarchic relations and transactions that are shaped and legiti-
mized by an existing party system, which help achieve something like 
a “general advantage” (1991, 295). Policy making is the result of nego-
tiation and accommodation between different groups. For Dahl, the 
key is to ensure that civil society actors, promoting their interests, can 
shape and infl uence policy outcomes.
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The liberal conception of civil society replaces sociability and pub-
licness with the pursuit of private interest. As the citizen becomes a 
solitary and “autonomous” consumer, issues of shared concern cannot 
be thematized from a broader perspective that includes the well- being 
of society as a  whole. Indeed, at best, one is left with citizens who seek 
to maximize their interests and preferences, and politics is reduced to 
instrumental relations.
Civil Society as a “Self- Limiting” Revolution
Some analysts view civil society in a more Gramscian sense, one that 
consists primarily of pop u lar social movements standing in opposition 
to the state.  Here, civil society opposes the state’s coercive power and 
creates and sustains a domain where individuals, acting collectively, fur-
ther social solidarity and their conceptions of the common good. Civil 
society can certainly play this role in transitions to create a space free 
from government repression where subordinate groups can contest of-
fi cial power. This view was widely endorsed in the Latin American civil 
society movements of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Carina Perelli 
(1992) has documented how youth movements in Uruguay confronted 
the authoritarian state fi rst through small acts of disobedience and later, 
as their temerity lessened, through rallies and publications that made 
explicit their antagonism toward the military regime. While the youth 
movement was never able to maintain signifi cant links with other 
groups in a broad front, it is nevertheless epigrammatic of this concep-
tion of civil society. In Chile, too, civil society became or ga nized and 
politicized beginning in 1983. In May of that year a series of large dem-
onstrations  were begun by labor groups, and grew to include a variety 
of youth groups, religious associations, leftist po liti cal organizations, 
women’s groups, and even some organizations representing middle class 
interests (Martínez 1992). These demonstrations failed to remove Pi-
nochet, but fundamentally altered the po liti cal landscape, eventually 
leading Pinochet to hold a referendum in 1988, which he lost. The move-
ment’s refusal to countenance any negotiations with the regime refl ects 
the politicized divide between state and society at the center of this ap-
proach (a position that was, alas, reciprocated by the government).
This pop u lar, confrontational approach gains its most theoretically 
careful elaboration in the work of Polish activist Adam Michnik. Under 
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the category of “new evolutionism,” Michnik conceptualizes civil soci-
ety in radical opposition to the state, and speaks of the necessity for an 
“unceasing struggle for reform and evolution” based on a “steady and 
unyielding stand” against the government (1985, 142– 143). Michnik 
draws on the importance of creating links with a host of civil society 
actors, including the Catholic Church. Civil society, in his estimation, 
should be a repository of transformational and horizontal relations be-
tween non- state groups, but it should be restrained, or “self- limiting”; 
that is, civil society actors do not seek formal power but remain in 
 permanent relations of contestation with the state in the pro cess 
demo cratizing the regime and society more broadly (1985, 144). This 
conception of broad opposition is useful insofar as it identifi es the 
 importance of social struggle against a repressive state— one that is 
unlikely to begin reform and expand civil liberties on its own initiative. 
It is rooted in contesting the legitimacy of authoritarian governments 
through self- limiting but forceful action. In present day Zimbabwe, the 
Movement for Demo cratic Change (MDC) and social movements like 
the Women of Zimbabwe Arise have continuously pressured President 
Robert Mugabe to recognize civil rights, hold fair elections, and share 
power with opponents, all the while eschewing violence or revolution-
ary struggle (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum 2008). The fact that 
Mugabe agreed to a power- sharing arrangement with the MDC speaks 
to the power, but also signifi cant limitations, of civil society in that 
country and oppositional politics more generally (Human Rights Watch 
2008).
This perspective is certainly helpful for contexts where an oppres-
sive regime is in power. Unlike the liberal model presented above, it is 
not primarily private in orientation; rather, it emphasizes the impor-
tance of continued engagement and pop u lar pressure on the state 
through broad social mobilization, while maintaining and cultivating a 
social space unencumbered by state interference. It is less useful, how-
ever, for understanding transitional situations and theorizing what fu-
ture relations between society and a reformed state should be. Civil 
society cannot be only oppositional; it must maintain selective links 
with the state if it is to maintain any infl uence and deepen demo-
cratization. In demo cratic transitions, the new regime distinguishes 
itself by its commitment to the rule of law and demo cratic responsive-
ness, and requires new state- society relations based on principles of 
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trust that emerge naturally over time. The crucial point, however, is 
that while pop u lar mobilization may be necessary in response to an 
authoritarian regime, civil society actors must transform themselves 
during the transition as well, for otherwise important links with the 
state will fail to develop and demo cratization may not occur. This 
model provides few insights for rethinking new relations and risks re-
ducing itself to either a depoliticized liberal- pluralism that emphasizes 
personal autonomy and little social engagement (as Vaclav Havel did in 
the mid- 1990s), or a confrontational stance that remains wary of any 
state action.
The “self- limiting” revolutionary model underscores the impor-
tance of broad- based social mobilization, making social solidarity the 
primary desired norm. It shares with liberal- pluralist views skepticism 
toward the state, while it rejects the liberal demotion of collective ac-
tion in favor of the private pursuit of satisfaction. Neither approach, 
however, satisfactorily explains how civil society actors can shape state 
policy and historical understanding in transitions. A more fruitful ap-
proach, I think, is found in the discourse theory model, which draws 
our attention to the importance of the deliberative force generated in 
the public sphere by civil society actors, and its infl uence on state prac-
tice and social discourse.
The Discourse Theory of Civil Society
In the discursive approach, civil society is conceived as a “network of 
associations that institutionalizes problem- solving discourses on ques-
tions of general interest inside the framework of or ga nized public 
spheres” (Habermas 1996, 367). Through open- ended, public engage-
ment with one another, myriad social groups form (or re- form) public 
opinions that shape and infl uence po liti cal elite behavior and state ac-
tion. There are numerous mediating institutions (e.g., radio, tele vi sion, 
newspapers, magazines, the Internet) that promote the proliferation of 
public opinion. The crucial contribution of this model is its theoriza-
tion of the “public sphere.” This is a domain in which civil society ac-
tors operate and is neither a formal institution nor or ga ni za tion, but 
rather a network where citizens (in a non- offi cial capacity) can com-
municate information and contest differing views on issues of common 
interest, with the goal of ultimately shaping public doxa. A well- formed 
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public sphere allows for the greatest possible participation and re-
sists po liti cal and economic pressures that can disrupt free discourse, 
while privileging argumentation based on basic principles of status 
parity among participants. Importantly, any public issue is open to dis-
cussion. “Public discourse,” argues Jean Cohen, “also has the impor-
tant po liti cal purpose of controlling and infl uencing the formation of 
policy in the juridically public institutions of the state” (1999, 70).
The discursive approach is concerned only with those issues that 
are of distinctly public relevance; as such, civil society “refers to the 
structures of socialization, association, and or ga nized forms of com-
munication in the lifeworld to the extent that these are institutional-
ized or are in the pro cess of being institutionalized” (J. Cohen and 
Arato 1992, ix). With its privileging of the public sphere, this model 
emphasizes the communicative power that fl ows from public delibera-
tion. Unlike the liberal conception, however, the discourse model does 
not conceive of deliberation as the result of preformulated aggregate 
individual or group interests; its content is broader, and includes re-
thinking and debating basic social norms and ways of reckoning with 
the past. In this sense, then, it is also transformative of the partici-
pants. They must subject their opinions and beliefs to public scrutiny 
and debate, justify them in ways that appeal to common interests, re-
frame them as new criticisms, and then raise counterarguments. With 
these transformations, participants move toward achieving some de-
gree of consensus on issues of public concern.
While this model has much in its favor, we should be wary of some 
of its rationalist pretensions. Critics have argued that cultural plural-
ism, economic in e qual ity, institutionalized status differentiation, social 
confl ict, and a highly contested social public sphere make the idea of 
consensus through public reason at best chimerical. In the context of 
transitional settings, where material and status differences can be 
more pronounced, the idea of an open public sphere seems even more 
vulnerable to these criticisms. We can draw some important lessons 
from the discursive approach, however, if we loosen some of its re-
quirements. First, we should acknowledge that the theoretical dis-
tinction between “rational” and “emotional” speech, central to much 
rationalist deliberative theory (especially Jürgen Habermas’s [1996]), is 
empirically unsustainable and normatively problematic. The elevation of 
rationality and demotion of affect not only misrepresents the nature of 
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actual deliberation but assumes that the latter contributes nothing 
of value to discourse. By privileging “rational” modes of communica-
tion at the expense of other forms that may employ emotional appeal 
or rhetoric, this approach risks delegitimizing interlocutors before they 
can even participate in collective deliberation, thus circumscribing the 
domain of appropriate debate arbitrarily (Young 1996; Streich 2002; 
Dryzek 2005). Furthermore, the assumption that rational debate can 
result in uncoerced consensus rests on a suspect teleology; that is, an 
end goal that is particularly unlikely where collective identities are 
deeply divided and groups disagree not only about current interests 
but even basic moral orientations and historical understandings. Where 
there is so little in common, except perhaps for a shared mistrust, ro-
bust rational consensus of the kind endorsed by Habermas is probably 
unattainable.
A discourse model of civil society requires a more participatory 
model of discursive exchange that allows for other forms of communi-
cation, particularly if it is to retain relevance in deeply divided socie-
ties. Rather than require, or expect, rational deliberation through 
epistemically robust norms of argumentation and decision making 
among free, equal, and purely rational actors that would result in sub-
stantial consensus, we can use the discursive approach from a different 
vantage point; one that offers us a way of rethinking the importance of 
drawing attention to and debating the most important po liti cal and 
normative issues that transitional societies confront. That is, delibera-
tion is ultimately the primary legitimate means of engaging one an-
other over concerns of deep po liti cal importance: It is the sine qua non 
of demo cratic life. The discursive model draws attention to the cen-
trality of a public sphere as the proper domain for formulating, assess-
ing, and contesting concerns. One of the strengths of such a model is 
its insistence on the open- ended nature of public discussion, and the 
expectation that long- held beliefs be “tested” in a public forum and 
even transformed through continuous critique. The ultimate aim is to 
reach normatively acceptable compromises on the most contentious is-
sues of public concern; that is, po liti cal compromises that recognize 
the importance of accountability, commit actors to presenting accurate 
accounts of past violence, include victims in deliberations and ac-
knowledge them as fellow citizens of equal moral worth and dignity, 
promote mutual respect, and further the rule of law. In this sense, the 
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deliberative approach sketched  here seeks to replace a politics of vio-
lence with a politics of discourse, but a public discourse that retains a 
normative edge precisely through its commitment to these normative 
concerns.
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato have argued that the discourse 
model emphasizes the importance of having associations whose inter-
nal structure is demo cratic. To the extent that civil society groups are 
internally demo cratic, civil society as a  whole becomes more demo-
cratic and pro cesses of demo cratization become better anchored.  Here 
I wish to loosen this requirement, as it is clear that although internally 
demo cratic organizations are desirable, their necessity is less clear. As 
I discuss further, some organizations, like the Catholic Church in parts 
of Latin America, have played extremely important roles in promoting 
human rights and condemning abuse while remaining internally hier-
archical. The correlation between internal structure and the institu-
tion’s values is not as linear as Cohen and Arato argue. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that, broadly speaking, social movements and civil society or-
ganizations represent a key element of “a vital, modern, civil society 
and an important form of citizen participation in public life” (1992, 
19). Particularly in transitional settings, what is needed is a civil society 
constituted of myriad groups that are committed to principles of ac-
countability, the recognition of the moral status of victims, investiga-
tion of the past, and the basic norms of democracy and the rule of law. 
Thus, operating as “counter- hegemonic blocs of social movements,” to 
take a term from Nancy Fraser (1997, 86), these groups can serve im-
portant roles in resisting collective amnesia or revisionist, self- serving 
histories.
The discourse model is sympathetic to Michnik’s concern about 
“self- limitation” (1985, 65). Civil society should not replace the market 
nor the state as the sole domain of human activity. However, it breaks 
with Michnik in rethinking civil society not as permanently opposed to 
the state but instead connected to it through a series of mediating 
spaces, such as po liti cal society, through which civil society can infl u-
ence social dynamics and pro cesses. Civil society actors and the state 
become strongly oppositional when “these mediations fail or when the 
institutions of economic and po liti cal society serve to insulate decision-
 making and decision makers from the infl uence of social organizations, 
initiatives and forms of po liti cal discussion” (J. Cohen and Arato 1992, 
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ix– x). Certainly, civil society cannot resolve fundamental social prob-
lems; hence the need to establish and maintain robust mediations with 
both po liti cal leaders and the state. But from the perspective of a the-
ory of reconciliation, the public sphere ideally serves as the location for 
citizens to thematize and contest basic social values and policies re-
lated to the past. Habermas (1996) argues that through unconstrained 
communication (i.e., a public sphere with no limitations on rights of 
access and participation) a collective will forms, with civil society serv-
ing as a critical bulwark to state power and the legitimacy of (possibly 
limited and self- serving) norms that the latter promotes. Public will, 
reframed as public opinion, seeks to infl uence state action by identify-
ing those issues that concern collective life. While Habermas’s view 
perhaps sets a normative ideal that is too high for transitional con-
texts, we can argue that civil society has a demo cratizing role to play 
in transitions insofar as the formal deliberative institutions with 
decision- making power, such as the legislature, can be infl uenced by 
public discourse.
The discourse model emphasizes groups that are internally demo-
cratic, a point about which I have raised some concerns. Nevertheless, 
it shares with the oppositional approach a focus on a domain where 
citizens feel they have a stake in issues concerning the common good. 
Because plurality is a fact of modern po liti cal and social life, shared 
world views can no longer be taken for granted— a situation particu-
larly pronounced in transitions— and norms of reciprocal respect and 
tolerance must play important roles for generating and maintaining 
social cohesion while also expanding the opportunities for meaningful 
recognition. The main point  here, however, is that the multiplicity of 
groups must be committed to resolving differences through delibera-
tion, and that civil society cannot substitute for the power of the state 
but rather should remain autonomous from the state while helping to 
shape elite policy.
Civil Society and Reconciliation
Using the somewhat reconstituted discourse model sketched above, 
we now turn to a discussion of the role civil society can play in foster-
ing reconciliation. If civil society is to work positively under such frag-
ile circumstances, that is, where the threat of a return to violence often 
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seems likely, its participants must espouse an ethics of deliberation, 
respect, and tolerance without sacrifi cing the commitment to critically 
interrogating the past.  Here I draw attention to several contributions 
civil society actors make before moving on to some limitations.
The most important contribution civil society can make to recon-
ciliation is to foster public deliberation, a point central to thinkers such 
as David Crocker (1999). Civil society actors can move po liti cal dis-
courses based on exclusion and threats of violence away from reduc-
tionist, zero- sum argumentation. Although J. Cohen and Arato do not 
explicitly link rational discourse with reconciliation and broader social 
regeneration in this manner, their notion of communicative activity 
and its theoretical presuppositions are conducive to the development 
of respect, mutual recognition, and rule of law. A politics based on ar-
gumentation and criticism at the very least rests on minimal respect, as 
it places limits on the kinds of strategies admissible in po liti cal debate. 
It requires, for example, that one give reasons for one’s beliefs and 
arguments, rather than resort to the threat of force to “convince” an 
opponent. Deliberation rests on the assumption that one’s interlocutor 
enjoys at least some basic rights that cannot be abrogated. J. Cohen 
and Arato stipulate more stringent requirements: A commitment to 
deliberation necessitates certain procedural safeguards such as ensur-
ing that participation is as inclusive as possible and free from “defor-
mations of wealth, power and social status” (J. Cohen and Arato 1992, 
186) and that arguments be justifi ed by reasons that can in principle 
be addressed to all. Thus, decision- making pro cesses produce collec-
tively authored results. While I have argued for fl exibility in the ratio-
nalist strictures of this approach to deliberation, the core argument— 
that a commitment to reciprocally endorsed norms of contestation are 
central to civil society— is important in several respects. It moves us 
toward achieving respect among citizens, since open deliberation is 
fundamentally inclusive of everyone who could potentially be affected 
by the outcome, and at the very least accepts their claims to participa-
tion. Additionally, deliberation includes within it a defense of toler-
ance, since public deliberation is always about debate and contestation, 
and differences of opinion must be tolerated (i.e., not censored or sup-
pressed) if deliberation is to be sustained, though of course they can be 
criticized and repudiated through further debate. Indeed, in a deeper 
sense, deliberation can promote a form of public moral education by 
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teaching the importance of values like democracy, basic human rights, 
how to listen to others with whom we disagree, and how to accept 
deep moral disagreements without turning to oppression. By engaging 
with others we partly rehumanize them and come to see aspects of 
them that we see in ourselves; that is, we extend a kind of moral recog-
nition. Moral education is based in ongoing practice and can be rein-
forced though deliberation and mutual engagement. Without sustained 
engagements with others and without learning how to listen to con-
tending voices, moral development is unlikely to occur.2 Deliberation 
also means a respect for the rule of law, as it rests on legitimized pro-
cedures for fair and open participation that are the scaffolding for 
vigorous but peaceful po liti cal life. Respect and tolerance among citi-
zens and respect for the rule of law strengthen one another over time. 
Respect and tolerance are reciprocal norms (i.e., all participants must 
endorse them for their actualization), and institutions of the rule of law 
become fi rmly anchored only when citizens and elites endorse public 
deliberation, with its attendant expectations of renouncing violence, as 
the primary mechanism for resolving disputes.
Second, civil society can inform the defi nition of categories of vic-
tims, perpetrators, and bystanders. Po liti cal violence leaves behind 
numerous victims, but disagreements about who is and is not a victim 
can persist long after the violence is over. As I discussed in Chapter 1, 
the issue of victim recognition works along several axes: material- 
symbolic and individual- collective. Legally, a victim is anyone whose 
rights  were violated; that is, the law constructs and categorizes victims 
according to its own internal logic of rights, duties, and remedies. Al-
though this is certainly a political- interpretative pro cess insofar as 
some persons are interpellated as victims while others are not, the is-
sue becomes signifi cantly more complex as we move from individual 
victims to family members (or even entire communities) who may or 
may not be considered victims, to the various consequences that fl ow 
from this. For instance, if an entire group is defi ned as a victim, such 
as an ethnic group, we are highlighting some common features that 
give salience to their victim status, aside from the fact of having been 
violated.3 Take, for example, the repression of indigenous groups in 
rural Guatemala. The state instituted a policy of systematic violence 
against indigenous communities that was framed as part of its anti- 
insurgency campaign. The indigenous  were seen as subversive and 
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treasonous persons who had forfeited their basic rights. In a sense, then, 
the Maya indigenous community as a  whole was a victim of state ter-
ror. However, some po liti cal leaders have claimed that though viola-
tions occurred on a relatively large scale in some areas, this was a 
 result of “excesses” rather than an actual policy. Where authoritarian 
enclaves persist, and especially in situations where individuals of the 
previous regime continue to serve in the current government, there is 
a tendency to reframe past abuses as “excesses,” without interrogating 
the structural and systematic aspects of violence. Rather, past policies 
(and their consequences) are framed as either necessary or unfortu-
nate but otherwise unrepresentative instances of atrocity. Civil society 
actors can resist these accounts and work to expand the category of 
victimization to include those close to them and others who  were af-
fected by their loss. Admittedly, this kind of discourse can be gener-
alized to the point of including all of society as the victim, with the 
consequent loss of real distinctions between actual victims and perpe-
trators, so that the terms lose their normative content. The risk is that 
responsibility is shifted away from actors to “history,” where persons 
 were “forced” to do what they did. But the importance of civil society 
lies in its ability to defi ne and elaborate different categories of victims, 
and thus ensure that those groups who have been marginalized or oth-
erwise ignored are given the moral recognition they deserve from the 
public. Indeed, victim recognition requires more than state redistribu-
tive policies; it also necessitates efforts at recasting victims as fellow 
citizens with moral claims to respect. The state and po liti cal elites, of 
course, play a central role in this; however, civil society can deepen 
this goal of victim recognition by ensuring that victims are not simply 
ignored or overlooked in offi cial accounts of the past.
Civil society actors can also catalyze debate about responsibility 
and perpetrators. They can highlight the complexity of this category 
and show how juridical guilt does not exhaust the category of perpe-
trator. Groups like the Association of the Relatives of the Disap-
peared in Peru (Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados y 
Detenidos- Desaparecidos [ANFASEP] 2002) have played crucial roles 
in ensuring that culpability is not conceived as belonging only to a se-
lect few. Rather, they have shown how “perpetrator” should include 
material and intellectual authors of crimes as well as the members of 
the  bureaucratic apparatus who carried out state terror. In conjunction 
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with other human rights groups, they have initiated campaigns to 
bring attention to the responsibility of the state and Marxist guerrillas 
in the perpetration of crimes. The Association for Human Rights (Aso-
ciación pro Derechos Humanos [APRODEH] 2009) and the Andean 
Commission of Jurists (Comisión Andina de Juristas [CAJ] 2009), two 
other Peruvian human rights organizations, have been instrumental in 
generating public debate about the extent of violations through work-
shops, publications and, in the former case, grassroots efforts at in-
forming citizens about the complicity of some elites in violence and the 
corruption that fostered it. Maintaining a broader conception of who is 
a perpetrator, one that includes others such as high- level bureaucrats 
who facilitate the commission of wrongs, forces elites and society in 
general to confront the past and their place in it. In this respect, civil 
society can deepen public refl ection on responsibility and guilt beyond 
that found in a juridical setting.
Perpetrator and bystander are not always easily distinguished from 
one another, however. As we move away from individual juridical 
culpability we encounter a kind of moral responsibility that is charac-
terized by a “responsibility for inaction,” or sin of omission. The Asso-
ciation of the Relatives of the Disappeared in Peru, as well as other 
survivor groups, have drawn attention to the urban elites’ lack of inter-
est in the suffering of poor indigenous peasants during that country’s 
civil war. For some, the fact that leaders  were in a social position where 
they could have publicly denounced state violations against peasants 
but chose not to underscores their moral culpability. Certainly, it is 
often diffi cult to know who is a perpetrator or a morally responsible 
bystander: If leaders support a war with awful consequences for the 
poor, does this make them perpetrators or accomplices of some other 
sort? Often there are substantial numbers of persons who benefi ted 
from the violence and chose not to denounce it. They fall outside the 
normal purview of justice but without their tacit— and sometimes 
explicit— support, the violence would likely be lessened, in either 
 intensity or duration. How do we understand the responsibility of 
 morally compromised bystanders, those whose guilt extends beyond 
the juridical, and how do civil society groups contribute to this 
understanding?
Karl Jaspers uses the term po liti cal guilt: a kind of guilt that at-
taches itself to all citizens who tolerated what was done by the state in 
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their name. According to Jaspers’s rather strong formulation, everyone 
“is co- responsible for the way he [sic] is governed” (1961, 31), a position 
echoed by groups as diverse as the Peruvian Association of History 
and Reconciliation and the Argentine Alliance for Refounding the Na-
tion to emphasize the broad responsibility that all of society carries. 
While Jaspers attempts to draw some distinctions between different 
forms of guilt, po liti cal guilt is perhaps too expansive and rough, since 
it fails to articulate how different individuals can be responsible in dif-
ferent ways, and how responsibility at this level may be better thought 
of on a moral continuum. It levels differences between perpetrators 
and others by extending responsibility to everyone, thus erasing spe-
cifi c perpetrator responsibility. Used in this way, civil society actors 
not only misrepresent responsibility but also distort history. However, 
a focus on the complexity of responsibility and the ways in which it 
goes beyond juridical conceptualization can open a space for more 
nuanced— and diffi cult— refl ections on the extent of pop u lar support 
for previous policies and the moral weight that this carries. Will this 
promote reconciliation? Clearly, any effort at widening debate about 
responsibility is likely to be divisive, at least in the short term. It can 
heighten antagonisms between former enemies and degenerate into 
po liti cal theater meant to tarnish one’s opponents, rather than reckon 
with the past and its place in the present. But in the risks of such an 
endeavor lie its strengths. Maintaining an open debate about responsi-
bility can shake complacent and self- serving historical accounts by 
placing those stories— and the population at large— under a critical 
eye. It reframes debate by resituating moral responsibility squarely in 
the center of discussion, and redirects attention toward the actual suf-
fering of victims, the violation of their rights, and the moral burdens 
that society as a  whole may carry. Civil society actors contribute to this 
by keeping alive these debates about responsibility and resist efforts at 
simplifying culpability. Indeed, the introduction of the bystander as a 
moral category reduces the ability of elites as well as common citizens 
to distance themselves from their history and moral obligations.
A third important contribution concerns civil society’s ability to 
interrogate and resist apologist historical accounts that justify past 
violations. Nietz sche (1997) defended the importance of critical his-
torical inquiry as a way of investigating and ultimately destabilizing 
those histories that are unrefl ective (i.e., unaware of or uninterested in 
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examining their own assumptions) and serve the interests of power, a 
point discussed in Chapter 2. The importance of this critical history 
cannot be overstated. Civil society can critique existing narratives to 
weaken and even replace elite accounts that mask their own ends and 
interests. In Peru, the human rights umbrella group National Coor-
dinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Hu-
manos [CNDDHH] 2009) plays a pivotal role in disseminating infor-
mation on human rights abuses with the explicit goal of overturning 
elite interpretations and “raising the consciousness of the population.”4 
The CNDDHH has published numerous large reports and shorter, 
glossy booklets and pamphlets for wide distribution contesting the 
 inevitability and necessity of abuses (an argument often made by com-
batants on all sides), and articulating an alternate historical interpreta-
tion that focuses on human rights abuses and the disproportionate 
suffering that fell on rural populations. The goal  here is twofold: (1) to 
trace how the Shining Path’s crude Marxist philosophy of history and the 
state’s national security doctrine both provided ideological justifi cation 
for atrocities, and (2) to re- situate victims at the center of  discussions 
about the war, forcing a reconsideration of existing interpretive frame-
works that see the confl ict as nothing more than a civil war between 
armed sides. This re- situation provides at least some form of public rec-
ognition of victims.
The CNDDHH campaign to discredit past narratives has been 
echoed in Timor- Leste. The Timorese NGO Perkumpulan Hak (2008) 
has worked extensively to highlight how Indonesian supremacist ideol-
ogy gave legitimacy to the state’s violent policies. Hak and other NGOs 
have continued to document how this ideology shaped the perceptions 
of the Timorese by creating substantial challenges to developing recip-
rocal moral respect.
Some civil society groups have focused on truth telling by mount-
ing investigative projects to detail and publicize government abuse. In 
Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, human rights and church groups cata-
logued violations and later published their fi ndings. A group of Brazil-
ian investigators secretly worked with the World Council of Churches 
and the Archbishop of São Paolo to copy hundreds of thousands of 
pages of judicial testimony of prisoners who  were tortured. Smuggled 
out of the country during the dictatorship, the rec ords became the 
heart of the report Brazil: Never Again (1985), which analyzed the 
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state’s use of torture over a de cade and a half. During Pinochet’s rule 
in Chile, the Roman Catholic Church’s Vicaría de la Solidaridad col-
lected thousands of judicial rec ords on disappearances. Later, these 
rec ords played a central role in Chile’s truth commission report. In 
Guatemala, the Archdiocese of Guatemala City (1998) created the 
Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) to document 
atrocities committed by both sides in the civil war. As Melissa Ballen-
gee (2000) notes, REMHI’s work was pivotal in providing additional 
information and documentation that was missing from the offi cial His-
torical Clarifi cation Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento 
Histórico [CEH] 1999), which was hampered by fi nancial constraints 
and a limited focus. REMHI’s fi nal report, Guatemala: Never Again, 
was disseminated widely around the country through public pre sen ta-
tions, radio, and print, enjoying a much larger audience than would 
otherwise be possible in a society with signifi cant illiteracy. The report 
estimated 150,000 deaths and another 50,000 disappearances during 
the civil war, holding government forces and their civilian militias re-
sponsible for approximately 90 percent of the violations and the insur-
gents responsible for roughly 5 percent (with the rest undetermined). 
REMHI was crucial for bringing public attention to the scope of viola-
tions and countering the justifi cations and lies of the military elite. In 
these and other examples, civil society groups have produced historical 
accounts that have challenged widely held beliefs and contributed to 
ongoing debates about complicity, collective identity, and obligations 
to victims.
Fourth, civil society groups can reframe historical memory by 
encouraging the state to establish public memorials about the past. 
In an important respect, monuments and memorials are reifi ed mem-
ory; they freeze public conceptions about common identity and give 
meaning to, if not create, a shared past. As markers of po liti cal vio-
lence and the experiences associated with it, these public works 
provide a locus around which a society can confront its history. The 
Argentine civil society group Seré Association for Promoting Memory 
and Life (2008) has used a former torture center as a synecdoche for 
the crimes of the previous regime, where the center itself assumes the 
status of symbol or icon for violations. Focusing on the torture center 
shows an alternate history of state terror that gives lie to previous 
 offi cial histories that minimized state atrocity and treated victims as 
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traitors. Ugandan groups like the Gulu District NGO Forum (2009) 
have worked extensively to establish memorial sites for the Acholi 
people, and in Cambodia, the former torture site Tuol Sleng S-21 
(2009) is today a museum documenting the atrocities committed by 
the Khmer Rouge.
Finally, civil society actors may give technical and policy recom-
mendations for restructuring institutions most responsible for viola-
tions. As Naomi Roht- Arriaza (2002) has argued, professional groups 
such as lawyers associations, scholarly institutes, and rights organiza-
tions with specifi c technical knowledge can provide useful assistance 
to the state in restructuring sectors of the government and achieving 
institutional reform. Consider the reform of the legal order: Groups 
such as the Peruvian CAJ have provided detailed recommendations on 
revamping the courts by instituting stronger chains of accountability 
to civilian leaders, greater transparency in the operation of the judi-
ciary, and removing the most unfi t judges from power. They have 
worked closely with certain sectors of the government, most notably 
the Ministry of the Public (in charge of prosecutions and rights viola-
tions) to strengthen the rule of law, and have provided technical re-
ports on that country’s “antiterrorism legislation,” an instrument used 
by the previous government to facilitate the commission of numerous 
human rights abuses.5 Similar professional organizations provide train-
ing programs to professionalize members of the judiciary and security 
forces. In Argentina, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (Centro 
de Estudios Legales y Sociales [CELS] 2009), has conducted numer-
ous training workshops for the judiciary and published a series of re-
ports on reform that have had an important impact in judicial restruc-
turing. The Santiago- based Commission on Human Rights (Comisión 
de Derechos Humanos 2009), an NGO founded by attorneys in 1978, 
continues to give legal advice on restructuring the military and police 
in Chile. In Sierra Leone, the Campaign for Good Governance ([CGG] 
2009) has developed important policy recommendations on security 
sector reform, which has enhanced women’s access to voting and re-
duced corruption in state institutions. Much of its success has come 
from its command of technical issues relating to government reform, 
placing it among a relatively small number of Sierra Leonean NGOs 
with professional training and experience on complex reform issues. 
The CGG’s combination of technical expertise and ability to publicize 
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instances of state corruption and abuse has made it an infl uential civil 
society actor in Freetown.6
None of this is to say that these organizations should replace the 
state in providing ser vices or administering the security apparatus. 
Rather than promoting the devolution of state power to civil society 
and the privatization of governmental obligations, civil support for in-
stitutional reform seeks to enhance the effi cacy of the state and guar-
antee greater demo cratic responsiveness and accountability. We should 
nevertheless avoid placing too great an expectation on the infl uence of 
civil assistance: These organizations cannot guarantee state reform or 
ensure that their recommendations are heeded. Often, their greatest 
impact stems from their ability to monitor reforms, provide policy rec-
ommendations, and watch for continued state abuses. But professional 
groups can contribute to public deliberation by publicly recommend-
ing needed reforms and thereby signaling the importance of state re-
sponsiveness to public accountability and input.
Reconciliation and the Challenges 
of Civil Society
Civil society’s contributions to reconciliation are important, but lim-
ited. There are a number of limitations that should bring pause to 
those who identify civil society as the fundamental wellspring of rec-
onciliation. Its transformative role as a site for debate and demo cratic 
practice can be hampered by other social dynamics, thus weakening 
its critical potential and contributions to social change. And it can only 
aid the pursuit of accountability and recognition of victims, as David 
Crocker notes: “Government has an indispensable role with respect 
to some forms of prosecution, punishment, investigation, compensation 
and commemoration” (2001, 390– 391). Even civil society’s greatest con-
tribution, the promotion of an ethics of deliberation in an open public 
sphere, has a limited ability to resolve signifi cant problems without 
state action. The state is necessary for securing these goals, and with-
out elite and institutional commitment it is unlikely that the public will 
succeed in achieving reconciliation.
Debates over history are rarely polite affairs, particularly when 
groups have their basic values and very sense of identity riding on the 
outcome. In such a context, it is not unlikely that exclusivist ideologies 
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will develop within civil society that strategically downplay a complex 
history and evade responsibility for crimes and in some instances shift 
the blame on opponents. The very liberties central to a healthy civil 
society, such as free speech and open debate, can become mechanisms 
to distort and even dismiss historical facts and experiences. Under cir-
cumstances where the public sphere simply becomes a venue for po liti-
cal combat, groups are driven to provide apologist accounts that ignore 
or minimize the complexity of past experiences and substitute simple 
narratives for complex events. Simplifi cation, then, is a danger com-
mon to not only elite state discourse but also civil society.
Indeed, a civil society fractured by deep differences with radically 
opposed historical understandings is unlikely to sustain the norms of 
respect and tolerance that are needed for social stability and cohesion. 
Without at least some shared understandings of the past (i.e., without 
some shared narratives) society will remain as torn as it was before the 
violence, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina today (Verdeja 2007). The old 
distinctions that played a pivotal role during the violence are rewritten 
in public debate, with in- groups and out- groups occupying the same 
positions they did in the past. In some cases polarization can hinder 
open debate to such an extent that authoritarian enclaves remain in 
place, ensconced in the same stories that work self- servingly to give 
them the legitimacy they seek. A recent World Bank (2005) study 
found that in the aftermath of confl ict civil society organizations fre-
quently worked to reinforce po liti cal divisions and mistrust by manipu-
lating past events to strengthen sectoral interests while ignoring the 
need to promote open deliberation. This, of course, is surprising only to 
thinkers who equate civil society with progressive and inclusive politics 
(one can read Habermas’s [1996] stronger formulations in this way). 
Such a shattered civil society is hardly civil, and in any case contributes 
nothing to a shared exploration of responsibility and reconciliation.
I emphasize, however, that we should be wary of treating oppo-
sition as illegitimate. The public sphere, and demo cratic politics in 
general, should be as open and inclusive as possible, and this means 
tolerating groups with whom we strongly disagree. I am not arguing that 
contestation is permissible only when we agree with the groups involved, 
as this effectively means tolerance in name only. Rather, we should 
draw a distinction, at least conceptually, between those groups that are 
willing to respect demo cratic and peaceful politics but nevertheless 
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harbor radically different views and may even support the previous 
regime, and those who reject the very premises of the demo cratic 
game and are little more than spoilers who are unwilling to compro-
mise. Spoilers exist at both ends of the po liti cal spectrum; they may 
include those who are unabashed in their defense of the most offensive 
past policies and those who will brook no compromise (or even the 
possibility of coexistence) with defenders of the past. Spoilers, in other 
words, includes the most unrepentant apologists as well as adamant 
retributive absolutists who view anything short of “full” justice as un-
acceptable. If politics is to replace violence, then citizens must accept 
that compromise and coexistence with former enemies are unavoid-
able. My concern with oppositional spoiler politics is that it does not 
generate values of respect for the rule of law, tolerance, deliberation, 
and other norms that are at the core of a functioning demo cratic order. 
Under these conditions state authority risks paralysis through its con-
stant confrontations with an oppositional civil society, and the public 
sphere loses it crucial capacity to nurture debate and reach acceptable 
compromises. Communicative power and argumentation become tools 
in the search for the tactical domination of opponents, and the possi-
bility of solidarity or even mutual respect disappears in the face of in-
creasingly virulent discourse. Relations between the state and society, 
and within society itself, are destroyed.
An alternative possibility is simply that public discourse becomes 
so drained of analytical and normative potential that apologist doxa 
remains supreme, and the communicative power of a critically engaged 
civil society disappears. Rather than sustaining counter- hegemonic 
discourses, social movements disappear due to lack of public interest 
and citizens seek a more privatized, less overtly po liti cal public order. 
In such a context, a weakened civil society ceases to try infl uencing 
 po liti cal elites or resisting policies of offi cial forgetting. The critical 
resources at the center of a deliberative civil society are no longer suf-
fi cient to mobilize continued interest in accountability, victim recog-
nition, and truth telling. Tomás Moulian (1998) gave a fascinating, if 
dispiriting, reading of Chile in the 1990s along these lines, showing 
how apart from a relatively small group of highly active human rights 
organizations and pro- military associations, many Chileans preferred 
to put the past behind them and place their energy in the emerging con-
sumerist culture. This second outcome bears more than a resemblance 
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to the defenses on historical oblivion discussed in Chapter 1. And it 
faces the same moral challenges. Precisely because the public sphere is 
such a crucial site for resisting self- serving elite calls for letting “by-
gones be bygones,” civil society’s loss to apathy and disengagement is a 
powerful blow to meaningful reconciliation.
Under either condition of a radically oppositional or po liti cally 
weak civil society it is not uncommon to fi nd existing enclaves of au-
thoritarian power. In the fi rst scenario, authoritarian blocs are often 
able to stall or derail efforts at historical reckoning or accountability, 
whereas in the latter situation authoritarian leaders may step into the 
vacuum left by an engaged civil society and make compelling public 
cases to simply “move on.” Under the former condition, however, it 
unlikely that mutual respect will gain much support, precisely because 
a signifi cant portion of the population refuses to engage in morally 
relevant issues. In the latter condition, of course, victims will continue 
to encounter forms of misrecognition and continued authoritarian 
power that will hamper demo cratic governance.
These points underscore the fundamental diffi culty of normatively 
overburdening civil society. What is clear is that civil society can con-
tribute to reconciliation, but its fragility means that we should not ex-
pect more from it that it can achieve. It is a necessary, though insuffi -
cient, level for reconciliation. Its importance stems from its potential 
for generating communicative power with which to pressure the state 
to address past wrongs and push for greater recognition of victims. 
Furthermore, it is in civil society that the general normative concepts 
of rule of law and mutual respect are nurtured and deepened. It is 
 here where a politics of deliberation can replace a politics of violence, 
citizens can learn through practice the importance of human rights, 
and where they can embark on the diffi cult project of achieving a just 




ocietal reconciliation is, in its most basic sense, about reconciling 
individuals, thus any theory of reconciliation must at some point 
face the diffi cult task of how to connect social and institutional 
pro cesses of reconstruction with the personal dynamics between in-
dividuals. At this level, issues of repentance, ac know ledg ment, for-
giveness, pardon, and vengeance occupy the moral space between 
victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. We are tasked with identifying 
which  responses are morally legitimate, which are not, and (in a more 
theoretical- refl exive sense) what the limits of such an inquiry are. 
There is a danger  here: A model of reconciliation should not reduce 
itself to the proposition that achieving broad- based social reconcilia-
tion requires every individual to reconcile him- or herself with the past 
and fellow citizens. It is not only empirically impossible but it is illib-
eral to ask for a degree of mutual ac cep tance that is achievable only 
through ideological coercion, and if so, it would most likely be a su-
perfi cial reconciliation. Such an approach also represents a kind of 
 reductive functionalism that places all possibility of reconciliation on 
individual behavior while downplaying its institutional, po liti cal, and 
social aspects. It is not the case that all individual perpetrators must be 
stigmatized and held accountable and all victims recognized individu-
ally for reconciliation to take root.
Interpersonal Reconciliation6
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Consequently, any discussion of reconciliation at this level is 
complex, for it requires a noncoercive understanding of social life that 
distances itself from both vengeance and an imposed forgiveness. It 
requires a great deal of sensitivity to the issues of individual transfor-
mation of all the actors involved— many of these affected by the spe-
cifi cs of personal experience with violence— without dismissing the 
importance of other social levels. In this chapter, I trace several types 
of interpersonal relations that can occur at this level, drawing on my 
interviews with survivors in Chile and Bosnia- Herzegovina as well as 
the extensive literature on this topic, and ultimately I defend one type 
of interpersonal relation based on reciprocal respect.1 Because this is a 
normative discussion I do not cover in any systematic detail the broad 
social psychological literature on what victims feel and desire, since 
what they seek may not necessarily be morally defensible, even though 
it is understandable. In a recent study, for example, researchers found 
that even if perpetrators pay reparations and accept guilt for their ac-
tions, many victims continue to feel insulted unless violators publicly 
express self- abasing shame.  Here, guilt is associated with ac cep tance 
of the wrongness of an action and may lead to an apology or reparation 
while shame involves the perception that “one’s core self is bad” and is 
thus a signifi cantly stronger expression of self- abasement (Giner- Sorolla 
et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2002). While resentment, anger, and similar emo-
tions are not morally empty— a point I address below— these fi ndings 
suggest that what survivors want may sometimes be morally problem-
atic, and thus any account of morally acceptable interpersonal recon-
ciliation must rest on a set of justifi cations wider than par tic u lar victim 
desires, though these should of course be taken seriously.
Three Views
We can discuss three general views, or paths, that relations between 
perpetrators and victims may take. They range from the notion of 
forgiveness to vengeance, with the latter understood as the morally 
justifi ed action that identifi es punishment as a necessary and prime 
integrative mechanism for achieving peace among former enemies. I 
endorse an alternate satisfactory notion, one that is characterized by 
mutual respect, yet understood in a par tic u lar manner. As I hope to 
show, this middle conception is not merely a mitigated synthesis of 
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forgiveness and vengeance but rather a distinct alternative. I then out-
line the relation of this level to the others by indicating how it is an 
important element for broader reconciliation.
Vengeance and Resentment
Revenge is often understood as little more than a perverse, irrational 
emotional reaction to harm (C. Lewis 1957). Jonathan Glover (1970, 
145) has remarked that many see it as an immoral  union of “hatred and 
plea sure,” and Robert Nozick (1981, 366) acknowledges its status as 
the “primitive view” of justice. Following mass violence, however, sur-
vivors may consider revenge appropriate for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding the basic sense that perpetrators “deserve” to be punished 
for their crimes. Indeed, when we demand revenge, we are demanding 
that a violator be punished for some harm done. Jeffrie Murphy cap-
tures the intuitive sense of moral appropriateness encapsulated in ven-
geance: “I believe that most typical, decent, mentally healthy people 
have a kind of commonsense approval of some righ teous hatred and 
revenge” and that “common morality” sees revenge as morally appro-
priate (1995, 136).2 For Murphy, revenge is at its core tied to punish-
ment: It gives perpetrators their just deserts for the unjustifi ed and 
willful harms they infl icted on others.
The driving forces of revenge are the emotions of anger and 
 resentment. Part of the diffi culty  here is that these emotions have be-
come morally suspect and are often perceived as irrational or other-
wise damaging to those who hold them (and in any case incompatible 
with reconciliation, “moving forward,” “letting the past go,” and so on). 
This has it roots, I think, in Nietz sche (1989) and Scheler’s (1973) 
highly infl uential accounts of ressentiment as a form of self- obsession 
and pity animated by spite and malicious envy toward those of higher 
social status, which often refl ects an irrational obsession with the past. 
This reading of resentment has effectively collapsed any sense of mor-
ally defensible outrage into indefensible feelings of hostility, refl ecting 
moral stuntedness. This is unfortunate, as resentment can tell us much 
more about a person— and about morality— than Nietz sche (1989) 
suggests. A much more sensitive and insightful understanding has been 
put forth by Thomas Brudholm (2008, 11), who centers resentment not 
on how one feels but in the ways in which these feelings are articulated 
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in terms of “injustice, injury or violation.”3 To the extent that resent-
ment refl ects a concern for one’s moral value, holding on to it and re-
fusing to forgive one’s abuser is not categorically irrational or morally 
blameworthy; it may be morally defensible. While in Chile, I met Cris-
tina H., a torture survivor who for many years sought to defend her 
right not to forgive to her family and friends. She went through terrible 
experiences and was insulted by the notion that the burden was on her 
to forgive her violators. “How can I forgive those people who harmed 
me? What they did to me was inexplicable, indefensible! To forgive 
them would be to say that it is OK, that I can move beyond the injuries. 
It would be to say that I don’t take myself seriously and they can do 
what ever they want. I am a person, with rights, and they should be 
punished for harming me!” A resentful person need not be crazed with 
vengeance or obsessed with the past. While Cristina still undergoes 
therapy, she has also become a successful businesswoman with a fam-
ily and fi nds numerous ways to channel her impressive energy and in-
tellect. But she refuses to equate “moving on” with forgiveness and is 
adamant that her resentment is a refl ection of her self- respect. Indeed, 
to be a person, morally speaking, means seeing oneself at least partly 
as an end in oneself, and resenting moral injuries and their perpetra-
tors is a sign that one takes this moral status seriously. To relinquish 
the desire for punishment for a serious wrong is to deny one’s own 
value as an agent with moral status; such relinquishment indicates that 
one neither considers oneself worthy of moral respect nor a bearer of 
rights. In a somewhat similar, though non- deontological vein, Aristotle 
also tied the feelings of resentment and vengeance to a proper sense of 
self, arguing that
the man who is angry on the right occasions and with those he 
should and also in the right manner and at the right time and 
for the right length of time is praised. . . .  The defi ciency, 
whether an inirascibility of a sort or what ever it might be, is 
blamed. For those who do not get angry on the occasions they 
should and in the manner they should, and when they should, 
and with those they should, are thought to be fools; for they 
are thought to be insensitive and without pain, and since 
they do not get angry, they are thought not to be disposed to 
defend themselves. But it is slavish for a man to submit to be 
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besmirched or to allow it against those who are close to him. 
(1984, 1125b– 1126a)
For Cristina, Brudholm, and Aristotle resentment and the desire for 
vengeance it animates are neither inappropriate nor irrational; rather 
they are understandable and legitimate moral expressions. Robert Sol-
omon goes so far as to locate it at the center of justice. “Vengeance is 
the emotion of ‘getting even,’ putting the world back in balance.” Jus-
tice “begins not with Socratic insights but with the promptings of some 
basic emotions, among them envy, jealousy, and resentment, a sense of 
being personally cheated or neglected, and the desire to get even” 
(1990, 293). Solomon may be correct to claim that resentment and de-
sires for revenge may be at the center of demands for justice, though 
the danger of justice degenerating into cycles of “righ teous” violence 
should give us pause in endorsing the moral appropriateness of ven-
geance. Solomon holds nothing back when he states that “if resent-
ment has a desire, it is in its extreme form the total annihilation, pref-
aced by the utter humiliation, of its target— though the vindictive 
imagination of resentment is such that even that might not be good 
enough” (1990, 266).
The desire for revenge following mass violence is, of course, ex-
pected. Victims understandably want to see their tormentors pun-
ished.4 More importantly for our purposes, I think resentment and the 
desire for revenge can be, at least in principle, morally defended.  Here, 
however, I distinguish a bit further between two different conceptions 
of punishment, echoing an earlier discussion in Chapter 2. There is 
institutionalized punishment, bounded by clear rules, procedures, and 
protections, and the wild justice carried out by individuals that can 
quickly degenerate into reciprocal violence. The point  here is not that 
the desire for revenge— much less the expression of resentment— is 
necessarily immoral or uncivilized, because the desire itself stems 
from the recognition that moral injuries should be punished and the 
moral worth of victims require ac know ledg ment. I agree with this as 
far as it goes. The point, rather, is that placing justice in the private 
domain (that is, taking justice into one’s “own hands,” so to speak) re-
duces the morally defensible response of punishment to little more 
than the reactionary infl iction of pain. Without laws and procedures 
limiting it, the demand for vengeance can become unyielding and 
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 escalate into open violence. As Solomon states, “If resentment has a 
desire, it is in its extreme form the total annihilation” of the opponent 
(1990, 266). Even short of the desire for total annihilation, revenge can 
easily degenerate into violence. One person I spoke with in Sarajevo, 
Mahir P., told me about how his Muslim family had been violently 
driven from Mostar during the war by Bosnian Croat forces. It was 
clear from speaking with him that the war still consumed him, and he 
spent much of his time thinking about private vengeance against 
Croats— any Croats. Mahir said, “I am furious every day. I hate the 
Croats. I recognize that this is unhealthy, in some way, but I  can’t let 
go. I simply hate these people who did this to us, and I doubt I’ll ever 
change. I think of hurting the fi rst Croat I see all of the time.” Not only 
is this psychologically unhealthy, but under certain circumstances Ma-
hir and others like him can act on these attitudes by carry ing out new 
violence against real or perceived enemies (the generalization to “the 
Croats” is typical; broad negative stereotyping is a necessary compo-
nent of mass violence). It is interesting to note that Mahir actively 
speaks of vengeance, whereas Cristina accepts that more violence will 
not bring her any peace. What she means to hold onto is a sense of 
justifi ed resentment, not the right to seek out her abusers and person-
ally harm them. She accepts that the courts are the proper space for 
accountability, and though she admitted to despairing over whether her 
perpetrators will ever see a courtroom, Cristina recognized that allow-
ing individuals to carry out their own private justice reproduces the 
lawlessness of the previous regime, with victims now the victimizers.
Forgiveness
What, then, of forgiveness? Forgiveness means many things to many 
people, and I am unconvinced that there is a “true” objective form that 
holds for all societies and situations. The proliferation of theories on 
the concept seems to bear this out (Walker 2006). There are, however, 
certain elements that are shared across understandings including the 
emphasis on overcoming resentment, bitterness, and anger, and for-
swearing vengeance and laying the ground for a new future sworn of 
violence. In its most traditional Christian formulation, for example, 
forgiveness is understood as a duty, as Jesus commands one to forgive 
“till seventy times seven” (Matthew 18:22). Forgiving not only allows 
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one to let go of pain and recast future relations; it also reinforces the 
idea of fraternal love that is at the core of Christianity. Indeed, some 
theologians such as Martin Marty (1998) and Desmond Tutu (1999) 
have presented forgiveness as a principle ethos of the Christian faith 
(Botman and Petersen 1997). It is a righ teous practice that promotes 
the love of one’s enemies. Others, such as Jacques Derrida (2001), ar-
gue for a secular forgiveness that is both unconditional and noninstru-
mental; one can forgive only what is unforgivable and it should be done 
for no extrinsic reasons (Verdeja 2004). Psychologists Robert Enright, 
Suzanne Freedman, and Julio Rique understand forgiveness as “a 
 willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, 
and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly injures us, while 
fostering undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love 
toward him or her” (1998, 46). They claim that “The offended may 
unconditionally forgive regardless of the other person’s current atti-
tude or behaviors toward the offended, because forgiving is one per-
son’s volitional response to another” (1998, 47). Such an understanding 
clearly rests on the transformative power of forgiveness, with its em-
phasis on the qualities of “compassion, generosity, and even love.” In 
fact, it is remarkable for its insistence that the offender’s repentance 
and apology are not even necessary.
Forgiveness is often cast as a more fundamental embrace of one’s 
enemy, or “positive mutual affi rmation,” in the words of Donald Shriver 
(1997, 8). The objective is to combine “realism with hope,” which em-
phasizes the distinctly practical relevance of forgiveness in a world 
torn asunder. Indeed, forgiveness is eminently of this world, and not an 
abstract concept for phi los o phers or saints.
While there are some differences among them, all of these ap-
proaches share several key points.5 First, they conceive of forgiveness 
as the abandonment of resentment and hatred toward one’s violator. 
Second, forgiveness becomes the primary way for achieving a funda-
mental transformation of both victim and perpetrator, allowing for the 
emergence of a new relationship between the two that is no longer 
anchored in the past. It is a transformative faculty. And not only is it 
transformative; it is morally superior to mere tolerance, indifference, 
or resentment because only forgiveness provides the possibility of a 
shared future that does justice to memory while eschewing vengeance. 
Finally, all of these thinkers emphasize the practicality of forgiveness. 
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Rather than placing it solely in the province of theologians, forgiveness 
should play a central role in po liti cal and personal life, especially fol-
lowing mass violence.
How extensive is forgiveness likely to be? Without doubt, some 
persons will forgive even the most awful acts committed against them 
or their loved ones. Indeed, we should not declare a priori when survi-
vors can and cannot forgive. Suleyman L. explicitly forgave the mur-
derers of his family, who  were killed outside of Bihać in northwestern 
Bosnia, telling me, “It is necessary that I forgive these soldiers, for this 
is the proper thing to do. I realize that they have not come forth to 
seek my forgiveness, but I do so anyhow.” Maria Helena C.’s brother 
was tortured by the Chilean military, and while she knows the perpe-
trators and they have not asked for her forgiveness, she forgave them 
anyhow, stating, “I am a Christian, and thus I must forgive. It is hard, 
very hard. But my faith directs me to do so, and I believe that by for-
giving them someday they will come to see the wrongness of their ac-
tions.” Some will forgive unconditionally, moved by a deep faith or 
other moral resource, others will demand certain conditions such as a 
show of contrition, and yet others will refuse to forgive under any cir-
cumstances. Forgiveness is ultimately the decision of the individual. 
But the likelihood of forgiveness becoming a generalized practice in 
transitions— at least forgiveness of the deeply transformative type dis-
cussed above— is probably rather low. Many survivors do not want to 
forgive but rather seek recognition, truth, and (often) retributive jus-
tice, if not outright revenge. A more satisfactory normative approach 
would leave open the possibility of forgiving while identifying other 
responses that are compatible with moral respect. Indeed, the real 
problem is not with forgiveness as such but with the problematic way 
in which these discussions are often formulated; that is, pitting the 
moral superiority of forgiveness against vengeance as if there  were no 
other defensible alternatives. Berel Lang imagines a world without 
forgiveness as “less than human— one where resentment and ven-
geance would not only have their day, but would also continue to have 
it, day after day” (Govier 2002, 42). Tutu shares this, arguing, “For-
giveness is an absolute necessity for continued human existence” (1998, 
xiii). But is this truly the case? Again, this partly depends on what is 
meant by forgiveness, whether it is requires substantial inner trans-
formation or simply a recognition of the need to let go of poisonous 
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feelings of anger. For Lang, as for Shriver, Tutu, and others, forgive-
ness is more like the former, leaving us with two fundamental choices: 
(1) commit oneself to the diffi cult pro cess of forgiveness with the ul-
timate goal of securing a deep transformation of both victim and per-
petrator, or (2) risk falling into paralyzing despair or obsession with 
vengeance. But this overlooks the variety of forms of interaction that 
are short of forgiveness yet signifi cantly deeper than mere coexistence 
and which are morally defensible. It also establishes a rather substan-
tial requirement for reconciliation because if interpersonal forgiveness 
is part of a theory of reconciliation, we risk placing an im mense bur-
den on all citizens.
Many victims may feel that their violators should not be forgiven 
and they argue this sentiment morally. Cristina H.’s passionate defense 
of not forgiving shows how rejecting a hasty forgiveness is a moral 
claim, thus signaling to society that she sees herself as a moral agent 
with self- worth and dignity. But she is also clear that she has been able 
to move forward with her life and has renounced any interest in seek-
ing personal payback. Nevertheless, Cristina bristles at the idea that 
she should forgive for the sake of society, stating that “those who want 
us to forgive for the sake of everyone are hardly speaking for victims; 
they are often the killers, or at least  were complicit in supporting Pi-
nochet.” Of course, many people calling for forgiveness are simply try-
ing to articulate the need to avoid a return to violence; they are not 
necessarily apologists for dictators. But it is also clear that expecting 
a victim to overcome resentment and “leave the past behind” for the 
sake of solidarity does little to convince survivors that society takes 
them seriously.
We should pause before accepting forgiveness— at least transfor-
mative forgiveness— as the prime way of securing reconciliation. Em-
bracing it as the fundamental moral response to violence disregards 
legitimate anger and resentment while placing a burden on victims 
that they may fi nd inappropriate. Victims may become instruments for 
some broader good without taking into account their desires or needs. 
Civil society can suffer, too, because if reconciliation comes to mean 
an imposed harmony with dissent and contestation suppressed, and 
disagreement is tarnished as the forerunner of po liti cal instability, 
then legitimate politics itself risks disappearing. We should be wary of 
treating any alternative to forgiveness as dangerous. Doing so robs us 
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of the potential of distinguishing theoretically between acceptable dis-
agreements and even legitimate resentment from personal revenge.
A weaker formulation of forgiveness seems to me both normatively 
defensible and practically attainable. This certainly has a utilitarian 
edge to it, insofar as it recognizes the need to give up debilitating feel-
ings of anger that would otherwise continue to harm the victim in 
some way. Uma Narayan, for example, defi nes forgiveness as abandon-
ing a right to a “sense of grievance” that the violated may otherwise 
continue to hold. A victim may still desire punishment or compensa-
tion, but has effectively repudiated the legitimacy of continued anger 
and resentment (1998, 172). By forgiving, the victim acknowledges that 
these emotions are no longer appropriate, even though they may resur-
face. This sense of letting go, then, is a recognition that while anger is 
unlikely to disappear it cannot continue to defi ne relations and some 
alternative form of living together without violence is necessary.  Here, 
forgiveness is not so much about moral transformation on the part of 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders but rather is about forswearing 
violence and coming to acknowledge the basic moral status of former 
enemies. This weaker conception of forgiveness, which I call a partial 
pardon, is closer to what I have in mind below, where I sketch an ac-
count of mutual respect among individuals. A partial pardon is not 
particularly transformative in individual ontological terms but it does 
require a substantial change in social relations.
An Alternative: Mutual Respect
Vengeance and transformative forgiveness face a number of challenges 
for establishing personal reconciliation. An alternative would allow for 
a certain skepticism toward some of the stronger claims of forgiveness 
while remaining morally satisfactory, yet reject the danger of revenge. 
This steers clear from a concern with repentance and instead argues 
that a pardon may be partial and offer a kind of ac cep tance of the per-
petrator as an equal for the purposes of social coexistence without any 
requirement of deep ontological transformation on the part of victim 
and violator. Such a “partial pardon” includes several elements, and 
in no way absolves a perpetrator of responsibility. Rather than spring-
ing from the principles of “love,” “fraternity,” and “pity” toward one’s 
enemy, this approach seeks to establish interpersonal relations on the 
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principles of mutual respect. It is not set in opposition to substantive 
understandings of forgiveness— as I have said, these are morally 
praiseworthy— but remains a considerably thinner articulation while 
including elements that are more demanding than either forgetfulness 
or vengeance.6 In order to make the distinction sharper, I fi rst discuss 
what is meant by respect and tolerance interpersonally, and then turn 
to the idea of a partial pardon.
Tolerance assumes both disagreement (and even strong disap-
proval) with the beliefs or actions of others and a willingness to not 
impose oneself on those with whom one disagrees. As the long history 
of liberal social thought has argued, tolerance assumes that disagree-
ments are a given part of social life and they can be eliminated only 
through an indefensible demand for uniformity. Especially in post- 
confl ict conditions, disagreements can run deep. Nevertheless, toler-
ance also assumes that we remain in a relationship with those whom 
we are in confl ict; we recognize the necessity of maintaining more 
than merely temporary relations. Tolerance emerges from the recogni-
tion of a shared fate or a sense that we are part of a larger community 
with a common past and future in which we are invested (or the very 
least from which we cannot escape), and thus we are tasked with estab-
lishing morally acceptable grounds for living with one another. This 
point of a shared fate, or of the awareness that we must live with those 
who harmed us and whom we harmed, underscores the importance of 
fi nding ways to live together peacefully and justly.
Tolerance, then, means simultaneously accepting fundamental dis-
agreements and the importance of reciprocal moral recognition. How 
this occurs in practice depends on the case at hand and various avail-
able strategies. We cannot deduce the full spectrum of the means for 
securing tolerance solely theoretically (though a commitment to the 
rule of law is indicative of at least one aspect of this, as I have dis-
cussed). The central point, however, is that tolerance is not simply 
unilateral; it is premised on establishing and nurturing relationships 
over time, even where confl ict and differences are still part of the 
 social background. Such an understanding of tolerance is based on 
the notion of respect. Respect is the recognition of the value of others, 
not because of their po liti cal views or identity but because of their 
 status as beings carry ing moral rights that we have an obligation to 
recognize. Interpersonal relations that privilege respect and tolerance 
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 establish the necessary conditions for the emergence of future social 
trust. The powerful dynamics of violence, which neatly divided every-
one into one category or another, are weakened to allow for the devel-
opment of alternative po liti cal identities over time; former enemies 
establish new alliances and identities that overlap with earlier, confl ict-
 era identities. This requires, at a minimum, that former adversaries 
realize that in politics negotiation and compromise do not signify de-
feat. Victory does not mean absolutely vanquishing the other side. 
Similarly, views and beliefs about others must be transformed so that 
others are seen as worthy of respect— that is, that enemies become op-
ponents. Another way to put this is to say that interpersonal moral re-
spect refl ects several things: The overcoming of dehumanizing hatred 
that is typical of relations between hostile groups, a rejection of per-
sonal claims to vengeance, and fi nally the rehumanization of the other, 
so that we come to see former enemies in human and individual terms, 
rather than ste reo typical examples of an out- group. This is deeper than 
mere coexistence because it implies recognition of the humanity of the 
other and of recognizing in others individualizing qualities that are 
familiar to us. To some extent, this also means a capacity to entertain, 
if only briefl y, another’s perspective and views and give them serious 
consideration, even though we may ultimately reject them. Most im-
portantly, however, is the notion of acknowledging former enemies as 
beings whose status as moral agents make claims, or demands, on us 
that we must respect. What then can facilitate the emergence of re-
spect and tolerance between individuals?
First, consider the status of the perpetrator. There is always the 
possibility that perpetrators may not be held accountable and society 
instead “chooses” to forget.  Here, reconciliation is highly unlikely be-
cause victims do not receive the recognition they deserve. But even if 
accountability is pursued, there is no guarantee of reconciliation. The 
perpetrator must refl ect on his or her actions critically and accept sev-
eral conclusions: (1) the moral criminality of his or her actions, (2) a 
sense of personal responsibility for those actions, (3) the injured party 
as a victim of those actions, and (4) a commitment to a new, inclusive 
po liti cal and social order that recognizes the moral status of the vic-
tim. Now, the perpetrator may indeed begin a profound pro cess of 
self- examination, culminating in repentance and possibly a plea for 
forgiveness. But more common is the example of Petar L., a Bosnian 
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Croat who fought during the war with a small guerrilla group that 
frequently engaged Bosnian Serb forces near Brčko in present- day 
northern Bosnia. While he was unwilling to go into detail about what 
he did, he made it clear to me that he participated in “what you would 
probably call criminal attacks” against civilians, though Petar gave 
little indication that this troubled him. “Do I regret what I did? Of 
course not. It was a war and they attacked us, and the only solution was 
to fi ght back, even if that meant attacking their people. They are dogs.” 
During our conversation, Petar made it clear that he saw all Serbians 
in essentially the same terms, that is, as violent thugs who deserved no 
quarter and with whom he could not live. It is hard to know whether 
he was radicalized prior to or during the confl ict but the depth of his 
animosity was striking, and his refusal to even accept that perhaps 
some of what he had done was wrong was disconcerting. With such an 
outlook, nearly fi fteen years after the end of the war, it is unlikely that 
Petar will ever come to see his enemies in human terms.
Say a perpetrator not only acknowledges responsibility but under-
goes some type of moral transformation and seeks forgiveness, as Tutu 
(1999) encourages; ought the victim forgive? Again, this depends on 
the victim. Forgiveness is a moral action and while it may be desirable, 
it should not be taken for granted. It can be an impressive example of 
moral agency, as Maria Helena showed, but I believe it should be given 
only if it strengthens the person’s dignity. Regardless, I think there are 
ways of theorizing perpetrator ac cep tance into the same po liti cal and 
social (and possibly moral) spheres without relying on a substantive 
conception of forgiveness. A survivor may forgive his or her tormentor 
and thus close or at least lessen the moral chasm between them, or in-
stead may offer a diminished or partial pardon; that is, a recognition 
that accepts the necessity of rejecting vengeance without offering full 
ac cep tance of the violator. Such a pardon, oriented toward mutual re-
spect and tolerance, is satisfactory, if only because it would be prob-
lematic to expect forgiveness to serve as the only or primary way of 
reaching reconciliation. Nevertheless, a partial pardon is more robust 
than the thin coexistence discussed in Chapter 1, because even to con-
sider pardoning there must be some ac know ledg ment of past wrongs 
and recognition of victims. The pardon is premised on the belief that 
any stable and just future must focus on creating a common moral, po-
liti cal, and social space for former enemies.
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A partial pardon should also be understood as emerging over time. 
It is rarely if ever “given” in one moment, like a self- executing speech- 
act. It does not create a new relationship ex nihilo, for new relations 
take root only through continued and sustained interactions between 
former adversaries working together on common enterprises as they 
slowly learn that they can trust one another. This is a complex endeavor 
occurring over years or perhaps generations, unlike some understand-
ings of forgiveness that occasionally downplay the importance of time. 
Indeed, respect among individuals is unlikely to result from a unifi ed, 
collective will but rather emerges from new personal relations, from 
changes in attitudes and behavior, and from a willingness to accept 
others as moral equals, though not necessarily as friends or intimates. 
One example that comes to mind is the case of Juan Carlos L., a Chil-
ean offi ce worker I met in Santiago whose father was tortured by the 
security ser vices during the dirty war, and passed away six years after 
Pinochet stepped down from power. Juan Carlos was adamant that 
he did not forgive the people who harmed his father. “I don’t forgive 
them, since that would be absurd. But I do recognize that we need to 
learn to live together, and that not everyone who was a supporter of 
Pinochet is evil. In fact, I work with some right- wingers, and while we 
don’t agree on many things, we get along. We have some things in com-
mon, like sports and even some social issues, and sure I  wouldn’t call 
them friends, but we can have conversations and feel OK around each 
other.  We’ve even gone out for drinks together. They also understand 
where I’m coming from, and realize that what happened to a lot of us 
was unjust.”
Juan Carlos’s comments are important for several reasons. First, he 
makes clear that for him and many like him, forgiveness for those who 
harmed them or their loved ones is out of the question. But second, he 
acknowledges that many people who hold opposing po liti cal views can 
nevertheless be decent human beings, and through sustained daily in-
teractions he began appreciating this. He has, in other words, begun 
a pro cess of rehumanization, recognizing that po liti cal opponents are 
like him in some ways. Furthermore, this has been a reciprocal pro-
cess where he and his coworkers have come to recognize each other as 
individuals, while trying to understand each other’s po liti cal perspec-
tives. Juan Carlos may not come to embrace them in any deep sense, 
but he has accepted that they can live together. Marisela P., an older 
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Chilean businesswoman who is suspicious of “leftists and students” 
and supported Pinochet, has come to a somewhat similar position from 
the other end of the po liti cal spectrum. She acknowledges that Pi-
nochet “did some bad things, and certainly many innocent people 
 suffered during the dictatorship.” Like Juan Carlos, over the years 
Marisela has come in close contact with persons holding opposing 
views, at work and in social gatherings. She realizes that many of the 
beliefs she once held  were grossly reductive and dehumanizing and 
treated anyone who opposed the junta as traitors who “deserved what 
they got.” She has gone through a long change, coming to recognize 
that her old views contributed to terrible crimes, and she has sought to 
reach out to other Chileans who suffered during military rule. What is 
interesting is that she couched this essentially in terms of recognition 
and respect:
For a long time, I didn’t even see [leftists and liberals] as hu-
man, as having any rights at all. I didn’t accept that they could 
have legitimate complaints, or that violating their rights to de-
fend the country meant treating them like nothing, like trash. 
With the [Truth and Reconciliation] Commission report and 
later getting to know people who suffered then, I realized the 
extent of what happened, and the importance of not letting 
this happen again. I’ve had a lot of discussions about this, a lot 
of arguments, which changed my mind. I still am suspicious of 
liberals, but I realize that they are Chileans, too, and we have 
to learn how to work things out. And I feel terrible about the 
years of the dictatorship and the fact that I supported it.
Marisela notes the importance of broader events, like the publication 
of the commission report and the ways in which personal interactions 
have given her a new perspective on the past. She later mentioned the 
ways in which general public debates framed for her how she thought 
about individual experiences she had heard, and also how personal ac-
counts of suffering and fear made sense in the larger historical context 
that emerged during the transition. Furthermore, she has moved to 
extend a kind of moral recognition to survivors by acknowledging the 
wrongness of what was done to them and accepting at least some 
responsibility.
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These are all examples of the ambiguities between ac cep tance and 
rejection. The complexity of this pro cess means that a society will not 
move in tandem or smoothly toward new relations or reconciliation 
because individuals have myriad ways of responding to suffering and 
violence. Some, of course, may follow Tutu, Shriver, and others and 
choose to forgive those who harmed them, while others may remain 
embittered and feel that only vengeance is satisfactory, as does Mahir. 
Others like Marisela will change enough to acknowledge the moral 
standing of victims and extend something like moral acknowledgment 
and respect to them. With time, hatred and resentment may  become 
dulled, and respect and tolerance may slowly replace the animosity of 
the past. “In some ways,” says Jasmina I., a Bosnian Muslim whose 
brother and father  were killed outside of Sarajevo during the war, “we 
need to fi gure out how to move on. I have fi nally come to realize that 
the other side suffered too, that they are people too, who suffered 
enormously at our hands. It has taken me a long time to accept this, 
that they could be our neighbors, that we can eventually work together 
and live next door to each other again and do things together as Bos-
nians. I don’t forgive the people who killed my family, but I do under-
stand that Bosnian Serbs are Bosnians, like me. We  can’t keep demon-
izing each other. We need to see each other as humans, as individuals.” 
Of course, time is not enough. Victims must feel that the future holds 
more than a fragile peace or continued impunity, for without some 
likelihood of improvement— of hope in the future— the sources of vio-
lence are not removed but only contained. Juan Carlos was clear that 
Chile’s impunity throughout the 1990s and the ever- present threat of a 
second coup made it practically impossible to speak of peace in any 
substantive sense. If hope in a better future is to be secured, there 
must be a sense that former enemies are willing to work together and 
address the deepest causes of confl ict. Furthermore, po liti cal institu-
tions and the rhetoric of politics must change, so as not to emphasize 
differences but instead a unity that is based on justice and respect. To 
the extent that these changes resonate among individuals, respect and 
tolerance may take hold and will be stronger if individuals experience 
these changes in their everyday lives. Respect and tolerance must be 
practiced in everyday life.
Perhaps a different way to express this is to say that people must 
see themselves as contributing to social change where exclusivist 
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 ideologies are replaced by values that emphasize inclusiveness and re-
spect. Survivors, in par tic u lar, must be brought back into the po liti cal 
and social life of the community, perhaps by creating spaces where 
their personal experiences can be retold publicly and connected to 
larger narratives about the past. In Chapter 1 I introduced the notion 
of phenomenological truth, which concerns personal experiences and 
suffering as well as their expression. Survivors express these experi-
ences through narration, specifi cally by tying their personal experi-
ences to collective stories that provide both empirical and normative 
context. Of course, it is not surprising that the kinds of experiences we 
are dealing with  here (that is, terrible suffering and seemingly mean-
ingless violence) often may not fi t comfortably with broader narratives, 
and so there remains an aporia between public versions of the past that 
may be shot through with stories of redemption and overcoming, and 
horrible personal experiences.7 We should not expect that personal 
stories will connect perfectly with general accounts but instead that 
these stories will bring an immediacy to the present that helps others 
understand the terribleness of the past, and the need to change for the 
future.
Linking personal stories and broader social narratives also pro-
vides moral recognition to victims. Survivors are rehumanized as moral 
agents when new, critical histories reframe history and bring the sto-
ries of individuals to the fore, thus drawing attention to the importance 
of human rights and the dignity of victims. Days of commemoration, 
memory sites, and other public endeavors strengthen this reframing, 
and draw a powerful connection between individual experiences and 
social refl ection on the past. Certainly, moral reframing does ease the 
burdens of suffering and the changes that this may engender can assist 
in combating the impunity and marginalization that often accompa-
nies victimhood. In addition to symbolic moral recognition, we should 
add that material reparations are equally necessary where victims con-
tinue to live in poverty that is a legacy of violence. Individualized repa-
rations provide greater personal autonomy, for they permit individuals 
to address their own needs as they see fi t. This matters only, of course, 
if the reparations are substantial enough to affect their lives, and not 
merely token responses with the aim of ultimately neutralizing or si-
lencing them.
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This leads us immediately to note that any form of recognition is 
only partial, since the most terrible experiences cannot be completely 
communicated to others. This repre sen ta tional gap is a product of the 
nature of the experiences we are dealing with  here. Broad patterns of 
repression, locations of mass graves, and institutional hierarchies of 
authority can be understood using traditional research and forensic 
techniques, but individual experiences are diffi cult, if not impossible, 
to represent and communicate, and serve as a terrible burden and 
source of loneliness for survivors. This gap is evident when a survivor 
of the Armenian genocide says, “My spirit is blinded. That is the point 
I have come to. Nothing will come of me, because I have been de-
feated by life” (Miller and Miller 1999, 172). His experiences lived on 
long after the violence ended and haunted him for the remainder of his 
life. Survivors “inhabit a world that has been made strange through the 
desolating experience of violence and loss” (Das 1997, 23). Such radi-
cal separation, and the attendant diffi culty of representing personal 
experiences of suffering and grief to those who  were protected from 
violence, give us a sense of the limited expectations we should hold for 
interpersonal reconciliation. While some individual survivors may suc-
ceed in placing the past behind them and leading meaningful lives, 
others may not be able to do so, and so we should be sensitive to the 
limited possibilities for reconciliation that are available in these con-
texts.8 The idea behind the partial pardon is the recognition that a 
certain distance from the past is necessary, and while any future will 
carry the weight of the past, it is incumbent to create a space where 
new relationships can take root. The pardon is skeptical of the radical 
change at the heart of substantive accounts of forgiveness, and instead 
emphasizes fostering the values of respect and tolerance, as well as 
practices that promote cooperation among former enemies. We should 
seek to lessen resentment and fear, foster respect, and bring adversar-
ies together into the same moral sphere, which is a signifi cant accom-
plishment on its own.
In the end, it is individuals who must adopt the principle of respect 
and accept the importance of reconciliation. The nature of inter-
personal relations means that  here reconciliation will have its own 
 dynamics, far from the publicity of offi cial apologies and truth commis-
sion hearings, or the excitement and anger generated by high- profi le 
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trials. Citizens must learn to negotiate the complexities of the past in 
ways that are acceptable but not too disruptive, and to navigate be-
tween the temptations of vengeance and the impossibility, for some at 
least, of forgiveness. As enemies become neighbors and face the pros-
pect of living together, everyday interactions take on a new cast. Cer-
tainly, change may occur more slowly  here than in civil society or in 
the law. A report may signal the end of a truth commission’s work but 
it is only the beginning of personal change. Victims may welcome a 
successful prosecution but it may also have relatively little direct im-
pact on their everyday lives. The variety of personal histories and ways 
of coping with the past means that in some respects this level is only 
loosely connected to po liti cal, institutional, and social developments.
None of this is to say that interpersonal reconciliation is separate 
from what happens in the rest of society. The interpersonal is con-
nected to public reconciliatory developments, even if only in a highly 
mediated fashion; however, individual reconciliation is unlikely where 
there are no efforts at institutional reform, where elites continue to 
disparage survivors, and where civil society turns away from the needs 
of the suffering. Without these broader developments, it is unlikely 
that reconciliation will develop, for there will be little reason to trust 
the state or believe that survivors and their loved ones will be safe 
or treated with respect. Impunity in the law reveals itself as fear 
among individuals. Without transparency in the workings of the state 
and robust methods of accountability citizens will continue to feel vul-
nerable to arbitrary violence, and may, under certain circumstances, 
demand private vengeance. Cristina H. argued that while Pinochet 
maintained impunity and power after stepping down, any talk of rec-
onciliation was largely a sham— a way of using moral language to cover 
up diffi cult po liti cal compromises that in her opinion had sidelined 
victims. Accountability is important not only as a way to strengthen the 
rule of law but also because it signals to the population what values 
should be protected in the new society. Leaders can change the con-
tours of debate and encourage individuals to confront the past, both in 
their public and private lives. Reparations, apologies, and similar strat-
egies can further respect by showing that the state is concerned with 
the plight of victims and that the population should reexamine its own 
responsibility. And to the extent that the rule of law is reinforced insti-
tutionally and accepted individually, its role as a regulative normative 
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ideal will thus be strengthened. Consequently, interpersonal changes 
are sensitive to developments at other social levels.
The success of interpersonal reconciliation requires an under-
standing of its possibilities and limitations. Too strong a conception of 
reconciliation may be unachievable, but forgetting and vengeance are 
so deeply problematic that they should be resisted. The idea of a par-
tial pardon speaks to both of these concerns by seeking to establish the 
groundwork for a defensible mode of morally satisfactory coexistence 
while not foreclosing the possibility of deeper instances of forgiveness. 
Its success depends in part on the achievements made by elites and 
institutions, and in civil society, but it requires at its most basic a com-
mitment by individuals themselves to live within a shared moral sphere 
with their former adversaries.
❖
I
n the aftermath of po liti cal violence and oppression, a society is 
tasked with the diffi cult challenge of moral and material reconstruc-
tion. This is a complex pro cess that involves many moral goals, actors, 
and institutions. I have sought to show how reconciliation in a society 
emerging from a period of signifi cant violence is shaped by a number 
of normative goals that operate across diverse social spaces, and I have 
sought to provide a theoretical framework for understanding such pro-
cesses that differs from prevailing approaches. The understanding of 
reconciliation provided  here attempts to ground a realistic, critical ac-
count of what is feasible by using a set of normative criteria that can 
work to gauge its success.
As I have argued, there are fi ve key concepts at play: (1) public dis-
semination of the truth of past atrocities, as well as a critical inter-
rogation of ideologies supporting the violence, (2) accountability of 
perpetrators, (3) public recognition and acknowledgment of victims, 
(4) a commitment to the rule of law, and fi nally, (5) the development of 
mutual respect among erstwhile enemies.
Respect is the core principle  here. Reconciliation is ultimately a 
condition of mutual respect between former adversaries that necessi-
tates the reciprocal recognition of moral worth and dignity. We can 
speak of reconciliation when earlier, confl ict- era identities are no 
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longer the primary fault lines in politics, and citizens have new identi-
ties that cut across earlier identifi cations. This requires moving away 
from estrangement and distrust toward tolerance and respect of oth-
ers, especially former enemies. The emergence of respect takes time 
and is unlikely to develop when the other normative concepts have not 
been adequately addressed. Respect develops partially in tandem with 
these other norms but also in the wake of their successful actualiza-
tion. It is only then, after erstwhile adversaries can come to see each 
other as moral beings (even if po liti cally at odds), that the goals of tol-
erance and respect can be said to take root.
I have sketched a conception of reconciliation as respect that em-
phasizes reciprocal recognition between equal actors. It emphasizes 
the recognition of the inherent moral value of others, while accepting 
that basic worldviews and po liti cal ideologies may often remain at odds 
and disagreements will persist. Reconciliation is primarily a public 
 relationship that differs from both esteem (which recognizes some ex-
ceptional aspect or attribute in a person) and liminal conceptualiza-
tions of thin coexistence, because reconciliation rests on the possibility 
of discussion, deliberation and, in short, politics. Furthermore, it falls 
short of the deep ac cep tance, or willful embrace of the “other,” that 
some have argued is the essence of reconciliation. The disagreements 
that pull us apart are balanced by a commitment to a sustained, signifi -
cant relationship.
Mutual respect is intimately tied to the other normative concepts 
presented earlier. Lies and half- truths about the past signal that vic-
tims’ experiences are considered unworthy of public attention, and re-
quire truth telling efforts to resist. Some accountability, too, is neces-
sary, as continued impunity effectively means contempt for all citizens 
and their basic rights. In a similar vein, survivors will not be respected 
if there are no efforts to recognize them morally. Under these condi-
tions, they will likely remain marginalized and ignored. The protection 
of the law and the commitment to demo cratic practices are also neces-
sary to deepen principles of respect.
These normative concepts allow us to see how reconciliation de-
velops across social space. The fundamental diffi culty with previous 
approaches like legal minimalism or maximalism based on forgiveness, 
as I indicated, is their univalent origin. What the model presented 
 here has attempted to show is the necessity of each social level for 
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broad- based social reintegration. Each level on its own is both neces-
sary and insuffi cient to achieve reconciliation. Such an approach 
highlights how reconciliation is fundamentally disjunctured and un-
even, occurring across social space in different ways and susceptible 
to different challenges. The complexity and disjuncture of the pro cess 
come from the fact that actors at different levels are infl uenced by dif-
ferent factors and that no one level is suffi cient to guarantee recon-
ciliation. The different levels are, in effect, engaged in a complex rela-
tion where developments at one level may affect the others.
For example, po liti cal society can contribute much to reconcilia-
tion, especially if elites commit themselves to endorsing and defending 
values like deliberation and the rule of law and rejecting violence, while 
pursuing the reform of key institutions responsible for violations. Lead-
ers can also shape pop u lar historical understanding by calling for sus-
tained refl ection on the past and establishing memory sites that rewrite 
shared historical narratives. And yet elite- driven reconciliation carries 
risks, particularly because they are typically concerned with the imme-
diate needs of stability and legitimacy, rather than extensive public re-
fl ection or moral discourses about responsibility. Pacted transitions fur-
ther constrain the opportunities available to leaders and are likely to 
focus elite attention on establishing basic ground rules for politics, even 
through amnesties, rather than embarking on morally challenging and 
po liti cally fraught challenges to injustices. Substantive justice claims 
like reparations and apologies can fall by the wayside under these con-
ditions. Reconciliation among elites does not indicate societal reconcili-
ation but only that they have settled on rules and procedures for solving 
differences (no small accomplishment, of course). Achieving this may 
mean avoiding the complex issues of responsibility, guilt, and the bur-
dens of memory. For leaders, the need to strengthen state legitimacy 
and effi cacy may sideline a commitment to deepen reconciliation.
Trials and truth commissions may also play important roles in rec-
onciliation but they, too, are only part of the puzzle. To be sure, fair 
prosecutions show the state’s commitment to fi ght impunity and return 
to the rule of law. Indeed, prosecutions can change the expectations 
citizens have of the state by highlighting the importance of protecting 
rights and bringing violators to justice, as well as by developing a 
 record of violations that can inform public debate. Truth commissions 
can play a somewhat similar role. Their offi cial status and public nature, 
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coupled with the publication and broad dissemination of a fi nal report, 
means that commissions are particularly well suited for furthering 
public debate. As important as trials and truth commissions may be, 
however, they can only contribute to public discourse; neither prosecu-
tions nor commission hearings can address the host of complex issues 
confronting transitional societies. Trials must contend with the diffi -
culty of selecting whom to prosecute and the danger of misrepresent-
ing patterns of abuse by individualizing guilt. Furthermore, we should 
be wary of overemphasizing the demo cratizing effects of trials (as 
Osiel (1997) sometimes does). While fairness is crucial, trials are likely 
to have a deeper impact if they confi rm pop u lar expectations of guilt. 
Nevertheless, acquittals may be legitimate if they are reached through 
fealty to procedural and substantive norms, though pop u lar support is 
likely to wane in the face of too many acquittals, however appropriate. 
For their part, commissions can provide, at best, only a general history 
of violence and responsibility since they lack prosecutorial (and often 
even subpoena) powers. Their fi nal reports are best thought of as pro-
visional though important histories rather than a fi nal truth. It is not 
uncommon for evidence to emerge after a commission report that can 
deepen or even change important fi ndings. In any case, strong advo-
cates of truth commissions often promise a sea change in social rela-
tions— or even reconciliation— following a report; something that is 
exceedingly unlikely.
Civil society plays an important role as well, for it is  here where 
more critical and nuanced historical understandings can counter stat-
ist or elitist accounts while encouraging greater recognition of victims. 
Most importantly, perhaps, is the contribution civil society can make 
to developing modes of public deliberation that take contestation seri-
ously without collapsing into confl ict. But exclusionary discourses may 
undermine this, or civil society may simply be so weakened that there 
are few resources or little interest in rebuilding social relations.
Finally, I have argued that reconciliation must develop among 
individuals. While interpersonal relations are shaped by events in 
public, reconciliation between people follows a different path, for 
most individuals are at least partly shielded from public attention 
and are much more responsive to the immediacy of everyday experi-
ences and demands. Through sustained and personal interactions 
with former enemies— at work and in our neighborhoods— we slowly 
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rehumanize them, we individualize them in ways that are impossible 
when collective identities trump individuality. Through this pro cess, 
fraught as it often is with distrust, anger, and fear, respect can de-
velop over time, though it may take years. Forgiveness may not al-
ways be possible but mutual respect can serve as the cornerstone of 
new relations. The complexity of these dynamics highlights how in-
terpersonal reconciliation remains somewhat detached from broader 
social and po liti cal developments, yet responsive to the everyday ex-
periences of individuals.
I have shown that reconciliation requires development across these 
different social levels. We cannot be certain of the success of any of 
these strategies in reconciling former enemies, for as Andrew Schaap 
notes, reconciliation— and politics more generally— is constituted by 
risk and we must “maintain an awareness of the frailty and contin-
gency of community” (2005: 150). It is unlikely that reconciliation 
across levels will unfold smoothly in practice. But by sketching a mul-
tivalent theory I have shown how various developments can shape, for 
better or worse, the possibility of reconciliation, as well as highlight 
the main normative issues that transitional societies confront.
Placing respect at the center of reconciliation may appear like the 
abandonment of loftier aims. Some may feel that this view of reconcili-
ation, which ultimately sees new relations and identities as a form of 
success (and perhaps the most we can expect), gives up on the need for 
deep personal transformation and refl ection. This may be so, but we 
should be aware of the challenges that post- atrocity societies face. The 
period following confl ict is frequently marked by bitterness, recrimi-
nations, and the threat of more violence. The challenges— emotional, 
material, po liti cal, and social— are often so staggering that any discus-
sion of peace or justice appears fanciful to the jaded and harmed. 
These conditions limit the kinds of expectations we should hold. 
Charles Villa- Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (2001: 290) turn to the 
poet William Merwin to capture the diffi culty of rebuilding what has 
been irreparably broken. Merwin’s short piece, “Unchopping a Tree,” 
begins:
Start with the leaves, the small twigs, and the nests that have 
been shaken, ripped, or broken off by the fall; these must be 
gathered and attached once again to their respective places . . .  
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. . .  the time comes for the erecting of the trunk. By now it 
will scarcely be necessary to remind you of the delicacy of this 
huge skeleton. Every motion of the tackle, every slight upward 
heave of the trunk, the branches, their elaborately re- assembled 
panoply of leaves (now dead) will draw from you an involuntary 
gasp.
Finally, there comes the moment when one must step back and see 
whether the tree will stand on its own.
The fi rst breeze that touches its dead leaves. . . .  You are afraid 
the motion of the clouds will be enough to push it over. What 
more can you do? What more can you do? But there is nothing 
more you can do. Others are waiting. Everything is going to 
have to be put back. (1970, 85)
How does one unchop a tree? Which pieces go where? Will they grow 
together in strength or collapse with the fi rst soft wind? And how does 
one rebuild a shattered society? The delicacy required of the endeavor, 
so perfectly captured in Merwin’s piece, reminds us of the fragility of 
remaking what has been destroyed. Like Merwin, citizens are en-
joined to rebuild something that has suffered devastating harm, and 
do so while carry ing their own burdens of trauma, pain, and fear. It 
may be impossible to return the tree to its prior self, just as it may be 
impossible to reconcile fully following terrible events, but the belief in 
a healthy tree, strong in its foundations and confi dent in its branches, 




1.  On the former, see Schaap 2005, Lederach 1999, and Amstutz 2005. 
On the latter, see Moon 2008, Norval 1998, and Short 2008.
2.  In 2005 the right was affi rmed by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in Resolution 2005/66 “Right to Truth.” Also see Linden 1994. Never-
theless, though moral arguments in favor of a “right to truth” can certainly be 
made, it is less clear that international humanitarian law has given a cogent le-
gal argument in its favor; thus to call it “emerging” seems a bit premature. The 
traditional source cited for this norm is Van Boven 1993, which is understood 
implicitly to include a right to the truth, since otherwise no reparations would 
be possible. More explicit is the argument put forth by UN Special Rapporteur 
Louis Joinet, who writes, “Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth is 
essential to avoid any recurrence of [gross human rights violations] in the fu-
ture,” and “[a] people’s knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of 
their heritage and, as such, shall be preserved by appropriate mea sures in 
fulfi llment of the State’s duty to remember. Such mea sures shall be aimed at 
preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in par tic u lar, at guard-
ing against development of revisionist and negationist arguments” (1997).
3.  Human Rights Watch’s “Policy Statement on Accountability for Past 
Abuses” states that there is “a duty to investigate” and that “the most impor-
tant means of establishing accountability is for the government itself to make 
known all that can be reliably established about human rights abuses” (1995, 
217). Amnesty International’s “Policy Statement on Impunity” states that 
“there should be a thorough investigation into allegations of human rights vio-
lations” and that “the truth about violations must be revealed” (1995, 219).
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4.  A variation on the argument in favor of forgetfulness does not focus on 
po liti cal constraints; rather, it embraces a triumphalist understanding of the 
power of forgetting, claiming that the will to forget, to maintain an “as- if- not” 
attitude toward transgression, refl ects the will to power of “noble morality.” In 
On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietz sche argues that the demand for retribu-
tion is reactive because it remains shaped by the transgression and limits both 
victim and perpetrator to a logic of vengeance. He then traces how forgetful-
ness can be a positive act, representing a sovereign disregard for just deserts 
(a kind of noblesse oblige, one suspects). He writes, “To be incapable of taking 
one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long— 
that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of power to 
form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget (a good example of this in modern 
times is Mirabeau, who had no memory for insults and vile actions done him 
and was unable to forgive simply because he— forgot). Such a man shakes off 
with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others;  here alone genuine 
‘love of one’s enemies’ is possible— supposing it to be possible at all on earth” 
(Nietz sche 1989, 39). Remarkably, Nietz sche rejects forgiveness in this pas-
sage as reactive, implying that both punishment and forgiveness are opposites 
of forgetfulness. The question is whether the as- if- not attitude is morally defen-
sible. I think not. It is morally indefensible to treat a rapist as if the rape had 
never occurred, and to the extent that the violator may be admitted back into 
society, it should happen once certain conditions have been met: for example, 
that he be identifi ed as the rapist in question, that he morally distance himself 
from the act and show sincere regret and remorse, that he receive some form of 
punishment (which can include the moral censure that accompanies being 
outed), and so on. It is diffi cult to see how letting perpetrators avoid facing the 
consequences of their actions is a sign of self- actualization for the victims 
rather than a further illustration of the injury infl icted upon the victims.
5.  The term is used in Schreiter 1997 (21). Also see Helmick 2008 
 (24– 29).
6.  Also see Muller- Fahrenholz 1997 (12).
7.  Indeed, I use the term “reconciliation” in this book with some appre-
hension, as it contains within it these serious internal tensions that elide its 
distinctly po liti cal aspects. Nevertheless, it has become common currency for 
discussing pro cesses of social change following violence or authoritarianism, 
and so I employ it for the sake of convention.
8.  The terms are used often in Dawson 2001 (219– 243).
9.  Though one could argue that the sovereign is also a “victim” of mass 
atrocities insofar as its mandate to ensure law and order is violated, this misses 
the point, since frequently it is precisely the sovereign state that commits 
many of these crimes, and thus to annul its responsibility through pardoning 
itself offers little consolation or ac know ledg ment for its victims. Even Hegel, 
while acknowledging that only the sovereign has the right to pardon, confuses 
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it with the notion of forgiveness: “The right to pardon criminals arises from 
the sovereignty of the monarch, since it is this alone which is empowered to 
actualize the mind’s power of making undone what has been done and wiping 
out a crime by forgiving and forgetting it” (1967, par 282).
Chapter 2
1.  This distinction is captured in Darwall 1977 (36– 49). Also see Bird 
2004 (211– 215).
2.  For a detailed discussion, see Van Boven 1993 (16– 34). Also see the 
UN Human Rights Council (2008) affi rmation of the right.
3.  The term is taken from Arendt 1993. Also see Crocker 2000 (100) and 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1995 (vol. 5, ch. 4, sec. 1).
4.  Also see Szymusiak 1999 and Ung 2000.
5.  Note that, broadly speaking, justice need not ignore the value of rec-
ognizing victims and providing them with some form of compensation. This is 
clarifi ed below.
6.  I use bystander in a moral sense and thus do not include persons who 
 were incapable of acting meaningfully to denounce or oppose abuses. Bystander 
includes some sense of agency, though this is often highly constrained.
7.  For this reason, some commentators prefer the term survivor to vic-
tim, for it connotes greater agency. Nevertheless, I use victim and survivor 
interchangeably throughout the book, with the explicit understanding that 
both should include a strong sense of agency.
8.  Honneth (1995, 249– 254) identifi es three forms of disrespect that en-
danger healthy identities: (1) at a very basic level, the injury to self- confi dence 
caused by loss over one’s physical integrity (e.g., through torture or rape) and 
the consequent devastating destabilization of personal identity and predict-
ability in the world, (2) the type of disrespect following the denial of rights 
enjoyed by other citizens, and (3) the damage done to self- esteem through the 
pronounced and repeated denigration of one’s way of life.
9.  It is important to emphasize that while I use recognition in Fraser’s 
sense of status parity to include both redistribution and recognition, I restrict it 
to the necessities of transitional societies. Broader social justice issues that she 
analyzes require slightly different theorization, since they engage long- term 
problems of both transitional and consolidated democracies and thus extend 
beyond the situation under discussion. One problem with confl ating redistribu-
tive mea sures in consolidated and transitional democracies is that victim recog-
nition becomes an issue of social policy, and the par tic u lar moral content that 
restitution includes is diluted into broader debates about redistributive justice. 
Victim recognition in these transitional settings should be seen as largely but 
(because of the unique burdens transitional societies face) not completely re-
ducible to a par tic u lar moment within general social justice debates.
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10.  The importance of this approach is evident in a number of notable 
works, including Herman 1997, Scarry 1987, Summerfi eld 1995, and Orr 2000.
11.  The state may, for example, claim that certain infrastructural im-
provements such as repairing roads or building schools in historically poor 
areas that experienced violence constitute reparations, and many inhabitants 
would certainly welcome these developments. But urban, middle- class vic-
tims will already enjoy access to roads, sanitation, education, and a number of 
other “benefi ts” that they see as the entitlements of citizenship. Indeed, for 
them, material aid should focus more on psychological support. Are the state’s 
economic development efforts, then, really reparations or simply part of citi-
zen rights relabeled through the discourse of victim recognition? See Roht- 
Arriaza 2004 (189).
12.  The goal  here is not, however, to offer a programmatic menu of re-
forms or required policy initiatives. The interested reader should consult the 
overview in the 2006 World Bank report by Samuels.
13.  It includes more than this, of course. In additional to criminal law, 
reform initiatives often tackle commercial law (particularly because economic 
and po liti cal corruption often go hand in hand) and broader constitutional is-
sues, insofar as they concern core human rights protections and the division 
of power among government branches. See, for example, Domingo and Sider 
2001, Menéndez- Carrión and Joignant 1999, and Lawyers Committee for 
 Human Rights 2002.
14.  For a broader account, see Sen 1999.
15.  Also see Laclau 1996 and 1990 and Lefort 1986 (307– 319).
16.  Also see Manin 1987 (338– 345) and Nino 1996 (67– 106).
17.  I realize that much legal theory equates the rule of law in transitional 
settings with prosecutions. Since  here the specifi c issue of prosecutions is a 
few degrees separated from the principle of non- violence and respect for law 
in question, this discussion is better left to the section on accountability.
Chapter 3
1.  To be clear, I mean po liti cal culture in the sense of the broad attitudes 
and values that most of the population has toward the po liti cal system (demo-
cratic, authoritarian, and so on). See Diamond 1995.
2.  Robert Post (1993, 654) has argued that the deliberative model over-
emphasizes unfettered deliberation at the expense of basic procedures of ex-
change. This is a rather unfair characterization, and in order to avoid facing 
the same accusation, I underscore the importance of having some basic 
ground rules for deliberation as the sine qua non of discussion.
3.  In discussing the usefulness of deliberation as a regulative ideal, James 
Johnson (1998, 161– 184) has argued that proponents of deliberative politics 
underplay the extent to which po liti cal actors seek to challenge one another 
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not at the level of reasons, but rather at an existential level. While this may be 
true, and it is certainly more pronounced in transitional settings, Johnson un-
derplays the point made by deliberative theorists, which is normative (as in a 
prescriptive principle) and not necessarily descriptive.
4.  This kind of narrative of rebirth was common in both South Africa, 
where black leaders  were unwilling to delve too deeply into black- on- black 
po liti cal violence during the apartheid regime, and France, where after World 
War II Charles de Gaulle’s government effectively redrew the extent of fascist 
collaboration to include only a few high- level members of the Vichy regime. 
See Golsan 2000 and Paris 2001 (74– 121).
5.  See Hartman 1994 (6). National memory is a fi ckle thing, and debates 
around the Berlin Holocaust memorial show that even its greatest advocates 
can remain insensitive to the present even as they genufl ect over past crimes. 
A memorial always risks serving the interests of the offending group more 
than those of victims, for it may speak directly to a shallow sense of guilt that 
remains narcissistic and indifferent— whether deliberate or not— to survivors 
or their claims to recognition. An anamnestic culture, one that remembers 
rather than forgets the past, is obligated to refl ect not only on its history but 
also on the meaning of solidarity in the present, lest it simply reproduce the 
separation and estrangement of victims through a self- absorbed commemora-
tion of its own culpability. See Moses 2007 (263– 284).
6.  Roy Brooks (1999, 3) has referred to this as “the age of apologies.” Also 
see N. Smith 2008. On transnational apologies, see Gibney and Roxstrom 
2001. On historical injustices, see Barkan 2000.
7.  Undoubtedly, there is no historically uniform Christian understanding 
of the relationship between apology and forgiveness, especially since the Ref-
ormation. Nevertheless, the basic understanding is similar among the major 
divisions. See Albrecht Ristchl’s important (1900) three- volume work, The 
Christian Doctrine of Justifi cation and Reconciliation, especially volume 3. 
Also see Mackintosh 1927 and Lehman 1986 (233). Forgiveness as teshuvah 
(“return”) has a long pedigree in Judaism as well. See Dorff 2001.
8.  Golding discusses how making moral amends speaks directly to the 
resentment held by the victim: “One of the main functions of other- oriented 
regret, in the interpersonal situation, is the negation of the justifi ability of the 
injured party’s resentment” (1984– 1985, 133). Also see Govier and Verwoerd 
2002 (69– 70).
9.  This concern was raised when then- President of Argentina Néstor 
Kirchner apologized for disappearances and torture during the Dirty War, 
and several victims’ groups refused to accept the apology on the grounds that 
to do so would constitute forgiveness and would thus result in a loss of public 
and offi cial attention to the era of military rule.
10.  I thank J. Donald Moon for raising this important point. Also see 
Buruma 1999 (4– 9).
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Chapter 4
1.  On East Timor, see UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
2000. On Sierra Leone, see the Special Court for Sierra Leone Web site at 
 http:// www .sc -sl .org. On Kosovo, see UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo 2001. On Bosnia and Herzegovina, see The Courts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the Bosnia and Herzegovina Web site at  http:// www .sudbih 
.gov .ba/ ?jezik = e. On Cambodia, see Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign 
Legal Experts for the Preparation of the Proceedings for the Trial of Se nior 
Khmer Rouge Leaders on the Cambodia Web site at  http:// www .cambodia .
gov .kh/ krt/ english/ and Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea on the Cambodia Web site at 
 http:// www .pict -pcti .org/ courts/ pdf/ Cambodia/ Cambodia _052203 .pdf. On Iraq, 
see Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal statute on the Iraq Web site at  http:// 
www .ictj .org/ static/ MENA/ Iraq/ iraq .statute .engtrans .pdf; see also Rassi 2006– 
2007, 219– 235). All Web sites accessed September 18, 2008.
2.  Note that this formulation is not meant to defend a positivist notion of 
law, where any determination of what is just is achieved through looking at 
extant law. An adequate response to a violation, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
must be a just response, and morality, and not merely positive law, should in-
form the relationship between crime and punishment. While the normative 
status of accountability was raised in Chapter 2, it bears repeating: Punish-
ment is intimately tied to the respect and autonomy of the victim, for it signals 
that a violation of such respect and autonomy is a moral wrong and should be 
addressed accordingly.
3.  Arendt takes this position to the extreme, arguing for a strong division 
between legal and extralegal issues. While I sympathize with this to an extent, I 
take exception to her strong formulation. She writes, “The purpose of a trial is to 
render justice and nothing  else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes— the mak-
ing of a record of Hitler’s regime which would withstand the test of history— 
can only detract from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges against the 
accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment” (1963, 233).
4.  But see the decisions in Prosecutor v. Krstić 2004 and Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić 2004. For a strong critique of these broader understandings of legal 
culpability, see Nersessian 2001– 2002.
5.  Some of the related technical problems are discussed in Dipardo 2008 
and Bassin 2006.
6.  Specifi cally, they had to show that their crimes  were committed for 
“po liti cal” reasons, not for personal gain or from personal malice. Establishing 
motive proved quite diffi cult in some cases. See the excellent 2007 book by 
Du Bois- Pedain.
7.  The best discussions of truth commissions can be found in Mark Free-
man 2006 and Hayner 2001.
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8.  This can occur even when a report does not completely detail a perpe-
trator’s actions. A dramatic instance is found in the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s fi ndings on former president F. W. de Klerk. By 
means of a last- minute court injunction, he successfully stopped the commis-
sion from publishing its fi ndings on him. The fi nal report includes a section 
devoted to de Klerk with the entire text blacked out. See South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission 1995 (vol. 5, ch. 6, sec. 104).
9.  See, for example, Humphrey 2002.
10.  These issues deal with the effectiveness of restitution. Pablo de Greiff 
(2006) has highlighted a second set of normative issues that consists in how to 
mea sure harm when dealing with individuals: How is compensation assessed 
for the loss of limbs or mental and emotional harms? Should reparations be 
highly individualized or part of a “package” (which minimizes administrative 
costs)? What if the same harm to different people has different effects? Should 
recompense be tailored accordingly? These complex questions have both 
practical and moral consequences.
11.  Precisely how long is an issue for case study, and it cannot be ascer-
tained a priori. In part, it concerns the degree to which the state has suc-
ceeded in convincing the population as a  whole that it is institutionalized and 
permanent and thus not likely to disappear anytime soon.
12.  Victims may also turn to foreign national courts to seek redress. The 
1992 U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act has served as a vehicle to prosecute 
foreigners domestically for violations of “the law of nations,” and this manner 
of tort redress is gaining popularity as universal jurisdiction becomes more 
widely accepted in national jurisprudence. Criminal trials in foreign courts 
are also gaining ac cep tance, even if the support is far from fi rm; Belgium 
sentenced four Rwandans (including two nuns) for their role in genocidal kill-
ings, though its broader “universal jurisdiction” legislation was signifi cantly 
curtailed as a result of U.S. pressure. And the impact of international trials 
(particularly tort cases) on domestic politics is uneven; in some cases, such 
victories have had little impact domestically (Macedo 2006).
Chapter 5
1.  David Crocker (1999, 374– 401) has presented a somewhat similar trip-
tych of civil society in his work, distinguishing between “anti- government,” 
“associational,” and “deliberative.” Since it is more relevant to well- established 
democracies, I do not discuss the most important American contribution to 
the civil society literature, Robert Putnam’s neo- Tocquevillean “associational” 
model (see Putnam 1995 and Edwards and Foley 2001 [1– 16]).
2.  Indeed, deliberation and engagement may promote social learning of 
this sort. See Volkhart 2001 and Vergara 1994.
3.  Obviously, everyone who suffered a human rights violation is a member 
of the group “everyone who was violated.” And this may become a po liti cally 
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salient group if its members, or some of them, or ga nize around that shared 
experience. But at this point, I am simply discussing people who  were in a po-
liti cally or socially recognized group before the violations occurred and where 
that group was targeted as such.
4.  See the Web site of the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
(2009) at  http:// www .dhperu .org/ Index .html .
5.  In Peru, the ombudsperson’s Offi ce of Human Rights also plays an 
important consultative role in restructuring the judiciary.
6.  Their work is available on the Campaign for Good Governance, Sierra 
Leone Web site at  http:// www .slcgg .org/ . Also see Baker 2005.
Chapter 6
1.  I spoke to survivors and others both in Chile and in Bosnia and Herze-
govina about the violence their societies experienced. In Chile, I met with not 
only individuals but also members of a number of groups, including CODEPU, 
Comité ProPaz, Agrupación de Familiares Detenidos Desaparecidos, FASIC, 
and the Fundación Jamie Guzmán. In Bosnia, I met with individuals who 
 were unaffi liated with other groups. These conversations are not meant to re-
fl ect the  whole range of responses or reactions to past experiences, but they do 
reveal various attitudes of victims and others. In the pages that follow, I draw 
on a few of these conversations to elucidate my points: In Chile, I conducted 
interviews with Cristina H. (July 24, 2000), Maria Helena C. (July 15, 2000), 
Juan Carlos L. (August 17, 2000), and Marisela P. (August 3, 2000). In Bosnia, 
I conducted interviews with Mahir P. (July 6, 2007), Suleyman L. (July 6, 
2007), Petar L. (July 5, 2007), and Jasmina I. (July 7, 2007).
2.  Margaret Walker similarly states, “To coerce in any way a person al-
ready harmed or disrespected by a wrong into relinquishing her own need to 
grieve, reproach, and make demands may itself be harmful or disrespectful” 
(2006, 179).
3.  Also see Murphy and Hampton 1988 (18) and Hill 1973.
4.  Charles K. Barton takes this position further: The plea sure that vic-
tims receive from the suffering of the perpetrator is “not morally objection-
able”; rather, it “is most plausibly identifi ed as satisfaction in justice being 
done” (1999, 13).
5.  Indeed, the literature espousing this approach is rather large. The 
classical formulation is given by Bishop Joseph Butler (1971 [1726]), especially 
Sermon VIII, “Upon Resentment,” and Sermon IX, “Upon Forgiveness of In-
juries.” For important modern statements, see Enright and The Human De-
velopment Study Group 1994, Downie 1965, Holmgren 1993, Horsbrugh 
1974, Lewis 1980, and Richards 1988.
6.  It is worth distinguishing this approach from another common one. 
Some liberals, such as Bruce Ackerman (1992), recommend that we avoid 
dealing with interpersonal relations after mass violence. They argue that the 
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better alternative to forgiveness (or even accountability) is social forgetting. 
This strategy may seem superfi cially similar to what I argue; however, my 
 approach emphasizes moral recognition, engagement with the past, and a 
commitment to accountability. Without these, such tolerance is morally im-
poverished. Their approach would bury likely feelings of mistrust and linger-
ing resentment under the rubric of “tolerance.”
7.  Such a gap is often evident in the personal memoirs of survivors; they 
struggle to explain experiences to readers who may have had no direct con-
nection to the violence. See Delbo 1968 and Langer 1991.
8.  Compare, for example, “Part II: Stages of Recovery” in Herman 1997 
with Scarry 1985 (especially chap. 3, “Pain and Imagining”).

❖
Ackerman, Bruce. 1992. The Future of Liberal Revolution. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press.
Alden, Chris. 2001. Mozambique and the Construction of a New State: From 
Negotiations to Nation- Building. New York: Palgrave.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006. The Civil Sphere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006.
Alie, Joe A. D. 2008. “Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition- Based 
Practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone.” In Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Confl ict: Learning from African Experi-
ences. Ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter. Stockholm: Institute for Democ-
racy and Electoral Assistance.
Ambos, Kai. 2007. “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility.” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 1– 25.
Amnesty International. 1995. “Policy Statement on Impunity.” In Transi-
tional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Re-
gimes. Ed. Neil Kritz. Washington, DC: United States Peace Institute, 
3 vols., 1: 219– 221.
———. 1996. “Peru: Amnesty Laws Consolidate Impunity for Human Rights 
Violations.” AI Index: AMR 46/003/1996 (February 23).
———. 2002. “Rwanda: Gacaca: A Question of Justice.” AI Index: AFR 
47/007/2002 (December 17).
Amstutz, Mark. 2005. The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Po-
liti cal Forgiveness. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefi eld.
References
198 ▪ References
Annan, Kofi . 1999. “Seventh Report of the Secretary General on the United 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone.” United Nations doc. S/1999/836, 
para. 1.
Apter, David, ed. 1998. The Legitimization of Violence. New York: New York 
University Press.
Archdiocese of Guatemala City. 1998. “Guatemala: Never Again.” REMHI: 
Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory. Guatemala City, Guate-
mala.
Archdiocese of Saõ Paolo. 1985. Brasil: Nunca Mais. Archdiocese of Saõ 
Paolo: Saõ Paolo, Brazil.
Arendt, Hannah. 1963. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil. New York: Viking.
———. 1989. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1993. “Truth and Politics.” Between Past and Future. New York: Pen-
guin Books.
Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared. 1986. Nunca Más: Re-
port of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Ariko, Charles. 2008. “Ex- LRA men get Amnesty.” The New Vision: Uganda’s 
Leading Website (January 21). Available at  http:// www .newvision .co .ug/ 
D/ 8/ 13/ 607788. Accessed May 25, 2008.
Aristotle. 1984. Nicomachean Ethics. Grinell, IA: Peripatetic Press.
Aron, Raymond. 1967. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. 
New York: Praeger.
Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados y Detenidos- Desaparecidos 
de Perú. 2002. “Análisis de la Situación Judicial en el Perú.” Lima, Perú.
Asociación pro Derechos Humanos. 2009. Available at  http:// www .aprodeh 
.org .pe/ . Accessed February 23, 2009.
Aylwin, Patricio. 1995. “Chile: Statement by President Aylwin on the Report 
of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation.” In Transi-
tional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Re-
gimes. Ed. Neil Kritz. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 171– 172.
Baines, Erin K. 2007. “The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice 
and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda.” International Journal of Tran-
sitional Justice 1, no. 1: 91– 114.
Baker, Bruce. 2005. “Who Do People Turn to for Policing in Sierra Leone?” 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23, no. 3 (September): 371– 390.
Ball, Howard. 1999. Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth 
Century Experience. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
Ballengee, Melissa. 2000. “The Critical Role of Non- Governmental Organiza-
tions in Transitional Justice: A Case Study of Guatemala.” UCLA Journal 
of International Legal and Foreign Affairs 4 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000): 
477– 506.
References ▪ 199
Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. 1997. Human Rights and Demo cratization 
in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
———. 2001. “Truth, Justice, Memory and Demo cratization in the Southern 
Cone.” In The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Demo cratizing 
Societies. Ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González- Enríquez, 
and Paloma Aguilar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 127– 131.
Barahona de Brito, Alexandra, Carmen González- Enríquez, and Paloma 
 Aguilar, eds. 2001. The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Demo-
cratizing Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barkan, Elazar. 2000. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating His-
torical Injustices. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
Bartoli, Andrea. 2001. “Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Mozambican 
Peace Pro cess.” In Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Pol-
icy and Confl ict Transformation. Ed. Raymond C. Helmick and Rodney 
Petersen. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 351– 373.
Barton, Charles K. 1999. Getting Even: Revenge as a Form of Justice. Peru, 
IL: Open Court.
Bass, Gary. 2000. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bassin, Ari S. 2006. “ ‘Dead Men Tell No Tales’: Rule 92 Bis— How the Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals Unnecessarily Silence the Dead.” 
New York University Law Review 81, (November).
Beah, Ishmael. 2008. A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Becarria, Cesare. 1995. On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. “Toward a Deliberative Model of Demo cratic Legiti-
macy.” In Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the 
Po liti cal. Ed. Seyla Benhabib. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
67– 94.
———. 2002. Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Benjamin, Jessica. 1988. The Bonds of Love. New York: Pantheon Books.
———. 1995. “Recognition and Destruction: An Outline of Intersubjectivity.” 
In Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual Differ-
ence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 27– 48
Bentham, Jeremy. 1995. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: 
Prometheus Books.
Bhargava, Rajeev. 2001. “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies.” In Truth 
v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. Ed. Robert Rotberg and 
Dennis Thompson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bird, Colin. 2004. “Status, Identity, Respect.” Po liti cal Theory 32, no. 2 
(April): 207– 232.
200 ▪ References
Boraine, Alex. 2001. “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third 
Way.” In Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. Ed. Rob-
ert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Borneman, John. 1997. Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice and Accountabil-
ity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. n.d. The Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Avail-
able at  http:// www .sudbih .gov .ba/ ?jezik = e. Accessed April 23, 2009.
Botman, Russell H., and Robin Petersen. 1997. To Remember and to Heal: 
Theological and Psychological Refl ections on Truth and Reconciliation. 
Cape Town: Thorold’s Africana Books.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1995. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Bowman, James. 1998. “Sorry about That.” New Criterion (May): 50.
Brilmayer, Lea. 1991. “Secession and Self- Determination: A Territorial Inter-
pretation.” Yale Journal of International Law 16: 177– 202.
Brooks, Roy, ed. 1999. When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy Over 
Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice. New York: New York 
University Press.
Brudholm, Thomas. 2008. Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Améry and the Refusal 
to Forgive. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup. 2000. The War in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ethnic 
Confl ict and International Intervention. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Press.
Burnet, Jennie E. 2008. “The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconcilia-
tion, and Revenge in Rwanda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 3/2 
(August): 173– 194.
Buruma, Ian. 1994. The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and 
Japan. New York: Meridian.
Butler, Bishop Joseph. 1971 [1726]. Fifteen Sermons. London: Cashew Books.
Cambodia. 2004. “Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed Dur-
ing the Period of Demo cratic Kampuchea.” Available at  http:// www .pict -pcti 
.org/ courts/ pdf/ Cambodia/ Cambodia _052203 .pdf. Accessed September 
12, 2008.
———. 2006. “Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts for 
the Preparation of the Proceedings for the Trial of Se nior Khmer Rouge 
Leaders.” Available at  http:// www .cambodia .gov .kh/ krt/ english/ . Accessed 
September 12, 2008.
Campaign for Good Governance of Sierra Leone. 2009. Available at  www 
.slcgg .org/ Programmes .html. Accessed April 15, 2009.
Casarjian, Robin. 1992. Forgiveness: A Bold Choice for a Peaceful Heart. New 
York: Bantam Books.
Cassesse, Antonio. 1998. “Refl ections on International Criminal Justice.” 
Modern Law Review, no. 60: 1– 10.
References ▪ 201
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales. 2009. Available at  www .cels .org .ar. 
Accessed April 26, 2009.
Chakravarti, Sonali. 2008. “More than Cheap Sentimentality: Victim Testi-
mony at Nuremberg, the Eichmann Trial, and Truth Commissions.” 
 Constellations 15/2 (July): 223– 235.
Cohen, Jean. 1999. “American Civil Society Talk.” In Civil Society, Democ-
racy and Civil Renewal. Ed. Robert K. Fullinwider. Lanham, MD: Row-
man and Littlefi eld, 55– 88.
Cohen, Jean, and Andrew Arato. 1992. Civil Society and Po liti cal Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Cohen, Stanley. 2001. States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffer-
ing. London: Polity Press.
Comisión Andina de Juristas. 2009. Available at  http:// www .cajpe .org .pe/ in 
dex .html. Accessed January 1, 2009.
Comisión de Derechos Humanos. 2009. Available at  http:// www .cndhch .org 
.ch. Accessed April 19, 2009.
Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico. 1999. Guatemala: Memoria del 
Silencio. Ciudad de Guatemala: CEH.
Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas. 1984. Nunca Más: 
 Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas. 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria.
Concannon, Brian, Jr. 2001. “Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial.” The In-
ternational Lawyer 35, no. 2 (Summer): 613– 648.
Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos. 2009. Available at  http:// www 
.dhperu .org/ . Accessed January 4, 2009.
Couper, David. 1998. “Forgiveness in the Community: Views From an Epis-
copal Priest and a Former Chief of Police.” In Exploring Forgiveness, Ed. 
Robert D. Enright and Joanna North. Madison, WI: University of Wis-
consin Press, 121– 130.
Crocker, David. 1998. “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society: 
Towards a Normative Framework.” Constellations 5, no. 4: 492– 517.
———. 1999. “Civil Society and Transitional Justice.” In Civil Society, De-
mocracy and Civil Renewal. Ed. Robert K. Fullinwider. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefi eld, 375– 401.
———. 2000. “Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice, and Civil Society.” 
In Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. Ed. Robert Rot-
berg and Dennis Thompson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
99– 121.
Dahl, Robert. 1991. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
Damaska, Mirjan. 2008. “The Henry Morris Lecture: What Is the Point of 
International Justice?” Chicago Kent Law Review 329: 329– 368.
Danner, Allison Marston and Jenny S. Martinez. 2005. “Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development 
202 ▪ References
of International Criminal Law.” California Law Review 93 (January): 77– 
170.
Darwall, Stephen. 1977. “Two Kinds of Respect.” Ethics 88, no. 1 (October): 
36– 49.
Das, Veena. 1997. “Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of 
Pain.” In Social Suffering. Ed. Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das, and Marga-
ret Lock. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Dawson, John. 2001. “Hatred’s End: A Christian Proposal to Peace Making 
in a New Century.” In Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public 
Policy and Confl ict Transformation. Ed. Raymond C. Helmick and Rod-
ney Petersen. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 67– 92.
De Greiff, Pablo. 2006. “Justice and Reparations.” In The Handbook of 
 Reparations. Ed. Pablo De Greiff. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 451– 477.
Delbo, Charlotte. 1968. None of Us Will Return. Boston: Beacon Press.
Dembour, Marie- Benedicte, and Emily Haslam. 2004. “Silencing Hearings? 
Victim- Witnesses at War Crimes Trials.” Eu ro pe an Journal of Interna-
tional Law 15, no. 1: 151– 177.
Derrida, Jacques. 2001. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: 
Routledge.
DeVito, Daniela. 2008. “Rape as Genocide: The Group/Individual Schism.” 
Human Rights Review 9, no. 3 (September): 361– 387.
Diamond, Larry. 1995. Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and In-
struments, Issues and Imperatives. Washington, DC: Carnegie Commis-
sion on Preventing Deadly Confl ict.
———. 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University.
Digeser, Peter E. 2001. Po liti cal Forgiveness. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.
Dipardo, Elizabeth. 2008. “Caught in a Web of Lies: Use of Prior Inconsistent 
Statements to Impeach Witnesses Before the ICTY.” Boston College In-
ternational and Comparative Law Review 277: 277– 302.
Domingo, Pilar, and Rachel Sider, eds. 2001. The Rule of Law in Latin Amer-
ica: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform. London: University 
of London, Institute of Latin American Studies.
Dominguez Charneo, and Margaret Lilian. 1998. “La Importancia de la So-
ciedad Civil para la Transformación Democrática en el Perú.” Análisis 4: 
23– 34.
Dorff, Elliot. 2001. “The Elements of Forgiveness: A Jewish Approach.” In 
Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological Research and Theological For-
giveness. Ed. Everett L. Worthington, Jr. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton 
Foundation Press, 29– 55.
Douglas, Lawrence. 2001. The Memory of Judgment. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
References ▪ 203
Downie, R. S. 1965. “Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly 15: 128– 134.
Drumbl, Mark. 2007. Atrocity, Punishment and International Law. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dryzek, John. 2005. “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives 
to Agonism and Analgesia.” Po liti cal Theory 33, no. 2 (April): 218– 242.
Du Bois- Pedain, Antje. 2007. Transitional Amnesty in South Africa. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dugard, John. 1997. “Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South 
African Model.” In Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New De-
mocracies. Ed. James McAdams. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Univer-
sity Press, 269– 290.
Edwards, Bob, and Michael Foley. 2001. “Civil Society and Social Capital.” In 
Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective. 
Ed. Bob Edwards, Michael Foley, and Mario Diani. Hanover, NH: Uni-
versity Press of New En gland, 1– 16.
Ehrenberg, John. 1999. Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New 
York: New York University Press.
Elster, Jon. 2004. Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical 
 Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
En gland, Harri. 2002. From War to Peace on the Mozambique- Malawi Bor-
derland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Enright, Robert D., Suzanne Freedman, and Julio Rique. 1998. “The Psychol-
ogy of Interpersonal Forgiveness.” In Exploring Forgiveness. Ed. Robert 
D. Enright and Joanna North. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
46– 62.
Enright, Robert D., and The Human Development Study Group. 1994. “Piaget 
on the Moral Development of Forgiveness: Reciprocity or Identify?” Hu-
man Development 37: 63– 80.
 Etcheson, Craig. 2005. After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian 
Genocide. Westport, CT.: Praeger.
Fletcher, George. 2001. Rethinking Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Fletcher, Laurel, and Harvey Weinstein. 2002. “Violence and Social Repair: 
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation.” Human Rights 
Quarterly 24, no. 3: 586– 591.
Fraser, Nancy. 1997. Justice Interruptus: Critical Refl ections on the “Postso-
cialist” Condition. New York: Routledge.
———. 2000. “Rethinking Recognition.” New Left Review 3: 107– 120.
———. 2001. “Recognition without Ethics?” Theory, Culture and Society 18, 
no. 2– 3: 21– 42.
———. 2003. “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, 
Recognition and Participation.” In Redistribution or Recognition? A 
Political- Philosophical Exchange. Ed. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. 
New York: Verso, 7– 109.
204 ▪ References
Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2003. “Introduction.” In Redistribution or 
Recognition? A Political- Philosophical Exchange. Ed. Nancy Fraser and 
Axel Honneth. New York: Verso, 1– 6.
Freeman, Mark. 2002. “Lessons Learned from Amnesties for Human Rights 
Crimes.” The 3rd Page: The Journal of Transparency International X, no. 9: 
12– 13.
———. 2006. Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Fuller, Lon. 1958. “Positivism and Fidelity to Law— A Reply to Professor 
Hart.” Harvard Law Review 71: 630– 670.
Fullinwider, Robert K., ed. 1999. Civil Society, Democracy and Civil Re-
newal. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefi eld.
Gagnon, Valére Philip. 2005. The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in 
the 1990s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1992. “Fear in Military Regimes: An Overview.” 
In Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Re sis tance in Latin America. Ed. 
Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 13– 25.
Gellately, Robert. 2001. Backing Hitler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibney, Mark, and Erik Roxstrom. 2001. “The Status of State Apologies.” Hu-
man Rights Quarterly 23: 911– 939.
Gibson, James L. 2004. Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Di-
vided Nation? New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Gill, Graeme. 2000. The Dynamics of Demo cratization: Elites, Civil Society 
and the Transition Pro cess. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Giner- Sorolla, Roger, Emanuele Castano, Pablo Espinosa, and Rupert Brown. 
2008. “Shame Expressions Reduce the Recipient’s Insult from Outgroup 
Reparations.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44: 519– 526.
Glover, Jonathan. 1970. Responsibility. London: Routledge.
Goffman, Erving. 1971. Relations in Public. London: Allen Lane Press.
Golding, Martin. 1985. “Forgiveness and Regret.” Philosophical Forum 16: 
1984– 1985.
Golsan, Richard A. 2000. Vichy’s Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in 
Postwar France. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.
Goodin, Robert. 1989. “Theories of Compensation.” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 9: 56– 79.
Govier, Trudy. 2002. Forgiveness and Revenge. London: Routledge.
Govier, Trudy, and Wilhelm Verwoerd. 2002. “The Promises and Pitfalls of 
Apology.” Journal of Social Philosophy 33, no. 1: 67– 82.
Graybill, Lyn. 2001. “To Punish or Pardon: A Comparison of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.” Human Rights Review 2, no. 4 (July– 
September 2001): 3– 18.
References ▪ 205
Gross, Jan T. 2001. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in 
Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2006. Fear: Anti- Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz. New York: 
Random  House.
Gulu District NGO Forum. 2009. Available at  http:// www .ugandafund .org/ 
Empowering _Gulu _NGO .htm. Accessed April 24, 2009.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Dis-
course Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory. Chicago: Chicago Univer-
sity Press.
Hampshire, Stuart. 1989. Innocence and Experience. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Hampton, Jean. 1994. “Democracy and the Rule of Law.” NOMOS XXXVI: 
The Rule of Law. Ed. Ian Shapiro. New York: New York University Press, 
13– 45.
Harneit- Sievers, Axel, and Sydney Emezue. 2000. “Towards a Social History 
of Warfare and Reconstruction: The Nigerian/Biafran Case.” In The Poli-
tics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice. Ed. Ifi  Amadiume and 
Abdullah An- Na’im. London: Zed Books, 110– 126.
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus. 1958. “Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals.” Harvard Law Review 71: 593– 629.
Hartman, Geoffrey. 1994. “Introduction: Darkness Visible.” In Holocaust 
 Remembrance: The Shape of Memory. Ed. Geoffrey Hartman. Oxford: 
Blackwell Press, 1– 22.
Harvey, Jean. 1995. “The Emerging Practice of Institutional Apologies.” Inter-
national Journal of Applied Philosophy 9, no. 2 (Winter/Spring): 57– 65.
Hatzfeld, Jean. 2008. Life Laid Bare: The Survivors of Rwanda Speak. Lon-
don: Other Press.
Hayner, Priscilla. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and 
Atrocity: How Truth Commissions Around the World are Challenging 
the Past and Shaping the Future. New York: Routledge.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1967. Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Helmick, Raymond C. 2008. “Seeing the Image of God in Others: The Key 
to the Transformation of Confl icts.” Human Development 29, no. 2 
 (Summer): 24– 29.
Herman, Judith. 1997. Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence: 
From Domestic Abuse to Po liti cal Terror. New York: Basic Books.
Hilberg, Raul. 1993. Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastro-
phe 1933- 1945. New York: Harper Perennial.
Hill, Thomas E. 1973. “Servility and Self Respect.” The Monist 57 (January): 
87– 104.
206 ▪ References
Him, Chanrithy. 2000. When Broken Glass Floats: Growing Up Under the 
Khmer Rouge, A Memoir. New York: Norton.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in 
Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Hodgkinson, Virginia, and Michael Foley, eds. 2003. The Civil Society Reader. 
Lebanon, NH: University Press of New En gland.
Holmgren, Margaret. 1993. “Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 4 (October): 341– 352.
Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social 
and Po liti cal Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
———. 1996. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Confl icts. Cambridge, MA: Masssachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Horsbrugh, H. J. N. 1974. “Forgiveness.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4: 
269– 289.
Human Rights Watch. 1995. “Policy Statement on Accountability for Past 
Abuses.” In Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon 
with Former Regimes. Ed. Neil Kritz. Washington, DC: United States 
Peace Institute, 3 vols., 1: 217– 218.
———. 2006. “Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure That Atrocities Go 
Unpunished” (March 1). Available at  http:// www .hrw .org/ english/ docs/ 
2006/ 03/ 01/ algeri12743 .htm. Accessed May 23, 2008.
———. 2008. “Zimbabwe: End Crackdown on Peaceful Demonstrators” 
(October 18). Human Rights Watch News. Available at  http:// www. 
hrw .org/ en/ news/ 2008/ 10/ 28/ zimbabwe -end -crackdown -peaceful -
demon strators. Accessed December 25, 2008.
Humphrey, Michael. 2002. The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From 
Terror to Trauma. London: Routledge.
Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The Third Wave: Demo cratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Huyse, Luc. 2008. “Tradition- Based Approaches in Peacemaking, Transitional 
Justice and Reconciliation Policies.” In Traditional Justice and Reconcili-
ation after Violent Confl ict: Learning from African Experiences. Ed. Luc 
Huyse and Mark Salter. Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Elec-
toral Assistance, 1– 21.
Ignatieff, Michael. 1996. “Articles of Faith.” Index on Censorship 25, no. 5: 
110– 122.
———. 1998. The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. 
New York: Owl Books.
Igreja, Victor, and Beatrice Dias- Lambranca. 2008. “Restorative Justice and 
the Role of Magamba Spirits in Post- civil War Gorongosa, Central Mo-
zambique.” In Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Con-
fl ict: Learning from African Experiences. Ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter. 
Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 61– 83.
References ▪ 207
Ikpeze, Nnaemeka. 2000. “Post- Biafran Marginalization of the Igbo in Nige-
ria.” In The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice. Ed. Ifi  
Amadiume and Abdullah An- Na’im. London: Zed Books, 90– 109.
Ingelaere, Bert. 2008. “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda.” In Traditional Jus-
tice and Reconciliation after Violent Confl ict: Learning from African 
Experiences. Ed. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter. Stockholm: Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 51– 57.
Iraq. n.d. “Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Statute.” Available at  http:// www 
.ictj .org/ static/ MENA/ Iraq/ iraq .statute .engtrans .pdf. Accessed Septem-
ber 12, 2008.
Jaspers, Karl. 1961. The Question of German Guilt. New York: Capricorn 
Books.
Johnson, Eric A. 1999. Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary 
 Germans. New York: Basic Books.
Johnson, James. 1998. “Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Consider-
ations.” In Deliberative Democracy. Ed. Jon Elster. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 161– 184.
Johnston, Douglas, and Cynthia Sampson, eds. 1994. Religion: The Missing 
Dimension of Statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press.
Joinet, Louis. 1997. “Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Hu-
man Rights through Action to Combat Impunity” (October 2). UN docu-
ment E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20. United Nations. Available at  http:// www 
.unhchr .ch/ huridocda/ huridoca .nsf/ Symbol/ E .CN .4 .sub .2 .1997 .20. Accessed 
September 23, 2008.
Jones, Adam. 2006a.“Why Gendercide? Why Root and Branch? A Compari-
son of the Vendée Uprising of 1793– 94 and the Bosnian War of the 
1990s.” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 1 (March): 9– 25.
———. 2006b. “Straight as a Rule.” Men and Masculinities 8, no. 4 (April): 
451– 469.
Jung, Courtney. 2000. Then I Was Black: South African Po liti cal Identities in 
Transition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
———. 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Keane, John, ed. 1988. Civil Society and the State. London: Verso.
Kelsall, Tim. 2005. “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Refl ections on the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone.” Human Rights Quar-
terly 27: 361– 391.
Kelsen, Hans. 1947. “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute 
a Pre ce dent in International Law?” International Law Quarterly 1: 153– 
159.
Kiernan, Ben. 2007. Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Exter-
mination from Sparta to Darfur. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
208 ▪ References
Kirchheimer, Otto. 1961. Po liti cal Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Po-
liti cal Ends. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Kirkby, Coel. 2006. “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique.” Jour-
nal of African Law 50: 94– 117.
Kiss, Elizabeth. 2001. “Moral Ambition within and Beyond Po liti cal Con-
straints.” In Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions. Ed. 
Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 68– 98.
Kleinfeld Belton, Rachel. 2005. “Competing Defi nitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners.” Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Car-
negie Papers, Rule of Law Series. New York: Carnegie Council.
Korsgaard, Christine.1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kritz, Neil, ed. 1995. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington, DC: United States Peace In-
stitute, 3 vols.
Krog, Antjie. 1998. Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of 
Forgiveness in the New South Africa. New York: Random  House.
Kuper, Leo. 1981. Genocide. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. “Theory, Democracy and Socialism.” In New Refl ec-
tions on the Revolution of Our Time. New York: Verso.
———. 1996. Emancipation(s). New York: Verso.
Lahav, Pnina. 1992. “The Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Question, and the 
American- Jewish Intelligentsia.” Boston University Law Review 72: 559– 
561.
Langer, Lawrence. 1991. Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 2002. “Building on Quicksand: The 
Collapse of the World Bank’s Judicial Reform Project in Peru.” New York: 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
Lederach, John Paul. 1999. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Lefort, Claude. 1986. The Po liti cal Forms of Modern Society. Cambridge, 
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Lehman, Paul. 1986. “Forgiveness.” In The Westminster Dictionary of Chris-
tian Ethics. Ed. James Childress and John Macquerrie. Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster Press.
Lehning, Percy B., ed. 1998. Theories of Secession. London: Routledge.
Leo, John. 1997. “So Who’s Sorry Now?” U.S. News and World Report (June 
30): 17.
Lester, I. 2000. Comisiones de la Verdad y Reconciliación Nacional. Santi-
ago, Chile: Esperanza.
Levine, Robert A., and Donald Campbell. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of 
Confl ict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior. New York: Wiley Press.
References ▪ 209
Lewis, Clive Staples. 1957. The Problem of Pain. London: Fontana Books.
Lewis, Michael. 1980. “On Forgiveness.” Philosophical Quarterly 30: 236– 
245.
Lifton, Robert Jay. 1991. Death In Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.
Linden, Ian. 1994. “The Right to Truth: Amnesty, Amnesia and Secrecy.” De-
velopment in Practice 4, no. 2: 16– 28.
Linz, Juan. 1978. The Breakdown of Demo cratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown 
and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Demo cratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Eu rope, South America, and Post- Communist 
Eu rope. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
Lira, Elisabeth. 1997. “Guatemala: Uncovering the Past, Recovering the Fu-
ture.” Development in Practice 7, no. 4: 54– 64.
Llewellyn, Jennifer. 1999. “Justice for South Africa: Restorative Justice and 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” In Moral Is-
sues in Global Perspective. Ed. Christine Koggel. Peterborough, Ontario: 
Broadview, 96– 107.
Locke, John. 1983. A Letter Concerning Toleration. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Lomasky, Loren. 1991. “Compensation and the Bounds of Rights.” In NOMOS 
XXXIII: Compensatory Justice. Ed. John Chapman. New York: New York 
University Press, 13– 44.
Loveman, Brian, and Elizabeth Lira. 2000. Las Ardientes Cenizas del Olvido: 
Vía Chilena de la Reconciliación Política 1932– 1994. Santiago, Chile: 
LOM Ediciones.
Macedo, Stephen, ed. 2006. Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the 
Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Mackintosh, L.R. 1927. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness. London: n.p.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1998. “When Does a Settler Become a Native?” Elec-
tronic Mail and Guardian (May 26). Available at  www .mg .co .za/ mg/ za/ 
links/ africa/ DRC -all .html. Accessed April 27, 2009.
Mani, Rama. 2002. Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of 
War. London: Polity Press.
Manin, Bernard. 1987. “On Legitimacy and Po liti cal Deliberation.” Po liti cal 
Theory 15, no. 3 (August): 338– 368.
Manning, Carrie. 2002. The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post Confl ict 
Demo cratization. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Martínez, Javier. 1992. “Fear of the State, Fear of Society: On the Opposition 
Protests in Chile.” In Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Re sis tance in 
Latin America. Ed. Juan Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel An-
tonio Garretón. Berkeley: University of California Press, 142– 160.
Marty, Martin. 1998. “The Ethos of Christian Forgiveness.” In Dimensions 
of Forgiveness: Psychological Research and Theological Forgiveness. 
210 ▪ References
Ed. Everett L. Worthington, Jr. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Foundation 
Press, 9– 28.
Mason, T. David, and James D. Meernik, eds. 2006. Confl ict Prevention and 
Peace Building in Post- War Societies. London: Routledge.
McAdams, James A., ed. 2001. Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in 
New Democracies. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Meier, Charles. 1988. The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and Ger-
man National Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Méndez, Juan. 1997. “Derecho a la Verdad frente a Graves Violaciones a los 
Derechos Humanos.” In La Aplicación de los Tratados sobre los Derechos 
Humanos por los Tribunales Locales. Ed. Martín Abregú and Cristián 
Courtis. Buenos Aires: Editorial Del Puerto- CELS, 517– 540.
———, ed. 1999. The (Un)rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin 
America. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.
Mendus, Susan. 1998. Justifying Tolerance: Conceptual and Historical Per-
spectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———, ed. 1999. The Politics of Toleration. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press.
Menéndez- Carrión, Amparo, and Alfred Joignant, eds. 1999. La Caja de Pan-
dora: El Retorno de la Transición Chilena. Santiago, Chile: Planeta/Ariel.
Merwin, William. 1970. “Unchopping a Tree.” In The Miner’s Pale Children. 
New York: Atheneum Books, 80– 88.
Michnik, Adam. 1985. Letters from Prison and Other Essays. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California.
Miller, Donald, and Lorna Touryan Miller. 1999. Survivors: An Oral History 
of the Armenian Genocide. Berkeley: University of California.
Minear, Richard. 2001. Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan.
Minow, Martha. 1998. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History 
After Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston: Beacon Press.
Moon, Claire. 2008. Narrating Po liti cal Reconciliation: South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Moses, A. Dirk. 2007. German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Mosse, George. 1991. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World 
Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mouffe, Chantal. 1997. The Return of the Po liti cal. New York: Verso.
Moulian, Tomás. 1998. Chile Actual: Anatomía de un Mito. Santiago, Chile: 
LOM ARCIS.
Muller- Fahrenholz, Geiko. 1997. The Art of Forgiveness: Theological Refl ec-
tions on Healing and Reconciliation. Geneva: WCC Publications.
Murphy, Jeffrie. 1995. “Getting Even: The Role of the Victim.” In Punishment 
and Rehabilitation. Ed. Jeffrie Murphy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 132– 
152.
References ▪ 211
Murphy, Jeffrie, and Jean Hampton. 1988. Forgiveness and Mercy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Narayan, Uma. 1998. “Forgiveness, Moral Reassessment and Reconciliation.” 
In Explorations of Value. Ed. Thomas Magnell. Atlanta: Rodopi Press, 
169– 178.
Nehushtan, Yossi. 2007. “The Limits of Tolerance: A Substantive- Liberal Per-
spective.” Ratio Juris 20/2 (June): 230– 257.
Neier, Aryeh. 1998. War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Strug-
gle for Justice. New York: Times Books.
Nersessian David L. 2002. “The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Ju-
risprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals.” Texas Interna-
tional Law Journal, 35– 60.
Nesiah, Vasuki. 2006. “Truth v. Justice?: Commissions and Courts.” In Hu-
man Rights and Confl ict: Exploring the Links between Rights, Law and 
Peacebuilding. Ed. Julie Mertus and Jeffrey W. Helsing. Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 375– 397.
Newey, Glen. 1999. Virtue, Reason and Tolerance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press.
Nietz sche, Friedrich. 1989. On the Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage 
Books.
———. 1997. “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” Untimely 
Meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 57– 124.
Nino, Carlos Santiago. 1996. The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Nobles, Melissa. 2008. The Politics of Offi cial Apologies. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Nora, Pierre, ed. 1996. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1997. A Different Kind of War Story: Ethnography of 
Po liti cal Violence. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
North, Joanna. 1998. “The ‘Ideal’ of Forgiveness: A Phi los o pher’s Explora-
tion.” In Exploring Forgiveness. Ed. Robert D. Enright and Joanna North. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 15– 34.
Norval, Aletta. 1998. “Memory, Identity and the (Im)possibility of Reconcilia-
tion: The Work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa.” Constellations 5, no. 2: 250– 265.
Nossack, Hans Erich. 2004. The End: Hamburg 1943. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
———. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Nyatagodien, Ridwan Laher, and Arthur Neal. 2004. “Collective Trauma, 
Apologies and the Politics of Memory.” Journal of Human Rights 3, no. 4 
(December): 465– 475.
212 ▪ References
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Phillipe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 
1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University, 4 vols.
Ojera Latigo, James. 2008. “Northern Uganda: Tradition- Based Practices in 
the Acholi Region.” In Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Vio-
lent Confl ict: Learning from African Experiences. Ed. Luc Huyse and 
Mark Salter. Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance, 85– 122.
Okin, Susan. 1999. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: 
 Princeton University Press.
Orentlicher, Diane. 1990. “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Hu-
man Rights Violations of a Prior Regime.” Yale Law Journal 100: 2537– 
2614.
Orr, Wendy. 2000. “Reparation Delayed Is Healing Retarded.” In Looking 
Back, Reaching Forward: Refl ections on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa. Ed. Charles Villa- Vicencio and Wilhelm 
Verwoerd. London: Zed Books, 34– 60.
Osiel, Mark. 1997. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Paris, Erna. 2001. Long Shadows: Truth, Lies and History. New York: 
Bloomsbury.
Parliament of Australia, Senate Legal and Constitutional References Commit-
tee. 2000. Healing: A Legacy of Generations: The Report into the Federal 
Government’s Implementation of the Recommendations Made by the 
Human Rights and Equal Commission in Bringing Them Home (Novem-
ber). Sydney: Government of Australia.
Perelli, Carina. 1992. “Youth, Politics and Dictatorship in Uruguay.” In Fear 
at the Edge: State Terror and Re sis tance in Latin America. Ed. Juan Cor-
radi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 212– 235.
Perkumpulan Hak. 2008. “The Hak Association Timor- Leste.” Available 
at  http:// www .yayasanhak .minihub .org/ eng. Accessed September 12, 
2008.
Peru. 1995. “Ley N°26479(7).” El Peruano (June 14). Lima, Peru.
———. 2003. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru. Final Report.” 
Available at  www .cverdad .org .pe. Accessed January 12, 2009.
Petersen, Rodney L. 2001. “A Theology of Forgiveness: Terminology, Rheto-
ric, and the Dialectic of Interfaith Relationships.” In Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy and Confl ict Transformation. Ed. 
Raymond C. Helmick and Rodney Petersen. Philadelphia, PA: Templeton 
Foundation Press, 175– 196.
Philip, Mark. 2008. “Peacebuilding and Corruption.” International Peace-
keeping 15, no. 3 (June): 310– 327.
References ▪ 213
Plunkett, Mark. 1998. “Reestablishing Law and Order in Peace- Maintenance.” 
Global Governance 4, no. 1: 63– 82.
Polonsky, Antony, and Joanna Michlic, eds. 2004. The Neighbors Respond: 
The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Post, Robert. 1993. “Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Demo cratic 
Dialogue.” Ethics 103, no. 4 (July): 654– 678.
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